Search results matching tags 'Geopolitics' and 'Greece'

Europe: The State of the Banking System

JohnMauldin — Thu, 08 Jul 2010 13:55:00 GMT

We're bombarded with information from the minute we wake up until the second we fall asleep. I was watching a news network last night for 45 minutes and the exact stories started coming back around. Nothing new to report, but the same topics on repeat, with the rare nominal development.

When I need something different (and relevant to me), I go to STRATFOR.com. They provide deep insight and explanation of events the networks can't begin to tackle. Today I'm including an extensive article on the banking situation in Europe. Enjoy, and sign up for their free email list to receive weekly reports and special offers.

John Mauldin
Editor, Outside the Box

Europe: The State of the Banking System

July 1, 2010 | 1245 GMT

PATRIK STOLLARZ/AFP/Getty Images
The European Central Bank in Frankfurt, Germany

Summary

In the last six months, the eurozone has faced its biggest economic challenge to date — one sparked by the Greek debt crisis which has migrated to the rest of the monetary union. But well before the sovereign debt crisis, Europe was facing a full-blown banking crisis that did not seem any closer to being resolved than when it began in late 2008. With investors and markets focused on European governments' debt problems, the banking issues have largely been ignored. However, the sovereign debt crisis and banking crisis have become intertwined and could feed off each other in the near future.

Analysis

July 1 is a milestone for eurozone banks, with 442 billion euros ($541 billion) worth of European Central Bank (ECB) loans coming due. The loans were part of the ECB's one-year liquidity offering made in 2009, which was intended to help stabilize the banking system.

However, one year after the ECB provision was initially offered, the eurozone's banks are still struggling, and now Europe's banks must collectively come up with the cash roughly equivalent to Poland's gross domestic product (GDP).

Fears regarding the potentially adverse consequences of removing ECB liquidity are gripping many European banks and, by extension, investors who were already panicked by the sovereign debt crisis in the Club Med countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy). These concerns are as much a testament to the severity of the eurozone's ongoing banking crisis as to the lack of resolve that has characterized Europe's handling of the underlying problems.

Origins of Europe's Banking Problems

Europe's banking problems precede the eurozone's ongoing sovereign debt crisis and even exposure to the U.S. subprime mortgage imbroglio. The European banking crisis has its origins in two fundamental factors: euro adoption in 1999 and the general global credit expansion that began in the early 2000s. The combination of the two created an environment that inflated credit bubbles across the Continent, which were then grafted onto the European banking sector's structural problems.

In terms of specific pre-2008 problems we can point to five major factors. Not all the factors affected European economies uniformly, but all contributed to the overall weakness of the Continent's banking sector.

1. Euro Adoption and Europe's Local Subprime Bubble

The adoption of the euro — in fact, the very process of preparing to adopt the euro that began in the early 1990s with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty — effectively created a credit bubble in the eurozone. As the adjacent graph indicates, the cost of borrowing in peripheral European countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece in particular) was greatly reduced due, in part, to the implied guarantee that once they joined the eurozone their debt would be as solid as Germany's government debt.

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In essence, euro adoption allowed countries like Spain access to credit at lower rates than their economies could ever justify based on their own fundamentals. This eventually created a number of housing bubbles across Europe, but particularly in Spain and Ireland (the two eurozone economies currently boasting the relatively highest levels of private-sector indebtedness). As an example, in 2006 there were more than 700,000 new homes built in Spain — more than the total new homes built in Germany, France and the United Kingdom combined, even though the United Kingdom was experiencing a housing bubble of its own at the time.

It could be argued that the Spanish case was particularly egregious because Madrid attempted to use access to cheap housing as a way to integrate its large pool of first-generation Latin American migrant workers into Spanish society. However, the very fact that Spain felt confident enough to attempt such wide-scale social engineering indicates just how far peripheral European countries felt they could stretch their use of cheap euro loans. Spain is today feeling the pain of a collapsed construction sector, with unemployment approaching 20 percent and with the Spanish cajas (regional savings banks) reeling from their holdings of 58.9 percent of the country's mortgage market. The real estate and construction sectors' outstanding debt is equal to roughly 45 percent of the country's GDP.

2. Europe's 'Carry Trade'

"Carry trade" usually refers to the practice in which loans are taken in a low interest rate country with a stable currency and "carried" for investment in the government debt of a high interest rate economy. The European practice, which extended the concept to consumer and mortgage loans, was championed by the Austrian banks that had experience with the method due to their proximity to the traditionally low interest rate economy of Switzerland.

In the carry trade, the loans extended to consumers and businesses are linked to the currency of the country where the low interest loan originates. Because of this, Swiss francs and euros served as the basis for most of such lending across Europe. Loans in these currencies were then extended as low interest rate mortgages and other consumer and corporate loans in higher interest rate economies in Central and Eastern Europe. Since loans were denominated in foreign currency, when their local currency depreciated against the Swiss franc or euro, the real financial burden of the loan increased.

This created conditions for a potential economic maelstrom at the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 when consumers in Central and Eastern Europe saw their monthly mortgage payments grow as investors pulled out from emerging markets in order to "flee to safety," leading these countries' domestic currencies to fall. The problem was particularly dire for Central and Eastern European countries with a great amount of exposure to such foreign currency lending (see adjacent table).

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3. Crisis in Central/Eastern Europe

The carry trade led Europe's banks to be overexposed to Central and Eastern European economies. As the European Union enlarged into the former Communist sphere in Central Europe, and as security and political uncertainties in the Balkans subsided in the early 2000s, European banks sought new markets where they could make use of their expanded access to credit provided by euro adoption. Banking institutions in mid-level financial powers such as Sweden, Austria, Italy and even Greece sought to capitalize on the carry trade by going into markets that their larger French, German, British and Swiss rivals largely shunned.

This, however, created problems for the banking systems that became overexposed to Central and Eastern Europe. The International Monetary Fund and the European Union ended up having to bail out several countries in the region, including Romania, Hungary, Latvia and Serbia. And before the eurozone ever contemplated a Greek or eurozone bailout, it was discussing a potential 150 billion-euro rescue fund for Central and Eastern Europe at the urging of the Austrian and Italian governments.

4. Exposure to 'Toxic Assets'

The exposure to various credit bubbles ultimately left Europe vulnerable to the financial crisis, which peaked with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. But the outright exposure to various financial derivatives, including the U.S. subprime market, was by itself considerable.

While the Swedish, Italian, Austrian and Greek banking systems expanded into the new markets in Central and Eastern Europe, the established financial centers of France, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom dabbled in various derivatives markets. This was particularly the case for the German banking system, where the Landesbanken — banks with strong ties to regional governments — faced chronically low profit margins caused by a fragmented banking system of more than 2,000 banks and a tepid domestic retail banking market. The Landesbanken on their own face between 350 billion and 500 billion euros worth of toxic assets — a considerable figure for the 2.5 trillion-euro German economy — and could be responsible for nearly half of all outstanding toxic assets in Europe.

5. Demographic Decline

Another problem for Europe is that its long-term outlook for consumption, particularly in the housing sector, is dampened by the underlying demographic factors. Europe's birth rate is at 1.53, well below the population "replacement rate" of 2.1. Exacerbating the demographic imbalance is the increasing life expectancy across the region, which results in an older population. The average European age is already 40.9, and is expected to hit 44.5 by 2030.

An older population does not purchase starter homes or appliances to outfit those homes. And if older citizens do make such purchases, they are less likely to depend as much on bank lending as first-time homebuyers. That means not just less demand, but that any demand will depend less upon banks, which means less profitability for financial institutions. Generally speaking, an older population will also increase the burden on taxpayers in Europe to support social welfare systems, dampening consumption further.

In this environment, housing prices will continue to decline (barring another credit bubble, which would of course exacerbate problems). This will further restrict lending activities because banks will be wary of granting loans for assets that they know will become less valuable over time. At the very least, banks will demand much higher interest rates for these loans, but that too will further dampen the demand.

The Geopolitics of Europe's Banking System

Given these challenges, the European banking system was less than rock-solid even before the onset of the global recession in 2008. However, Europe's response as a Continent to the crisis so far has been muted, with essentially every country looking to fend for itself. Therefore, at the heart of Europe's banking problems lie geopolitics and "capital nationalism."

Europe's geography encourages both political stratification and unity in trade and communications. The numerous peninsulas, mountain chains and large islands all allow political entities to persist against stronger rivals and continental unification efforts, giving Europe the highest global ratio of independent nations to area. Meanwhile, the navigable rivers, inland seas (Black, Mediterranean and Baltic), Atlantic Ocean and the North European Plain facilitate the exchange of ideas, trade and technologies among the disparate political actors.

This has, over time, incubated a continent full of sovereign nations that intimately interact with one another but are impossible to unite politically. Furthermore, in terms of capital flows, European geography has engendered a stratification of capital centers. Each capital center essentially dominates a particular river valley where it can use its access to a key transportation route to accumulate capital. These capital centers are then mobilized by the proximate political powers for the purposes of supporting national geopolitical imperatives, so Viennese bankers fund the Austro-Hungarian Empire, for example, while Rhineland bankers fund the German Empire. With no political unity, the stratification of capital centers becomes more solidified over time.

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The European Union's common market rules stipulate the free movement of capital across the borders of its 27 member states. Theoretically, with barriers to capital movement removed, the disparate nature of Europe's capital centers should wane; French banks should be active in Germany, and German banks should be active in Spain. However, control of financial institutions is one of the most jealously guarded privileges of national sovereignty in Europe.

One reason for this "capital nationalism" is that Europe's corporations and businesses are far less dependent on the stock and bond market for funding than their U.S. counterparts, relying primarily on banks. This comes from close links between Europe's state champions in industry and finance (for example, the close historical links between German industrial heavyweights and Deutsche Bank). Such links, largely frowned upon in the United States for most of its history, were seen as necessary by Europe's nation-states in the late 19th and early 20th centuries because of the need to compete with industries in neighboring states. European states in fact encouraged — in some ways even mandated — banks and corporations to work together for political and social purposes of competing with other European states and providing employment. This also goes for Europe's medium-sized businesses — Germany's mid-sized businesses are a prime example — which often rely on regional banks they have political and personal relationships with.

Regional banks are an issue unto themselves. Many European economies have a special banking sector dedicated to regional banks owned or backed by regional governments, such as the German Landesbanken or the Spanish cajas which in many ways are used as captive firms to serve the needs of both the local governments (at best) and local politicians (at worst). Many Landesbanken actually have regional politicians sitting on their boards while the Spanish cajas have a mandate to reinvest around half of their annual profits in local social projects, tempting local politicians to control how and when funds are used.

Europe's banking architecture was therefore wholly unprepared to deal with the severe financial crisis that hit in September 2008. With each banking system tightly integrated into the political economy of each EU member state, an EU-wide "solution" to Europe's banking problems — let alone the structural issues, of which the banking problems are merely symptomatic — has largely evaded the Continent. While the European Union has made progress in enhancing EU-wide regulatory mechanisms by drawing up legislation to set up micro- and macro-prudential institutions (with the latest proposal still in the implementation stages), the fact remains that outside of the ECB's response of providing unlimited liquidity to the eurozone system, there has been no meaningful attempt to deal with the underlying structural issues on the political level.

EU member states have, therefore, had to deal with banking problems largely on a case-by-case (and often ad hoc) basis, as each government has taken extra care to specifically tailor its financial assistance packages to support the most and upset the fewest constituents. In contrast, the United States — which took an immediate hit in late 2008 — bought up massive amounts of the toxic assets from the banks, swiftly transferring the burden onto the state.

ECB to the 'Rescue'

Europe's banking system obviously has problems, but exacerbating the problems is the fact that Europe's banks know that they and their peers are in trouble. This is causing the interbank market to seize up and thus forcing Europe's banks to rely on the ECB for funding.

The interbank market refers to the wholesale money market that only the largest financial institutions are able to participate in. In this market, the participating banks are able to borrow from one another for short periods of time to ensure that they have enough cash to maintain normal operations. Normally, the interbank market essentially regulates itself. Banks with surplus liquidity want to put their idle cash to work, and banks with a liquidity deficit need to borrow in order to meet the reserve requirements at the end of the day, for example. Without an interbank market there is no banking "system" because each individual bank would be required to supply all of its own capital all the time.

In the current environment in Europe, many banks are simply unwilling to lend money to each other, as they do not trust their peers' creditworthiness, even at very high interest rates. When this happened in the United States in 2008, the Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation stepped in and bolstered the interbank market directly and indirectly by both providing loans to interested banks and guaranteeing the safety of the loans banks were willing to grant each other. Within a few months, the U.S. crisis mitigation efforts allowed confidence to return and this liquidity support was able to be withdrawn.

The ECB originally did something similar, providing an unlimited volume of loans to any bank that could offer qualifying collateral, while national governments offered their own guarantees on newly issued debt. But unlike in the United States, confidence never fully returned to the banking sector due to the reasons listed above, and these provisions were never canceled. In fact, this program was expanded to serve a second purpose: stabilizing European governments.

With economic growth in 2009 weak, many EU governments found it difficult to maintain government spending programs in the face of dropping tax receipts. They resorted to deficit spending, and the ECB (indirectly) provided the means to fund that spending. Banks could purchase government bonds, deposit them with the ECB as collateral and walk away with a fresh liquidity loan (which they could use, if they so chose, to buy yet more government debt).

The ECB's liquidity provisions were ostensibly a temporary measure that would eventually be withdrawn as soon as it was no longer necessary. So on July 1, 2009, the ECB offered the first of what was intended to be its three "final" batches of 12-month loans as part of a return to a more normal policy. On that day 1,121 banks took out a record total of 442 billion euros in liquidity loans (followed by another 75 billion euros taken out in September and 96 billion euros in December). The 442 billion euro operation has come due July 1. The day before, banks tapped the ECB's shorter-term liquidity facilities to gain access to 294.8 billion euros to help them bridge the gap.

Europe now faces three problems. First, global growth has not picked up sufficiently in the last year, so European banks have not had a chance to grow out of their problems. This would have been difficult to accomplish on such a short timeframe. Second, the lack of a unified European banking regulator — although the European Union is trying to set one up — means that there has not yet been any pan-European effort to fix the banking problems. And even the regulation that is being discussed at the EU-level is more about being able to foresee a future crisis than resolving the current one. So banks still need the emergency liquidity provisions now as they did a year ago (to some degree the ECB saw this coming and has issued additional "final" batches of long-term liquidity loans). In fact, banks remain so unwilling to lend to one another that they have deposited nearly the equivalent amount of credit obtained from ECB's liquidity facilities back into its deposit facility instead of lending it out to consumers or other banks.

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Third, there is now a new crisis brewing that not only is likely to dwarf the banking crisis, but could make solving the banking crisis impossible. The ECB's decision to facilitate the purchase of state bonds has greatly delayed European governments' efforts to tame their budget deficits. There is now nearly 3 trillion euros of outstanding state debt just in the Club Med economies — vast portions of which are held by European banks — illustrating that the two issues have become as mammoth as they are inseparable.

There is no easy way out of this imbroglio. Reducing government debts and budget deficits means less government spending, which means less growth because public spending accounts for a relatively large portion of overall output in most European countries. Simply put, the belt-tightening that Germany and the markets are forcing upon European governments likely will lead to lower growth in the short term (although in the long term, if austerity measures prove credible, it should reassure investors of the credibility of the eurozone's economies). And economic growth — and the business it generates for banks — is one of the few proven methods of emerging from a banking crisis. One cannot solve one problem without first solving the other, and each problem prevents the other from being approached, much less solved.

There is, however, a silver lining. Investor uncertainty about the European Union's ability to solve its debt and banking problems is making the euro ever weaker, which ironically will support European exporters in the coming quarters. This not only helps maintain employment (and with it social stability), but it also boosts government tax receipts and banking activity — precisely the sort of activity necessary to begin addressing the banking and debt crises. But while this might allow Europe to avoid a return to economic recession in 2010, it alone will not resolve the European banking system's underlying problems.

For Europe's banks, this means that not only will they have to write down remaining toxic assets (the old problem), but they now also have to account for dampened growth prospects as a result of budget cuts and lower asset values on their balance sheets due to sovereign bonds losing value.

Ironically, with public consumption down as a result of budget cuts, the only way to boost growth would be for private consumption to increase, which is going to be difficult with banks wary of lending.

The Way Forward?

So long as the ECB continues to provide funding to the banks — and STRATFOR does not foresee any meaningful change in the ECB's posture in the near term or even long term — Europe's banks should be able to avoid a liquidity crisis. However, there is a difference between being well-capitalized but sitting on the cash due to uncertainty and being well-capitalized and willing to lend. Europe's banks are clearly in the former state, with lending to both consumers and corporations still tepid.

In light of Europe's ongoing sovereign debt crisis and the attempts to alleviate that crisis by cutting down deficits and debt levels, European countries are going to need growth, pure and simple, to get out of the crisis. Without meaningful economic growth, European governments will find it increasingly difficult — if not impossible — to service or reduce their ever-larger debt burdens. But for growth to be engendered, the Europeans are going to need their banks, currently spooked into sitting on liquidity, to perform the vital function that banks normally do: finance the wider economy.

As long as Europe faces both austerity measures and reticent banks, it will have little chance of producing the GDP growth needed to reduce its budget deficits. If its export-driven growth becomes threatened by decreasing demand in China or the United States, it could also face a very real possibility of another recession which, combined with austerity measures, could precipitate considerable political, social and economic fallout.

The Global Crisis of Legitimacy

JohnMauldin — Thu, 06 May 2010 19:04:00 GMT

From my friend George Friedman, founder & CEO of STRATFOR, here's my newest favorite quote concerning economic recessions: "Like forest fires, they are painful when they occur, yet without them, the forest could not survive. They impose discipline, punishing the reckless, rewarding the cautious." The thin line of where risky becomes reckless is something I'd like to focus us on today. No matter the risk-level of your portfolio, if you are reading this you are probably smart enough to know that when you play with fire you may get burned. You have to know how to look for smoke, or signs of a potential catastrophe, so you know not to grab the doorknob with both hands.

I'm including George's discussion of the contributing facets of a recession, its inevitability and the idea of risk. As if the title won't intrigue you to begin with, take my advice and give "The Global Crisis of Legitimacy" a read. STRATFOR uses its signature analytic approach to decipher today's issues, applying historical context ranging from Adam Smith to the Lehman Brothers. Also, join their mailing list to receive two weekly intelligence pieces, and find that fire before your next investment opportunity comes along.

John Mauldin
Editor, Outside the Box

The Global Crisis of Legitimacy

May 4, 2010 | 0856 GMT

By George Friedman

Financial panics are an integral part of capitalism. So are economic recessions. The system generates them and it becomes stronger because of them. Like forest fires, they are painful when they occur, yet without them, the forest could not survive. They impose discipline, punishing the reckless, rewarding the cautious. They do so imperfectly, of course, as at times the reckless are rewarded and the cautious penalized. Political crises - as opposed to normal financial panics - emerge when the reckless appear to be the beneficiaries of the crisis they have caused, while the rest of society bears the burdens of their recklessness. At that point, the crisis ceases to be financial or economic. It becomes political.

The financial and economic systems are subsystems of the broader political system. More precisely, think of nations as consisting of three basic systems: political, economic and military. Each of these systems has elites that manage it. The three systems are constantly interacting - and in a healthy polity, balancing each other, compensating for failures in one as well as taking advantage of success. Every nation has a different configuration within and between these systems. The relative weight of each system differs, as does the importance of its elites. But each nation contains these systems, and no system exists without the other two.

Limited Liability Investing

Consider the capitalist economic system. The concept of the corporation provides its modern foundation. The corporation is built around the idea of limited liability for investors, the notion that if you buy part or all of a company, you yourself are not liable for its debts or the harm that it might do; your risk is limited to your investment. In other words, you may own all or part of a company, but you are not responsible for what it does beyond your investment. Whereas supply and demand exist in all times and places, the notion of limited liability investing is unique to modern capitalism and reshapes the dynamic of supply and demand.

It is also a political invention and not an economic one. The decision to create corporations that limit liability flows from political decisions implemented through the legal subsystem of politics. The corporation dominates even in China; though the rules of liability and the definition of control vary, the principle that the state and politics define the structure of corporate risk remains constant.

In a more natural organization of the marketplace, the owners are entirely responsible for the debts and liabilities of the entity they own. That, of course, would create excessive risk, suppressing economic activity. So the political system over time has reallocated risk away from the owners of companies to the companies' creditors and customers by allowing corporations to become bankrupt without pulling in the owners.

The precise distribution of risk within an economic system is a political matter expressed through the law; it differs from nation to nation and over time. But contrary to the idea that there is a tension between the political and economic systems, the modern economic system is unthinkable except for the eccentric but indispensible political-legal contrivance of the limited liability corporation. In the precise and complex allocation of risk and immunity, we find the origins of the modern market. Among other reasons, this is why classical economists never spoke of "economics" but always of "political economy."

The state both invents the principle of the corporation and defines the conditions in which the corporation is able to arise. The state defines the structure of risk and liabilities and assures that the laws are enforced. Emerging out of this complexity - and justifying it - is a moral regime. Protection from liability comes with a burden: Poor decisions will be penalized by losses, while wise decisions are rewarded by greater wealth. Because of this, society as a whole will benefit. The entire scheme is designed to increase, in Adam Smith's words, "The Wealth of Nations" by limiting liability, increasing the willingness to take risk and imposing penalties for poor judgment and rewards for wise judgment. But the measure of the system is not whether individuals benefit, but whether in benefiting they enhance the wealth of the nation.

The greatest systemic risk, therefore, is not an economic concept but a political one. Systemic risk emerges when it appears that the political and legal protections given to economic actors, and particularly to members of the economic elite, have been used to subvert the intent of the system. In other words, the crisis occurs when it appears that the economic elite used the law's allocation of risk to enrich themselves in ways that undermined the wealth of the nation. Put another way, the crisis occurs when it appears that the financial elite used the politico-legal structure to enrich themselves through systematically imprudent behavior while those engaged in prudent behavior were harmed, with the political elite apparently taking no action to protect the victims.

In the modern public corporation, shareholders - the corporation's owners - rarely control management. A board of directors technically oversees management on behalf of the shareholders. In the crisis of 2008, we saw behavior that devastated shareholder value while appearing to enrich the management - the corporation's employees. In this case, the protections given to shareholders of corporations were turned against them when they were forced to pay for the imprudence of their employees - the managers, whose interests did not align with those of the shareholders. The managers in many cases profited personally through their compensation system for actions inimical to shareholder interests. We now have a political, not an economic, crisis for two reasons. First, the crisis qualitatively has moved beyond the boundaries of a cyclical event. Second, the crisis is rooted in the political-legal definitions of the distribution of corporate risk and the legally defined relations between management and shareholder. In leaving the shareholder liable for actions by management, but without giving shareholders controls to limit managerial risk taking, the problem lies not with the market but with the political system that invented and presides over the limited liability corporation.

Financial panics that appear natural and harm the financial elite do not necessarily create political crises. Financial panics that appear to be the result of deliberate manipulation of the allocation of risk under the law, and from which the financial elite as a whole appears to have profited even while shareholders and the public were harmed, inevitably create political crises. In the case of 2008 and the events that followed, we have a paradox. The 2008 crisis was not unprecedented, nor was the federal bailout. We saw similar things in the municipal bond crisis of the 1970s, and the Third World Debt Crisis and Savings and Loan Crisis in the 1980s. Nor was the recession that followed anomalous. It came seven years after the previous one, and compared to the 1970s and early 1980s, when unemployment stood at more than 10 percent and inflation and mortgages were at more than 20 percent, the new one was painful but well within the bounds of expected behavior.

The crisis was rooted in the appearance that it was triggered by the behavior not of small town banks or third world countries, but of the global financial elite, who took advantage of the complexities of law to enrich themselves instead of the shareholders and clients to whom it was thought they had prior fiduciary responsibility.

This is a political crisis then, not an economic one. The political elite is responsible for the corporate elite in a unique fashion: The corporation was a political invention, so by definition, its behavior depends on the political system. But in a deeper sense, the crisis is one of both political and corporate elites, and the perception that by omission or commission they acted together - knowingly engineering the outcome. In a sense, it does not matter whether this is what happened. That it is widely believed that this is what happened alone is the origin of the crisis. This generates a political crisis that in turn is translated into an attack on the economic system.

The public, which is cynical about such things, expects elites to work to benefit themselves. But at the same time, there are limits to the behavior the public will tolerate. That limit might be defined, with Adam Smith in mind, as the point when the wealth of the nation itself is endangered, i.e., when the system is generating outcomes that harm the nation. In extreme form, these crises can delegitimize regimes. In the most extreme form - and we are nowhere near this point - the military elite typically steps in to take control of the system.

This is not something that is confined to the United States by any means, although part of this analysis is designed to explain why the Obama administration must go after Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers and others. The symbol of Goldman Sachs profiting from actions that devastate national wealth, or of the management of Lehman wiping out shareholder value while they themselves did well, creates a crisis of confidence in the political and financial systems. With the crisis of legitimacy still not settling down after nearly two years, the reaction of the political system is predictable. It will both anoint symbolic miscreants, and redefine the structure of risk and liability in financial corporations. The goal is not so much to achieve something as to create the impression that it is achieving something, in other words, to demonstrate that the political system is prepared to control the entities it created.

The Crisis in Europe

We see a similar crisis in Europe. The financial institutions in Europe were fully complicit in the global financial crisis. They bought and sold derivatives whose value they knew to be other than stated, the same as Americans. Though the European financial institutions have asserted they were the hapless victims of unscrupulous American firms, the Europeans were as sophisticated as their American counterparts. Their elites knew what they were doing.

Complicating the European position was the creation of the economic union and the euro by the economic and political elite. There has always been a great deal of ambiguity concerning the powers and authority of the European Union, but its intentions were always clear: to harmonize Europe and to create European-wide solutions to economic problems. This goal always created unease in Europe. There were those who were concerned that a united Europe would exist to benefit the elites, rather than the broader public. There were also those who believed it was designed to benefit the Franco-German core of Europe rather than Europe as a whole. Overall, this reflected minority sentiment, but it was a substantial minority.

The financial crisis came at Europe in three phases. The first was part of the American subprime crisis. The second wave was a uniquely European crisis. European banks had taken massive positions in the Eastern European banking systems. For example, the Czech system was almost entirely foreign (Austrian and Italian) owned. These banks began lending to Eastern European homebuyers, with mortgages denominated in euros, Swiss francs or yen rather than in the currencies of the countries involved (none yet included in the eurozone). Doing this allowed banks to reduce interest rates, as the risk of currency fluctuation was pushed over to the borrower. But when the zlotys and forints began to plunge, these monthly mortgage payments began to soar, as did defaults. The European core, led by Germany, refused a European bailout of the borrowers or lenders even though the lenders who created this crisis were based in eurozone countries. Instead, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was called in to use funds that included American and Chinese, as well as European, money to solve the problem. This raised the political question in Eastern Europe as to what it meant to be part of the European Union.

The third wave is represented by crisis in sovereign debt in countries that are part of the eurozone but not in the core of Europe - Greece, of course, but also Portugal and possibly Spain. In the Greek case, the Germans in particular hesitated to intervene until it could draw the IMF - and non-European money and guarantees - into the mix. This obviously raised questions in the periphery about what membership in the eurozone meant, just as it created questions in Eastern Europe about what EU membership meant.

But a much deeper crisis of legitimacy arose. In Germany, elite sentiment accepted that some sort of intervention in Greece was inevitable. Public sentiment overwhelmingly opposed intervention, however. The political elite moved into tension with the financial elite under public pressure. In Greece, a similar crisis emerged between an elite that accepted that foreign discipline would have to be introduced and a public that saw this discipline as a betrayal of its interests and national sovereignty.

Europe thus has a double crisis. As in the United States, there is a crisis between the financial and political systems. This crisis is not as intense as in the United States because of a deeper tradition of integration between the two systems in Europe. But the tension between masses and elites is every bit as intense. The second part of the crisis is the crisis of the European Union and growing sense that the European Union is the problem and not the solution. As in the United States, there is a growing movement to distrust not only national arrangements but also multinational arrangements.

The United States and Europe are far from the only areas of the world facing crises of legitimacy. In China, for example, the growing suppression of all dissent derives from serious questions as to whom the financial expansion of the past 30 years benefits, and who will pay for the downturns. It is also interesting to note that Russia is suffering much less from this crisis, having lived through its own crisis before. The global crisis of legitimacy has many aspects worth considering at some point.

But for now, the important thing is to understand that both Europe and the United States are facing fundamental challenges to the legitimacy of, if not the regime, then at least the manner in which the regime has handled itself. The geopolitical significance of this crisis is obvious. If the Americans and Europeans both enter a period in which managing the internal balance becomes more pressing than managing the global balance, then other powers will have enhanced windows of opportunities to redefine their regional balances.

In the United States, we see a predictable process. With the unease over elites intensifying, the political elite is trying to stabilize the situation by attacking the financial elite. It is doing this to both demonstrate that the political elite is distinct from the financial elite and to impose the consequences on the financial elite that the impersonal system was unable to do. There is precedent for this, and it will likely achieve its desired end: greater control over the financial system by the state and an acceptable moral tale for the public.

The European process is much less clear. The lack of clarity comes from the fact that this is a test for the European Union. This is not simply a crisis within national elites, but within the multinational elite that created the European Union. If this leads to the de-legitimization of the EU, then we are really in uncharted territory.

But the most important point is that almost two years since a normal financial panic, the polity has still not managed to absorb the consequences of that event. The politically contrived corporation, and particularly the financial corporations, stands accused of undermining the wealth of nations. As Adam Smith understood, markets are not natural entities but the result of political decisions, as is the political system that creates the allocation of risk that allows markets to function. When that system appears to fail, the consequences go far beyond the particular financials of that event. They have political consequences and, in due course, geopolitical consequences.

The Making of a Greek Tragedy

JohnMauldin — Mon, 26 Apr 2010 22:09:00 GMT

Back and recovering from my Strategic Investment Conference this weekend (where I decided to give myself permission not to write my usual letter, but I promise I will be back at it this next Friday!) I have spent some time pondering what we learned. It was a fabulous conference. Lacy Hunt, Dr. Gary Shilling, David Rosenberg, Niall Ferguson, Paul McCulley, George Friedman, former Fed Senior Economist Jason Cummins (who is now Chief Economist for Brevan Howard, the largest European hedge fund, and who was quite impressive), Jon Sundt of Altegris, and your humble analyst were all in top form. I must admit with a little pride that I think this is the finest speaker lineup for ANY investment conference anywhere. We were given a lot to think about.

Let me give you a few key points as an intro to this week's Outside the Box. First, there is a bubble building and it is in sovereign debt. It threatens to be a worse bubble than subprime or the credit crisis. Second, at one panel where we were asked what is our main worry, Paul McCulley said "Europe," which triggered an intense discussion, both in the panel and later that night over dinner. I agreed, of course, as I have written that very thing.

Both Paul and Niall think the consequences of a euro breakup could be severe, not only for Europe but for the world. I agree. That is why I have focused so much space in my writing and in Outside the Box on the European and especially the Greek situation. Everyone is hopeful that a major breakup can be avoided, but the problems the Mediterranean countries face are serious. I got the sense that most everyone expects the euro to fall further over the coming years.

In my opinion, there is little hope that Greece can resolve its fiscal crisis in a way that is less than draconian. I see almost no way out without a default of some kind. There will be band-aids and other measures to postpone the day of reckoning, but not to avoid it. They have just gone too far down a road of bad decisions.

Today we look at two short essays on Greece, one from Stratfor (George Friedman was in rare form this weekend) and the other from my friends Eric Sprott and David Franklin of Sprott Asset Management. Sprott gives us some details on a brewing Greek banking crisis and then closes with some thoughts on sovereign debt. He throws this little bon mot at us:

" ... [the US Government Accounting Office] goes on to state, however, that using reasonable assumptions, 'roughly 93 cents of every dollar of federal revenue will be spent on the major entitlement programs and net interest costs by 2020.'"

That is an example of the economic truism that if something can't happen, then it won't. Long before we get to 2020, massive change will be forced upon the US. The question is, do we do it willingly or do we become Greece?

And before I turn you over to the capable hands of Stratfor and Sprott, I have to end with what I think was the best one-liner of the conference (and there were so many). Paul McCulley noted that the debt crisis (the shadow banking system, subprime mortgages, SIVs, etc.) was the equivalent of an under-age drinking party with the rating agencies handing out fake IDs.

Have a good week. (And a special thanks to Lee Stein and David Malcolm for being so generous with their homes and wine cellars, respectively.)

Your feeling like I was drinking information through a fire hose analyst,

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box

The Making of a Greek Tragedy

From Stratfor

Greece has not had many good days in 2010, but Thursday was a particularly bad day. First, Europe's statistical office (Eurostat) revised up the Greek 2009 budget deficit, which placed Athens' accounting shenanigans in the spotlight again. The bottom line is that the situation is even worse than previously thought, and the budget deficit may very well be adjusted up as more Greek accounting malfeasance comes to light. Following the announcement, credit rating agency Moody' s dropped Greece's credit rating one notch, immediately prompting a rise in Greek government bond yields, thus increasing Athens' borrowing costs.

The yield on a Greek 10-year bond shot above nine percent, while a two-year bond rose above 11 percent, both record highs since Greece joined the eurozone. Particularly daunting is the fact that short-term debt financing is now more expensive than long-term funding. This situation is referred to as an "inverted yield curve," and it is generally considered a harbinger of financial doom. This means that investors are sensing that Athens is more likely to experience problems sooner rather than later.

Higher yields mean that Greece is facing increasingly larger interest payments on an increasingly larger stock of debt. This all but confirms that Athens' claim that its stock of public debt will peak at 120 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) is simply wishful thinking. Worse still, Greece is also facing continued economic recession, induced in part by Athens' austerity measures designed to reduce its budget deficit. Given this vicious dynamic, we cannot see how Greece's debt level will stabilize at anything below 150 percent of GDP range.

The point is that the financial writing is now on the proverbial wall; some form of default is simply unavoidable. Exactly how the Greek default will unfold is unclear, but the bottom line is that the question now is not "if" but "when." Under "normal" circumstances, when the IMF becomes involved with a country in a situation similar to Greece's, the standard procedure is to devalue the local currency. By lowering the relative prices within the economy, the devaluation increases the competitiveness of the country's export sector and helps to reorient the economy toward external demand. Devaluation is also politically expedient because regaining competitiveness does not require employers to slash employees' wages, as the devaluation adjusts the relative costs silently and discreetly.

However, Greece does not have the option of devaluation because it is locked into a monetary union. The eurozone's monetary policy is controlled by the Frankfurt-based European Central Bank. The fact that Greece is locked in the "euro straitjacket" raises two questions, the first being how the Greek debt crisis will play out.

Without the option of devaluation, the Greeks will have to implement and endure draconian austerity measures - in addition to the ones it has already enacted - similar to what Latvia and Argentina endured as part of their IMF programs. Argentina in 2000 and Latvia in 2008 also could not go the currency devaluation route because neither country controlled its monetary policy. In Argentina' s case, the austerity measures were so severe that they caused considerable social unrest - including a brief period of outright anarchy in late 2001, which saw the country go through five heads of government in about two weeks - ultimately culminating in the country's partial debt default in 2002. To this day, Argentina is still dealing with the fallout of that financial calamity.

Latvia is a case of more recent vintage. In late 2008, Latvia agreed to what the IMF itself has called one of the most severe austerity programs since the 1970s. To accomplish it, Latvia has done everything from slashing public sector wages by 25 to 40 percent, increasing taxes, reducing unemployment and maternity benefits and cutting the defense budget. The crisis has already cost the Latvian prime minister his job and stoked social unrest. Despite all of that, the budget deficit has not budged much, remaining around eight percent of the GDP mark. Spending has been cut to the bone, but Latvia is simply too small of an economy to emerge from recession on its own.

Since the broader European economic recovery remains moribund at best, less government spending has translated directly to less growth. Less growth means less tax income, and less tax income means that the country' s budget deficit remains stubbornly high. Latvia has essentially become a ward of the IMF, and will remain so until either the broader European economic recovery is more robust or the Baltic state is fast-tracked into the eurozone itself.

An EU-IMF bailout of Greece would ultimately give Athens the choice of becoming either an Argentina or a Latvia. A financial assistance program that does not involve substantial structural reform on Greece's part would lead to a default a la Argentina. A bailout that forces Greece to get serious about reforms would mean Greece becomes an IMF-ward like Latvia, with default still a serious possibility down the line. In either case, Greece will essentially lose control over its destiny.

The next question is what the rest of Europe will look like, and there is no shortage of impacts. Europe, and Germany in particular, must decide whether and to what extent it should "bail out" the Greeks. How that might happen is now the topic of the day in Europe. Driving the urgency is this simple fact: In the absence of substantial (and subsidized) financial assistance, Greece will inevitably default on its debts, thus generating write-downs for all those who hold Greek government debt (mostly European banks).

The Greek default therefore is no longer an isolated problem, but a problem that threatens to aggravate an already weakened European banking sector. One of the most misunderstood facts of the international financial world is that even at the peak of the U.S. subprime crisis, in the dark hours when American hedge funds seemed to be snapping like matchsticks, Europe's banks were in even worse shape. As the Americans stabilized, so did their banks. But Europe never cleaned house, and now a Greek tsunami is poised to wash over the whole mess. [emphasis mine - JM]

Weakness Begets Weakness: from Banks to Sovereigns to Banks

By: Eric Sprott & David Franklin
Sprott Asset Management

The Greek debt situation has been an interesting case study for students of the sovereign bond markets. If there's a lesson to be learned from Greece's experience thus far it's that sovereign bailouts are far more complicated than bank bailouts. They require more sophisticated negotiations and proposals and involve an extra layer of diplomacy that makes them especially difficult to accomplish. As we write this, the European Union has recently announced new lending terms to support the Greek government, with great efforts made to assure the markets that these new terms do not constitute a 'bailout'. The problem with the Greek situation is that an actual bailout would involve an almost impossible coordination among all the major powers within the EU. It would require the unanimous pre-approval of all the EU heads of state. It would involve the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) all visiting Greece to perform financial assessments. And finally, it would involve at least seven EU countries affirming support through parliamentary votes - all of this before a single euro is spent.

A true bailout involves an almost impossible number of hurdles that essentially guarantee nothing will happen until all other avenues of rescue are exhausted. However, judging by the recent increase in yields on 10-year Greek bonds, Greece may soon need more than a loan package proposal to solve its fiscal problems.

One aspect of the Greek situation that has been obscured by all the recent political wrangling is the crisis' impact on the Greek banks. Although the banks were supposed to be rock solid after all the government-injected capital they received (not to mention zero-percent interest rates and generous lending terms from the European Central Bank), data shows that Greek bank deposits have fallen 8.4 billion euros, or 3.6 percent, in two months since December 2009. With no restraints on capital flows within the European Union, Greek savers are free to transfer their assets elsewhere. Given that bank deposit guarantees in Greece are the responsibility of the national government rather than the European Central Bank, we suspect Greek citizens are pulling money out of their banks because they question their government's ability to honour its domestic deposit guarantees. We envision Greek depositors asking themselves how a government that can't raise enough money to stay solvent can then turn around and guarantee their bank deposits? It's a fair question to ask.

The Greek bank stocks have been thoroughly punished throughout the crisis. Chart A plots an index consisting of the four largest Greek bank stocks and shows an average decline of 47% since November 2009. The deposit withdrawals from these banks have been so damaging to their respective balance sheets (remember bank leverage?) that the Greek banks have asked to borrow 17 billion euros left over from a 28 billion euro support program launched in 2008.3 You see the connection here? Greece experienced a financial crisis, followed by a sovereign crisis, followed by another financial crisis. There is no doubt that the Greek crisis has helped drive the gold spot price to its recent all time high in euros. Gold is a prudent asset to own in times of crisis, and it's possible that a portion of the Greek deposit withdrawals were reinvested into the precious metal. The fact remains, however, that if the Greek government cannot stem the outflows of deposits soon, the EU will have no other choice but to undertake a real sovereign bailout with all its bells, whistles and arduous protocols.

It's a vicious spiral from financial crisis to sovereign debt crisis to banking crisis, and there is no reason it can't spread to other European countries suffering from similar fiscal imbalances. With Spain and Portugal next in line with their own sovereign debt issues, we can expect depositors in these countries to make similar runs to the bank for their cash. "Guaranteed by Government" is truly beginning to lose its potency in this environment. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) seems to be preparing for such a scenario with its recent announcement of a tenfold increase in its emergency lending facility. The IMF's New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) facility is designed to prevent the "impairment of the international monetary system or to deal with an exceptional situation that poses a threat to the stability of that system." The NAB facility has grown from US$50 billion to US$550 billion with the mere stroke of a pen. Does the IMF know something that the market doesn't? Is this a pre-emptive measure to repel an attack by bond vigilantes' on Europe's fiscally-weakened countries?

Sovereign Debt

In our examination of the Greek situation this past month, we kept coming across various sovereign credit ratings. In an effort to better understand the Greek situation, we decided to look at how the ratings agencies generate their actual rankings and built our own model to determine a country's credit risk.5 We used common metrics such as GDP per Capita, Government Budget Deficits, Gross Government and Contingent Liabilities, the inflation rate and incorporated a simple debt sustainability metric in order to generate our own sovereign ratings. What we discovered in the process was quite puzzling.

It should first be noted that the rating agencies are in the business of offering their 'opinions' about the creditworthiness of bonds that have been issued by various kinds of entities: corporations, governments, and (most recently) the packagers of mortgages and other debt obligations. These opinions come in the form of 'ratings' which are expressed in a letter grade. The best-known scale is that used by Standard & Poor's ("S&P") which uses AAA for the highest rated debt, and AA, A, BBB, BB, for debt of descending credit quality.

In our opinion, as they relate to sovereign debt, the ratings provided by the agencies are highly suspect. While these agencies claim to provide ratings that consider the business credit cycle, there appears to be very little forward-looking information actually factored into their credit models. In some cases, the agency ratings end up looking absurdly optimistic. This of course should come as no surprise - we all remember the subprime mortgages that were rated AAA that are now worth pennies on the dollar.

While there were some similarities in our rankings (for example, our model ascribed AAA ratings to the local currency debt of Australia, Canada, Finland, Sweden, New Zealand which matched the ratings given by S&P), we found some glaring inconsistencies in the rating results for less fiscally prudent countries that left us scratching our heads. A good example is South Africa. The agencies currently rate South Africa an A+ entity, while our model calculated a 'BBB-' rating for its debt using our estimates. 'BBB-' is the lowest 'investment grade' rating for local currency sovereign debt - one level above junk. We arrived at this rating without having factored in South Africa's resource endowment. A significant contributor to South African GDP is derived from mining, particularly gold mining. While South Africa has been the largest producer of gold until very recently, their below-ground reserves have not been revised since 2001 when the country held 36,000 tonnes of gold (or about 40% of the global total). Recent stats from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimate that South Africa now has only 6,000 tonnes worth of economic gold reserves remaining. Further review by Chris Hartnady, a former associate professor at the University of Cape Town, using similar techniques to those of M. King Hubbert (the Peak Oil theorist), suggests that South Africa could have only half of the gold reserves estimated by the USGS.7 If these new estimates are correct, South Africa could have 90% less gold than claimed - and it's not even factored into our BBB- rating! So what's South African debt really worth? An 'A+' from the ratings agencies seems far too generous based on our cursory review of the country's fundamentals.

The rating agencies' ranking of the United States is even more disconnected from reality. To believe that the US sets the benchmark for sovereign debt credit ratings is preposterous. While we have written ad nauseam about the excessive debt issuance by the United States, we found a recent update written by United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) to be particularly instructive. The update noted the US's budget deficit equivalent to 9.9% of GDP in 2009 - the largest 10 since 1945 - and stated that without significant policy changes the US government would soon face an "unsustainable growth in debt".

This was not news to us. It goes on to state, however, that using reasonable assumptions, "roughly 93 cents of every dollar of federal revenue will be spent on the major entitlement programs and net interest costs by 2020." This is news! In less than ten years, using reasonable assumptions, there will essentially be no money left to run the US government - 93% of all tax revenues the US government collects will go to pay social security, Medicare, Medicaid and the interest costs on their national debt. This implies no money left over for defense, homeland security, welfare, unemployment benefits, education or anything else we associate with the normal business of government. And the US government is rated AAA!?

The historian Niall Ferguson recently wrote that, "US government debt is a safe haven the way Pearl Harbor was a safe haven in 1941." It's hard not to agree given the foregoing statements by the GAO. The risk inherent to investors, of course, is what happens when the bond market begins to realize and react to this new level of risk. In a speech earlier this month, Jürgen Stark, who is a member of the board of the European Central Bank, stated, "We may already have entered into the next phase of the crisis: a sovereign debt crisis following on the financial and economic crisis."

The activities of the IMF would confirm this statement. The question we must now ask ourselves is whether "backed by government" actually means anything anymore. In the depths of the 2008 crisis it was the governments that stepped in to provide a guarantee on financial assets. It was the governments that backed our savings accounts, money market funds, day-to-day business banking accounts, as well as debt issued by US banks. But what happens when confidence in the government guarantee begins to erode? We've seen what happened to Greece. Leverage inherent in the banking system elevated a bank run, equivalent to a mere 3.6 percent of deposits, into another full blown banking crisis. In our view it's time for investors to acknowledge sovereign risk. The ratings agencies can opine all they want, but it seems clear to us that the only true AAA asset to protect your wealth is gold.

April 2010AGEMENT LP