Thoughts From The Frontline : Richard Russell

The Paradox of Deficits

John Mauldin — Sat, 23 May 2009 20:44:50 GMT

Things That Go Bump in the Night
A Trillion Dollars as Far as the Eye Can See
The Global Recession Gets Worse
Where Will the Money Come From?
The Paradox of Deficits
Naples, London, and Eastern Europe

From ghoulies and ghosties

And long-leggedy beasties

And things that go bump in the night,
Good Lord, deliver us!

--Old Scottish Prayer

There is something that is bumping around in my worry closet. The bond market is not behaving as if there is deflation in our future, and the dollar is getting weaker. Unemployment keeps rising, but most of all, the US government deficit looks to be spinning out of control. This week we look at all of this and take a tour around the world to see what is happening. There is a lot of interesting material to cover.

But first, I am proud to announce that thanks to your donations the net proceeds from the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner totaled $17,000! A donation was made in that amount to the Autism Society of America, San Diego County Chapter, in Richard Russell's name.

The evening was captured in both video and photographs, and we would like to share those with you. We have put together a DVD that captures all the wonderful moments, including tributes from Richard's longtime friends and family, an entertaining skit by Richard's daughter Daria, and another touching tribute by Richard's daughter Betsy. Perhaps the best speech, however, came from Richard himself -- which is of course included on the video. For those who could not attend in person, we have already made copies of the video and will mail it to you as soon as you order it. The cost is $29.95, and that includes shipping. You may order as many copies as you like.

To order the video, please visit: http://www.johnmauldin.com/russell-tribute-dvd.html

The photographs were placed on Shutterfly, an online gallery where you may view them and choose the ones you would like to order. We have created a web page specifically for these photos. To access that page, please use this link: http://richardrusselltributedinner.shutterfly.com or you can link from the page above. Now, let's jump right into the letter.

A Trillion Dollars as Far as the Eye Can See

As of this week, total US debt is $11.3 trillion and rising rapidly. The Obama Administration projects that to rise another $1.85 trillion in 2009 (13% of GDP) and yet another $1.4 trillion in 2010. The Congressional Budget Office projects almost $10 trillion in additional debt from 2010 through 2019. Just last January the 2009 deficit was estimated at "only" $1.2 trillion. Things have gone downhill fast.

But there is reason to be concerned about those estimates, too. The CBO assumes a rather robust recovery in 2010, with growth springing back to 3.8% and then up to 4.5% in 2011. Interestingly, they project unemployment of 8.8% for this year (we are already at 8.9% and rising every month) and that it will rise to 9% next year. It will be a strange recovery indeed where the economy is roaring along at 4% and unemployment isn't falling. (You can see their spreadsheets and all the details if you take your blood pressure medicine first, at www.cbo.gov.)

Just a few quick thoughts. This year the proposed administration plan is to borrow 50% of every dollar spent. The CBO projects than nominal GDP will grow by about 50% over the next 10 years (which is historically reasonable), but also that revenues will double, which suggests massive tax increases in relation to GDP. Interestingly, the International Monetary Fund says growth next year will be tepid at best (more below). The deficit in 2010 is almost 10% of GDP. The average proposed deficit is almost a $1 trillion average for the next ten years. Ten years from now, the deficit is projected to be $1.2 trillion. And that is if government costs do not go up and inflation only averages 1.1% for the next six years.

The Global Recession Gets Worse

Let's take a quick trip around the world. In the first quarter, the German economy fell by 14%, Japan by 15%, Mexico by 21%, and England was down almost 8%.

Global trade is simply collapsing. The chart below is the ugliest it has ever been. Chinese exports are down 41%, Japanese exports down 38%, Germany's down by 32%, and so on. (chart courtesy of www.variantperception.com )

Let me quote from the very interesting study the team at Variant Perception did.

"As we have repeatedly said, Spain is set for a long, painful deflation that will manifest itself via a spectacularly high unemployment level, a real estate collapse and general banking insolvencies. Consider this: the value of outstanding loans to Spanish developers has gone from just €33.5 billion in 2000 to €318 billion in 2008, a rise of 850% in 8 years. If you add in construction sector debts, the overall value of outstanding loans to developers and construction companies rises to €470 billion. That's almost 50% of Spanish GDP. Most of these loans will go bad.

"Spanish banks are now facing a very bleak outlook. Spain's unemployment rate reached over 17% last month; there are now four million unemployed Spaniards and over one million families with not a single person employed in the family. Spain and Ireland had the worst housing bubbles in the world and now Spain has as many unsold homes as the US, even though the US is about six times bigger.

"Why are Spanish banks not insolvent? Spanish banks are not marking their real estate loans to market. We've often wondered how it is that our thesis for Spanish real estate and industrial collapse has not created more victims. The answer is simple according to an article in Expansion, the Spanish equivalent of the Financial Times, from the 19th of April titled 'Spanish banks control half of all real estate appraisals.' You can't make this stuff up. We haven't even begun to see the worst in Spain yet."

European banks are in far worse shape than their US counterparts. That is because they utilize far more leverage, on an average about 30 times leverage. How can that be, in what is supposed to be a conservative industry?

"European banks were only restricted on the basis of risk-weighted assets, unlike the US where it is the total leverage ratio that matters, so most European banks bought assets that were rated by Moody's and S&P, who couldn't rate their way out of a paper bag, and for anything that wasn't highly rated, they bought credit default swaps or guarantees from AIG and MBIA. Because of that European banks were able to lever up a lot more than their US counterparties. Given the much higher leverage levels and general worsening of collateral values, we think that all the shoes in Europe have not dropped."

European banks have assets of about 330% of their GDP, compared to US banking assets, which are about 50%. They have over $700 billion in loans to Asian businesses (which are watching their exports collapse) and $1.3 trillion in loans to Eastern Europe, which is in a very serious recession, and so many of those loans are simply not going to be worth anything. Simply put, there is going to be a need for massive amounts of money to bail out European banks, or we'll watch their economies simply implode.

Where is the money for the bailouts going to come from? Germany? That will be a tough sell politically in a country that is in a much worse recession than the US. How do you tell your citizens you need to bail out banks in other countries with their tax dollars? Italian and Austrian banks are going to need a lot of capital, more than their governments can pay. It is going to be a very tough problem.

Governments around the world are responding to the global recession by running massive deficits. In addition to the US, the UK, Japan, Russia, Spain, and Ireland are all running deficits of over 10%.

And, as in the case of the US, these are not going to be one-time deficits. The IMF predicts that England will shrink again next year and the recovery in the US will be modest at best. The US economy is expected to grow by 0.2% (far from the optimistic projections of various US government agencies), the 16-nation eurozone will eke out a modest gain of 0.1%, and the Group of Seven (G7) leading industrial economies will, as a whole, only grow by 0.2 percent. They project that Japan's economy will stagnate next year.

Where Will the Money Come From?

And now let's look at what is bumping in my worry closet. The world is going to have to fund multiple trillions in debt over the next several years. Pick a number. I think $5 trillion sounds about right. $3 trillion is in the cards for the US alone, if current projections are right.

Just exactly where is that money going to come from? The US trade deficit is now down to under $350 billion a year. The Fed can monetize a trillion. Maybe. Look at the yield curve on US government debt below (Bloomberg). US savings are going to go up, but where is the incentive to buy ten-year debt at 3.5%? Four-year debt under 2% doesn't do much for your savings growth. Even with monetization and the Chinese buying our debt with the dollars we send them, that still leaves the bond market about $1.5 trillion short, give or take $100 billion.

The world is deleveraging. Debt is being drawn down. Securitization of various types of debt has seriously slowed. Banks are cutting back on lending. Home prices are dropping all over the world. Commercial real estate is rolling over, and banks all over the world are exposed. "Recession turns malls into ghost towns" is the headline in today's Wall Street Journal. Personal savings are rising and retail sales are flat to down. Unemployment is rising.

All this should be massively deflationary. Interest rates should be falling or at least not rising. But a funny thing is happening. In the past two months, the yield on the ten-year bond has risen by 1%. It has moved 0.38% or almost "4 big handles" in just two weeks. Look at the chart below. What is happening?

According to Merrill Lynch, the size of the world bond market is estimated to be approximately $67 trillion, with the shares of US, Euroland, and Japanese securities each representing less than 50 percent of this total. (PIMCO)

England has been put on negative watch for its debt rating. Bill Gross said yesterday that it is not unthinkable that the US could lose its AAA rating. I think the bond market is looking at the mountain of debt that will have to be somehow sold and wondering where such a colossal sum will come from. Where do you find $10 trillion in the next ten years for US debt?

And that is just for US government debt. $5 trillion for new global debt in the next two years? In a deleveraged world? How much will the other countries need? What about money needed for businesses and mortgages and credit cards and so on?

If you add $10 trillion to the current $11.3 trillion (including Social Security trust funds, etc.), that totals $21 trillion in 2019. Let's be generous and suggest that interest rates will only be an average of 5%. That would be an interest-rate expense of over $1 trillion. That is 25% of projected revenues and 20% of expected expenses. And that assumes you have nominal growth of over 4% for the next ten years. If growth is less, tax revenues will be less. It also assumes massive tax increases from carbon credits.

The Paradox of Deficits

I think the bond market is looking a few years down the road and saying that $1-trillion deficits are simply not capable of being financed. And if the debt is monetized, then inflation is going to become a very serious issue.

When you run deficits that are 4-6-8% or more than nominal GDP, at some point things simply back up. Can we ride along for a few years? Certainly. Japan is getting ready to see its debt-to-GDP ratio rise to almost 200%. But everybody can't do it all at once.

Call it the Paradox of Deficits. We have been running a large trade deficit in the US for years, because the people (China, Japan, and the Middle East) who wanted to sell us "stuff" were kind enough to turn around and invest the money in our bonds. This in turn created Greenspan's conundrum, as it helped keep down US (and global) interest rates. Combine that with a massive increase in leverage, a few bubbles, and we now arrive at a true crisis.

Deficits are not necessarily a bad thing if kept in check and restraint is shown. But everyone cannot run deficits at the same time. If we don't buy $700 billion in goods, then that money cannot be recycled back to our debt. It is that simple.

(Sidebar: And now, China and Brazil are moving to do their trades in their own currencies rather than dollars. Very smart on their part.)

Europe, Japan, and the US cannot try to borrow $5 trillion in the next two years without a serious distortion of the bond market, not to mention the entire economic landscape.

I have long thought that "crunch time," the end game, would show up around 2013-14. But I never in my wildest imaginings thought we could run an almost $2 trillion deficit. That crazy guy on the corner telling us "The end is nigh"? He may be right.

Long before we get to 2015, let alone 2019, I think the bond markets will have called a halt to $1 trillion deficits. There will be a real crisis. The deficits will not be funded at anywhere close to an interest rate that will not break the budget. Taxes will get raised beyond what they were in the Clinton years. And Obama's budget makes some very optimistic judgments about how much will be saved in medical costs, as if no one has tried to rein in medical costs before. The crisis may come much sooner if his universal health-care bill is passed as proposed without offsetting cuts somewhere else.

Watch the bond market. Rates should be going down, not up. The bond market is telling us the deficit simply can't be financed down the road. Now, maybe a few cool heads in the Democratic Party will prevail in the US Senate and the deficits will be brought under control. (The Republicans have so far seemed as clueless as they are impotent.) We could (theoretically) run $400 billion deficits for a very long time, as GDP would be growing somewhat faster.

It would be best to run budget surpluses, but the game does not end if there are reasonable deficits. It ends with deficits that cannot be funded except by monetization. And that will tank the dollar, except against all the other countries that are monetizing their debt.

I am increasingly inclined to think that as the world comes out of its current malaise – and it will – US investors should think more globally with their investment portfolios. That is something we will explore over the coming year. But that's enough for today.

Naples, London, and Eastern Europe

Next Friday I go to London to speak at a conference for my friends at Jyske Bank. International investing expert Gary Scott will be there, as well as my friend and business associate Steve Blumenthal. It should still be possible to attend, if you would like. You can see more at www.jgam.com. And then, in theory, I will be home all of June.

The plan now is for me to return to London on July 15^th. I will co-host CNBC London Squawk Box on July 17^th, see clients, and then be with London business partner Niels Jensen for his 50^th birthday party on the 18^th. (And here's wishing him a speedy recovery from his back surgery last week!)

And then I am actually going to take a vacation. I am slowly trying to expand the list of countries I have been to. This year I am thinking of venturing further into Eastern Europe. Romania and Bulgaria are on the top of the list, and perhaps Slovenia? I would love to hear from readers in those countries, or from others who have visited them. I will have about 12 days and want to be able to see the sights and relax as well.

Then I come back, go to Maine with young son Trey for our annual get together with all the guys at the Shadow Fed fishing trip run by David Kotok, and get back in time for daughter Amanda's wedding on the 22nd. It is going to be a full, fun summer.

And speaking of Trey, he turns 15 on Wednesday. He is the last of my seven in the house. The rest are all out and (more or less) on their own. But then I get three new grandkids between now and the end of the year, so the next generation is starting.

These are interesting and serious times we find ourselves in, but we should all try and remember to enjoy life as much as possible. I am grateful that I am so busy, and count it as a blessing when so many are not. Have a great Memorial Day, and take a few moments to remember those who have sacrificed so that we can be free.

Your looking forward to summer analyst,

John Mauldin

Deep Inside the Dow

John Mauldin — Sat, 04 Apr 2009 02:27:00 GMT

What About the Original Dow 30 Stocks?
Adding and Subtracting Value
The Original Dow 30 Components
A Few Thoughts from Richard Russell
How to Succeed at Writing
Conversations on Banks
Copenhagen, London and Orange County, etc.

Tonight (Saturday) some 450 people will come together in San Diego to honor Richard Russell, who has been writing the Dow Theory Letter for over 50 years. In that spirit, in today's letter we are going to look deep inside the Dow, back to its very roots. The Dow is a price-weighted index as opposed to a cap-weighted index. Does that make a difference in performance? Specifically, does it affect how the Dow has performed since it was expanded to 30 names in 1928? There are some real surprises we have found, and I think you will find this letter very interesting.

What About the Original Dow Jones 30 Stocks?

The Dow Industrials was expanded to 30 names from 20 on October 1 of 1928. Today, only nine names of the original 30 remain in the Dow. The committee at Dow Jones has replaced the other names as the companies grew out of favor, were merged into other stocks, were considered too small, or the committee felt that other companies better represented the industrial prowess of the US economy.

For instance, in November of 1999, Goodyear and Chevron were removed in order to allow Microsoft and Intel to join the Dow 30, where the two tech giants proceeded to rise handily the next few quarters. However, it has not been that pretty since the end of 2000, with both stocks down approximately 60% from their entry price, and much further from their peak price. Chevron proceeded to move up some 60% in price after it was removed, at which point Chevron was inserted back into the Dow 30 on February 19, 2008, where it is now down about 15%. Not a good run for the selection committee.

But it is not all bad. If you look at the deletions and additions, you find some interesting timing issues. Some additions were excellent in terms of performance. Some avoided later bankruptcies.

Thinking about the Dow, I wondered how much the committee had helped or hurt the Dow performance over the last 80 years. What if we went back to the original 30 stocks and simply bought them and held them until today? Good, bad or indifferent, what would the results be?

I asked that question to good friend Rob Arnott of Research Affiliates. It turns out that he and Jeremy Siegel (of Wharton and Stocks for the Long Run fame) were corresponding over that very same question about the S&P 500. Rob helpfully sent my question on to one of his top research associates, Ms. Feifei Li, who spent a lot of time and effort to get me several large spreadsheets, some of which are over 800 pages long. The rest of this letter is based on her research, some very helpful comments, and observations by Rob, with some homework by me. Any wrong conclusions are all mine.

So, the question of the day: would you have been better off investing in the index, or buying the 30 stocks and holding them? Further, would it make any difference if you price-weighted them or equal-weighted them (explanations below)? What about inflation? And how does that compare to the S&P 500?

And before you answer, remember that one stock, Bethlehem Steel, went bankrupt. You would be stuck with Chrysler, which was removed in 1979 for IBM, which itself had been taken out in 1939 for AT&T. There have been 55 changes in the components of the Dow over the last 80 years. Some of the original 30, listed below, we would all recognize. But our kids might not remember Victor Talking Machines or Nash Kelvinator (Nash Auto).

(Sidebar: As a country, we let LOTS of auto companies fail over the decades. My Dad worked at Nash Auto in Wisconsin during the Depression because he could play baseball for their semi-pro team. Remember Rambler or Studebaker? But now we obsess about keeping an auto industry and union jobs.)

The Original Dow 30 Components

The following companies are the original members of the Dow 30 on October 1, 1928:

Allied Chemical, American Can, American Smelting, American Sugar, American Tobacco B, Atlantic Refining, Bethlehem Steel, Chrysler, General Electric Company, General Motors Corporation, General Railway Signal, Goodrich, International Harvester, International Nickel, Mack Truck, Nash Motors, North American, Paramount Publix, Postum Incorporated, Radio Corporation of America, Sears Roebuck & Company , Standard Oil (N.J.), Texas Company, Texas Gulf Sulphur, Union Carbide, U.S. Steel, Victor Talking Machine, Westinghouse Electric, Woolworth, and Wright Aeronautical.

Almost immediately the Dow 30 changed, as Radio Corporation of America bought Victor Talking Machines in January of 1929. Since RCA was already in the Dow, they added National Cash Register instead. Over time, US Steel became Marathon Oil. The remains of what was once mighty Woolworth are now Footlocker. Westinghouse is CBS. So, there have been some changes over time, leaving us only nine of the original Dow 30 still in the index.

For the insatiably curious, you can go to http://www.dogsofthedow.com/djdelete.htm and find a trove of data, including the additions and deletions over time.

Before we get into the actual data, a little about methodology. There is some subjectivity here. For instance, RCA was bought by GE in 1985. We did not then double-weight GE; we simply had one less component in our model. When Bethlehem Steel went bankrupt, that took away another component. While some stocks have clear trails all the way up until December of 2008, like Woolworth/Footlocker, others were taken private. We made our best effort to rationalize the data with the real world.

Adding and Subtracting Value

Now, the rather stark conclusion. As Rob noted to me in the email he sent with the data, "If Dow Jones hadn't tinkered with the index, the 30 companies would have merged or failed their way down to just 9 survivors. Of the 21 companies in the original 30 that are now gone, 20 disappeared through M&A, some were replaced by successor firms and others not, and only one (Bethlehem Steel) failed outright. But this no-fiddling index would have topped out at just over 30,000 in October 2007 and would have finished 2008 at 14,600. Ugly decline, but not as ugly as a level of 8776 [now down to 7300 as I type this]. This compounds out to a 0.7% per year greater return than the actual Dow 30 results. The difference comes from dropping companies when they're out of favor, and trading at deep discounts, only to replace them with popular large-cap, high-multiple newcomers."

Like Intel and Microsoft, as a prime example. And in the graph below, there was an almost immediate difference between the returns as RCA bought Victor, as mentioned above. But RCA was already in the Dow, so we did not double down on RCA but simply rebalanced with one less component for our 30.

The graph below is going to be hard to read for those who print it out in black and white, but I will try and talk you through it.

We track the original Dow 30 equal-weighted, the original Dow 30 using the Dow price-weighting methodology, and the S&P cap-weighted, for comparison. Also the Dow Total Return Index, the Dow price-only (no dividends), and the Dow 30 Real Price Index, or inflation-adjusted.

So, looking at the lines from the bottom and going up. First, let's see how you would have done on an inflation-adjusted basis with just the actual Dow 30. It's not pretty. The price-only inflation-adjusted index returns for the last 80 years are only a mediocre 1.4%! The price level of the Dow 30 is currently less than twice that of its August 1929 peak, net of inflation. Sadly, we last saw the 1929 peak level as recently as October of 1992. That means that an investor in the Dow 30, in August 1929, would have pocketed only the dividends, with no real price appreciation, for some 63 years.

Rob couldn't resist writing Jeremy, "Net of taxes on the dividends and cap gains taxation on the inflation "gains," the real after-tax return would have been awfully skinny. Jeremy, I hope you'll forgive me for saying so, but that's a 'Long Run' indeed!"

The next line is the Dow 30 price-only index (without dividends). That gives us a 4.6% annual average return. The next line up is the Dow 30 total returns, including dividends, which is 8.9%; this shows how important dividends are to the total return of the Dow. And with dividends now fairly skinny and being cut almost monthly by some component or other, we are left to wonder what total return will be over the next few years.

Next, we find that the S&P 500 cap-weighted index outperforms the Dow by about 0.2% annually, for a total return of 9.1%. Not much difference there.

Now we come to the interesting part. The next-to-the-top line is the original Dow 30, using a price-weighted index, just like the current Dow 30 uses. The only changes in the next 80 years are companies getting bought or dying. That "Original 30" gives us an annual return of 9.6%. Just 0.7% a year, so you might think, not much difference. But if you start with $100 and compound it for 80 years, that 0.7% becomes a quite large differential. With the Dow 30, your $100 would have grown to $96,993 as of December 2008, but the Original 30 would have grown to $161,603.

And there is an even bigger differential if you simply equal-weight the components rather than use a price-weighting methodology. Your $100 grows at a 10.4% clip and becomes $272,554, or almost three times the actual Dow 30. This is probably due to the fact that, whenever a change was necessary, it would be natural to add one of the more popular and respected large-cap growth stocks that wasn't already on the list. It's hard to earn a "risk premium" on assets that are not seen as having much risk!

What accounts for the difference? There were 34 changes in Dow components in the first five years. Many were dropped and then added back in. It was a VERY fluid index. There were two changes in 1939. IBM was dropped for AT&T, and Nash Kelvinator was again dropped for United Technologies. (NK was dropped the first time in 1930, only to be added back in 1932.) But, most of our Original 30 survived the Depression, so the Original 30 was largely unchanged during those tumultuous years.

Then, from 1939 there were no changes until 1956, when International Paper was added, followed by four changes in 1959. There were only three changes in the late 1970s and five in the '80s, but since then there have been 17 changes. The past two decades hardly qualify for buy and hold.

And we may see more changes. Anyone care to speculate on when General Motors gets replaced? Can you have a bankrupt component of the Dow, which typically removes a stock below $10? GM is now at $2, which is basically a call option on the Obama administration not completely wiping out shareholders in a bankruptcy. GE was down to $5.89 before rebounding today to $10.89. Could you really replace GE?

Can we find some nuggets of investing wisdom here? I think the thing that stands out most to me is how the slight difference of value over growth builds up over time, which is what a number of other studies show. This goes along with my numerous exhortations that the valuations you start with when you invest in stocks have a great influence on the long-term returns.

A market-cap-weighted index will tend to perform better than a price-weighted index over time, again because of the value orientation of the cap weighting. But equal weighting or, better yet, weighting and indexing according to valuation fundamentals like price to earnings, price to sales, price to book, etc. is even better. We don't have time to delve back into the research on fundamental indexes, but the letters I have written on it are in my archives at http://www.investorsinsight.com/.

A Few Thoughts from Richard Russell

As noted above, well over 400 guests will honor Richard Russell this weekend for 50 years of writing the incomparable Dow Theory Letters. A lot of people ask him how can they succeed as writers. He recently made some comments which I thought I would pass on, because they are so right. Also, he gives us a few fascinating moments, looking back over his career.

But first, let me thank the following firms and people for their generous support of this evening as sponsors, which will allow us to make a donation in Richard's name to his favorite charity, the Autism Foundation in San Diego:

Matthew Connors of ProFunds (www.profunds.com)

Ian McAvity of Deliberations

Bill Bonner, founder of Agora and editor of The Daily Reckoning (www.dailyreckoning.com )

Monex (www.monex.com)

Frank Trotter of Everbank (www.everbank.com)

Martin Zweig

Robert Prechter (http://www.elliottwave.com/)

And now, let's turn to Richard:

"I've been in this business a l-o-o-o-n-g time, and I've known a lot of great people, mostly through their subscriptions. Stanley Kubrick, the genius movie producer and director, was a subscriber for many years. Stan was a gold man, and we used to correspond. Stanley would tear off a piece of yellow paper and write notes to me. He invited me to visit his studio, 30 miles outside of London. When I visited England years ago, damn it, I completely forgot to visit him, a mistake I've always regretted.

"Marlon Brando's dad was a subscriber for years. I had met his Marlon while he was shooting On the Waterfront. I exchanged services with the great Hamilton Bolton, genius writer for The Bank Credit Analyst. Marty Zweig is a good friend of mine, and when Marty retired I took over his advisory -- this was years ago, and I still have many of Marty's subscribers on the books. I knew Garfield Drew, the original interpreter of the odd lots. I also knew E. George Schaefer, who authored his famous Dow Theory Trader advisory during the 1940s through the '70s. George used to run four-page ads in Barron's.

"John Magee was a friend of mine. John had a sign posted on his wall. It said, 'Don't tell me what to buy, tell me WHEN to buy it.' Bob Bleiberg, the brilliant editor of Barron's, was my friend and mentor. Bob was responsible for popularizing technical analysis of stock trends. General Marion Cooper was a subscriber. Coop invented the concept of King Kong and he produced the original movie. Coop was also adjutant general to Claire Chennault of the famous Flying Tigers, in Asia. The Tigers, with their outdated P-40s (painted like sharks), played hell with the Japanese off China.

"I'm very friendly with that fabulous pair, the gifted Aden sisters. I count Jim Grant (Interest Rate Observer) as a good friend (Jim is probably the best writer in the business). Then there's Robert Prechter of Elliott Wave fame (I originally urged Bob to go into business, and he's built up a wide following since). A few years ago, I took over Julian Snyder's business when Julie wanted to retire. I still talk with my old buddy Joey Granville. Other old-timers I keep in touch with are Jim Dines and Mister International -- the one and only Sir Harry Schultz.

"I guess my strangest subscriber was a priest who worked in a leper colony in West Africa. I never could figure out why he was interested in the stock market. The Bank of China was a subscriber; I don't know whether they still are. Many Arab organizations are subscribers. I used to say that I was the only Jew who the Arab big-wigs really listened to. Paul Penner, CEO of Agnico-Eagle, was a good friend of mine. Paul devoted his life to that gold mine, which is now one of the leading gold mines in Canada.

"The tireless, peripatetic John Mauldin is a good friend, and how John gets it all done (he has a million readers for his famous column) is a mystery to me.

"And it goes on and on. I did find that the stock market and finance was a totally democratic business. On Wall Street they don't give a damn who you are or what color or religion you are -- they only care about whether you know anything, which I believe is one of the best things about the money business.

How to Succeed at Writing

"I've been asked a thousand times, 'What's the secret of success in the advisory business?'

(1) You've got to be an obsessive nut to start with.

(2) You have to be able to write in a way that people understand and like to read.

(3) You can't come across as a phony who knows it all. Readers know that nobody knows it all.

(4) It helps if you have a long life and don't want to retire.

(5) You need a wife who can put up with a husband whose head is full of the markets 24 hours, day and night.

(6) Woody Allen said the 90% of success in life is just showing up. If you can show up for the markets 250 days a year, you're ready to start an advisory service (but I wouldn't wish this business on my worst enemy -- it's the closest thing to absolute madness. No wonder nobody else has lasted in the business 50 years).

(7) This is a lonely business. So be prepared. Need a friend? Get a dog. Need two friends? Get two dogs.

(8) One last thing -- you must have thick skin, because no matter what you write, some subscriber will send an e-mail calling you a moron or brain-damaged, and the scary thing is, that makes you think, because they may be right."

Conversations on Banks

This week I recorded a special conversation with Chris Whalen and Rich Lashley, two of the real experts on the US banking system. I learned a lot and found it a fascinating time. The Conversation will be up for subscribers the early part of next week. We will send you a notice. If you would like to know more about Conservations with John Mauldin, you can go to https://www.johnmauldin.com/newsletters2.html. The regular price for a yearly subscription is $199, but you can subscribe now for $109 and still get access to the previous timely Conversation with Ed Easterling and Lacy Hunt, as well as one with Nouriel Roubini. Don't wait, as I am sure my staff will only keep raising the price. To find out more, just click on the link and put in code JM75, which will give you the discounted price.

And for organizations that would like to purchase a discounted multiple subscription for all their brokers or partners, just drop Tiffani a note at conversations@2000wave.com and she will get back to you.

Copenhagen, London and Orange County, etc.

I will report at some point on the fascinating afternoon I had with Dr. Hans Keirstead, a professor at the University of California, Irvine, and one of the leading stem cell researchers in the world. We are on the cusp of amazing changes in medicine. Real therapies for numerous major killers like MS and spinal cord injuries are around the corner. It was a very upbeat session.

Today, I am in La Jolla for my Strategic Investment Conference, co-hosted with my partners Altegris Investments. I will be talking on how I see the global economy shaping up over the next few years. Eventually, that talk will make it into this weekly letter. Saturday night is the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner. Then home for a week. Easter weekend, all seven kids will be home. Then the following week I go to Copenhagen for a board meeting; and I will be in London, Thursday April 16 to meet with my European partners, Absolute Return Partners, and clients. The next weekend I go back to California for a conference sponsored by Rob Arnott, and then the next week I'll be a day or so in Orlando, where I'll speak at the CFA conference on the state of the alternative investment industry.

At the end of May (29-31), I will be in Naples, where I will be doing a seminar with Jyske Global Asset Management and Gary Scott. You can see more at www.jgam.com.

A quick note: There has been a lot of writing on mark-to-market. There were a few bloggers who said I was wrong (some rather rudely) about the mark-to-market changes that were coming. I hope by now they see they were wrong and have edited their remarks. And for a sense of what the mark-to-market controversy is all about, I suggest you look at this video presentation by Barry Habib of Mortgage Market Guide. Barry was on top of the issue months ago as the source of a lot of problems. It is done in a way that everyone can understand. http://www.mortgagesuccesssource.com/go/markmarket/index.html

This is a fun weekend. Almost 300 clients and friends are at my sold-out conference in La Jolla. And because of the Russell dinner, so many writers and publishers are here as well. And my business partners from around the world. And Tiffani is her usual well-dressed self. She rarely buys new clothes, but for whatever reason she goes all out for this weekend, and her attire is now subject to oohs and aahs, and she has a reputation to live up to. Dad is proud.

Have a great week, and find a few friends, at least over the phone, to share some time with. It is about the healthiest thing you can do.

Your ready to listen and learn this weekend analyst,

John Mauldin

Why Bother With Bonds?

John Mauldin — Sat, 28 Mar 2009 13:32:00 GMT

Why Bother With Bonds?
So Then, Bonds for the Long Run?
P/E Ratios at 200? Really?
Mark-to-Market Slip Slides Away
Housing Sales Improve? Not Hardly
La Jolla, Copenhagen, London, etc.

Investors, we are told, demand a risk premium for investing in stocks rather than bonds. Without that extra return, why invest in risky stocks if you can get guaranteed returns in bonds? This week we look at a brilliantly done paper examining whether or not investors have gotten better returns from stocks over the really long run and not just the last ten years, when stocks have wandered in the wilderness. This will not sit well with the buy and hope crowd, but the data is what the data is. Then we look at how bulls are spinning bad news into good and, if we have time, look at how you should analyze GDP numbers. Are we really down 6%? (Short answer: no.) It should make for a very interesting letter.

And for the last time, let me remind you of the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner this Saturday, April 4 in San Diego. We have had over 400 of Richard's fans (I guess you could say we are all groupies) sign up. A significant number of my fellow writers and publishers have committed to attend. It is going to be an investment-writer, Richard-reader, star-studded event. You are going to be able to rub shoulders with some very famous analysts and writers. If you are a fellow writer, you should make plans to attend or send me a note that I can put in the tribute book we are preparing for Richard. And feel free to mention this event in your letter as well. We want to make this night a special event for Richard and his family of readers and friends. So, if you haven't, go ahead and log on to https://www.johnmauldin.com/russell-tribute.html and sign up today. The room will be full, so don't procrastinate. I wouldn't want any of you to miss out on this tribute. I look forward to sharing the evening with all of you. I am really looking forward to that evening.

Why Bother With Bonds?

If stocks outperform bonds by as much as 5% over the long run then, for our truly long-term money, why should we bother with bonds? Why not just ignore the volatility and collect the increased risk premium from stocks? That is the message of those who believe in "Stocks for the Long Run" and also from those who want you to invest in their long-only mutual fund or managed account program. Indeed, it is always a good day to buy their fund.

One of my favorite analysts is my really good friend Rob Arnott. Rob is Chairman of Research Affiliates, out of Newport Beach, California, a research house which is responsible for the Fundamental Indexes which are breaking out everywhere (and which I have written about in past letters), as well as the only outside manager that PIMCO uses, for his asset allocation abilities. He has won so many industry awards and honors that I won't take the time to mention them. In short, Rob is brilliant.

He recently sent me a research paper that will be published next month in the Journal of Indexes, entitled "Bonds: Why Bother?" The publisher of the journal, Jim Wiandt, has graciously allowed me to review it for you prior to it actually being sent out. The entire article will be available when the Journal of Indexes goes to print in late April, at www.journalofindexes.com. Qualified financial professionals can also get a free subscription there to pick up the print copy. There is some very interesting research at the website. But let's look at a small portion of the essay. I am reducing 17 pages down to a few, so there is a lot more meat than I can cover here, but I will try and hit a few things that really struck me.

It is written into our investment truisms that investors expect their stock investments to outpace their bond investments over really long periods of time. Rob notes, and I confirm, that there are many places where investors are told that stocks have about a 5% risk premium over bonds.

By "risk premium," we mean the forward-looking expected returns of stocks over bonds. As noted above, if you do not think stocks will outperform bonds by some reasonable margin, then you should invest in bonds. That "reasonable margin" is called the risk premium, about which there is some considerable and heated debate.

Most people would consider 40 years to be the "long run." So, it is rather disconcerting, or shocking as Rob puts it, to find that not only have stocks not outperformed bonds for the last 40 plus years, but there has actually been a small negative risk premium.

In a footnote, Rob gets off a great shot, pointing out that the 5% risk premium seen in a lot of sales pitches is at best unreliable and is probably little more than an urban legend of the finance community.

How bad is it? Starting at any time from 1980 up to 2008, an investor in 20-year treasuries, rolling them over every year, beats the S&P 500 through January 2009! Even worse, going back 40 years to 1969, the 20-year bond investors still win, although by a marginal amount. And that is with a very bad bond market in the '70s.

Let's go back to the really long run. Starting in 1802, we find that stocks have beat bonds by about 2.5%, which, compounding over two centuries, is a huge differential. But there were some periods just like the recent past where stocks did in fact not beat bonds.

Look at the following chart. It shows the cumulative relative performance of stocks over bonds for the last 207 years. What it shows is that early in the 19^th century there was a period of 68 years where bonds outperformed stocks, another similar 20-year period corresponding with the Great Depression, and then the recent episode of 1968-2009.

In fact, note that stocks only marginally beat bonds for over 90 years in the 19^th century. (Remember, this is not a graph of stock returns, but of how well stocks did or did not do against bonds. A chart of actual stock returns looks much, much better.

Bill Bernstein notes that in the last century, from 1901-2000, stocks rose 9.89% before inflation and 6.45% after. Bonds paid an average of 4.85% but only 1.57% after inflation, giving a real yield difference of almost 5%. In the 19^th century the real (inflation-adjusted) difference between stocks and bonds was only about 1.5%.

In the late '90s, stock bulls would point out that there was no 30-year period where stocks did not beat bonds in the 20^th century. The 19^th century for them was meaningless, as the stock market then was small, and we were now in a modern world.

But what we had was a stock market bubble, just like in 1929, which convinced people of the superiority of stocks. And then we had the crash. Also, from 1932 to 2000 stocks beat bonds rather handily, again convincing investors that stocks were almost riskless compared to bonds. But in the aftermath of the bubble, yields on stocks dropped to 1%, compared to 6% in bonds. If you assumed that investors wanted a 5% risk premium, then that means they were expecting to get a compound 10% going forward from stocks. Instead, they have seen their long-term stock portfolios collapse anywhere from 40-70%, depending on which index you use.

So what is the actual risk premium? Rob Arnott and Peter Bernstein wrote a paper in 2002 about that very point. Their conclusion was that the risk premium seems to be 2.5%. Arnott writes:

"My point in exploring this extended stock market history is to demonstrate that the widely accepted notion of a reliable 5% equity risk premium is a myth. Over this full

207-year span, the average stock market yield and the average bond yield have been nearly identical. The 2.5 percentage point difference in returns had two sources: inflation averaging 1.5 percent trimmed the real returns available on bonds, while real earnings and dividend growth averaging 1.0 percent boosted the real returns on stocks. Today, the yields are again nearly identical. Does that mean that we should expect history's 2.5 percentage point excess return or the five percent premium that most investors expect?

"As Peter Bernstein and I suggested in 2002, it's hard to construct a scenario which delivers a five percent risk premium for stocks, relative to Treasury bonds, except from the troughs of a deep depression, unless we make some rather aggressive assumptions. This remains true to this day."

One other quick point from this paper. Just as capitalization-weighted indexes will tend to emphasize the larger stocks, many bond indexes have the same problem, in that they will overweight large bond issuers. At one point in 2001, Argentina was 20% of the Emerging Market Bond Index, simply because they issued too many bonds. If you bought the index, you had large losses. The same with the recent high-yield index which had 12% devoted to GM and Ford. In general, I do not like bond index funds, and this is just one more reason to eschew them.

So Then, Bonds for the Long Run?

Let me be clear here. I am not saying you should put your portfolio in 20-year bonds, or that I even expect 20-year bonds to outperform stocks over the next 20 years. Far from it! The lesson here is to be very careful of geeks bearing charts and graphs (it will be a challenge for my Chinese translator to translate that pun!). Very often, they are designed with biases within them that may not even be apparent to the person who created them.

Professor and Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson in late 1998 was quoted as saying, a bit sadly, "I have students of mine - PhDs - going around the country telling people it's a sure thing to be 100% invested in equities, if only you will sit out the temporary declines. It makes me cringe."

When someone tells you that stocks always beat bonds, or that stocks go up in the long run, they have not done their homework. At best, they are parroting bad research that makes their case, or they are simply trying to sell you something.

As I point out over and over, the long-run, 20-year returns you will get on your stock portfolios are VERY highly correlated with the valuations of the stock market at the time you invest. That is one reason why I contend that you can roughly time the stock market.

Valuations matter, as I wrote for many chapters in Bull's Eye Investing, where I suggested in 2003 that we were in a long-term secular bear market and that stocks would be a difficult place to be in the coming decade, based on valuations. I looked foolish in 2006 and most of 2007. Pundits on TV talked about a new bull market. But valuations were at nosebleed levels. And now?

I have been doing a lot of interviews with the press, with them wanting to know if I think this is the start of a new bull market. There are a lot of pundits on TV and in the press who think so. I also notice that many of them run mutual funds or long-only investment programs. What are they going to do, go on TV and say, "Sell my fund"? And get to keep their jobs?

Am I accusing them of being insincere? Maybe a few of them, but most have a built-in bias that points them to the positive news that would make their fund (finally!) perform. And believe me, I can empathize. It is part of the human condition. But you just need to keep that in mind when you are thinking about investing in a new fund, or rethinking your own portfolio.

P/E Ratios at 200? Really?

Just for fun, when I was interviewing with the New York Times today, I went to the S&P web site and looked at the earnings for the S&P 500. It's ugly. The as-reported loss for the S&P 500 for the 4^th quarter was $23.16 a share. This is the first reported quarterly loss in history. That almost wipes out the expected earnings for the next three quarters. For the trailing 12 months the P/E ratio, as of the end of the second quarter, is 199.97. Close enough to 200 for government work.

But it gets worse. The expected P/E ratio for the end of the third quarter is (drum roll, please) 258! However, taking the loss of the fourth quarter off the trailing returns allows us to get back to an estimated P/E of 23 by the end of 2009. The problem is that you have to believe the estimates, which I have shown are repeatedly being lowered each quarter, and which I expect to be lowered by at least another 25% in the coming months.

Now, much of that loss is coming from the financials, which showed staggering write-offs of $101 billion, $28 billion coming from (no surprise) AIG alone. Sales across the board are down almost 9%, with 290 companies reporting lower sales.

This quarter the estimated consensus GDP is somewhere between down 5% to down 7%. Last quarter we were down an annualized 6.3%. That would be two ugly quarters back to back. It is hard to believe earnings for nonfinancial companies are going to be all that much better.

Side note: The economy did not contract at 6.3% in the 4^th quarter. That is an annualized number. The quarter actually contracted at about 1.6%. If we go a whole year with a 6% contraction, that would be truly horrendous. We would blow right on through 10% unemployment. While it is possible, we should start to see somewhat better numbers in the second half of the year, although I still think they will be negative.

Mark-to-Market Slip Slides Away

But it is quite possible that the financial stocks see an improvement in earnings this quarter. The US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) changed the mark-to-market rules last week, which many (including your humble analyst) thought was needed. First, they suspended the mark-to-market rules for assets in distressed markets. Second, they widened the definition of "temporary" impairments of troubled assets, which will "allow banks to write up the value of some troubled assets if these have been hit by falling markets without (yet) suffering any significant credit losses." (www.gavekal.com)

Here's the important part. The board decided to make the new changes effective immediately, prior to full board approval on April 2.

As my friend Charles Gave noted, this will allow banks to write up their paper, and it happens before Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner starts putting taxpayer money at risk. Expect to see a pop in valuations. It will be interesting to see if Citi and B of A post profits this quarter.

(I should note that the International Accounting Standards Board sent out a scathing press release. I guess from that we should assume that European banks will not be so fortunate as their US counterparts.)

In theory, as I understand it, the information will still be there, but the way it will be recorded will not be reflected in the profit and loss statement. I understand that this is a very controversial proposal, and I expect many readers will disagree. The key is whether or not the information is available to investors and how the proposals are put into actual practice. If there is abuse, and regulators should be all over this, then the old rules must quickly go back into place.

This could put some strength back into financials, at least until the commercial mortgage and credit card problems start having to be written off. At the least, it could make for another solid rise in the stock market until we start to get what I expect to be very bad 1^st and 2^nd quarter earnings.

Housing Sales Improve? Not Hardly

I opened the Wall Street Journal and read that new home sales were up in February. Bloomberg reported that sales were "unexpectedly" up by 4.7%. I was intrigued, so I went to the data. As it turns out, sales were down 41% year over year, but up slightly from January.

But if you look at the data series, there was nothing unexpected about it. For years on end, February sales are up over January. It seems we like to buy homes in the spring and summer and then sales fall off in the fall and winter. It is a very seasonal thing. If you use the seasonally adjusted numbers, you find sales were down 2.9% instead of up 4.7%. But the media reports the positive number. Interestingly, they report the seasonally adjusted numbers for initial claims, which have been a lot better than the actual numbers. Not that they are looking to just report positive news, you understand.

Plus, as my friend Barry Ritholtz points out, the 4.7% rise was "plus or minus 18.3%". That means sales could have risen as much as 23% or dropped 13%. We won't know for awhile until we get real numbers and not estimates. Hanging your outlook for the economy or the housing market on one-month estimates is an exercise in futility, and could come back to embarrass you.

But that brings up my final point tonight, and that is how data gets revised by the various government agencies. Typically with these government statistics, you get a preliminary number, which is a guess based on past trends, and then as time goes along that data is revised. In recessions like we are in now the revisions are almost always negative.

There is no conspiracy here. The people who work in the government offices have to create a model to make estimates. Each data series, whether new home sales, employment, or durable goods sales, etc., has its own unique sets of characteristics. The estimates are based on past historical performance. There is really no other way to do it.

So, past performance in a recession suggests higher estimates than what really happens. Then, the numbers in the following months are revised downward as actual numbers are obtained. But the estimates in the current months are still too high. That makes the comparisons generally favorable, at least for one month. And the media and the bulls leap all over the "data," and some silly economist goes on TV or in the press and says something like, "This is a sign that things are stabilizing." It drives me nuts.

Ignore month-to-month estimated data. The key thing to look for is the direction of the revisions. If they are down, as they have been for over a year, then that is a bad sign. Further, one month's estimates are just noise. Look at the year-over-year numbers. When the direction of the revisions is positive and the year-over-year numbers are starting to stabilize, then we will know things are starting to turn around.

La Jolla, Copenhagen, London, etc.

April is a travel month. Next week I am going to a presentation in Irvine on the state of stem cell research, which I must admit fascinates me. Then I'm in La Jolla for my Strategic Investment conference, co-hosted with my partners Altegris Investments. Then home for a week. Easter weekend, all seven kids will be home. Then the next week I go to Copenhagen for a board meeting; and I will be in London, Thursday April 16 to meet with my European partners, Absolute Return Partners, and clients. The next weekend I go back to California for a conference, and then the next week I'll be a day or so in Orlando, where I'll speak at the CFA conference on the state of the alternative investment industry.

While I'm in London, I need to drop by and buy a pint for David Stevenson, a columnist for the Financial Times. Seems that he was asking his readers for nominations for best financial websites. For whatever reason, he decided I deserved a special award: "Best online commentator goes to US analyst John Mauldin, whose weekly letters at www.frontlinethoughts.com are required reading for all the big City-based bears I encounter." It's nice to be appreciated.

At the end of May (29-31), I will be in Naples, where I will be doing a seminar with Jyske Global Asset Management and Gary Scott. I will try to line up a web site where you can see whether you would like to attend.

It's after midnight and time to hit the send button. The day simply vanished on me, although I did get to the gym, at least. I am working hard, but somebody turned the dial down on my metabolism.

Have a great weekend. It is spring in the northern hemisphere, and the azaleas in Texas are awesome this year. Make sure you stop and enjoy nature a little this spring (or fall, for you blokes Down Under).

Your getting more skeptical of data as I get older analyst,

John Mauldin

The Swiss Start Their Engines

John Mauldin — Sat, 14 Mar 2009 14:03:26 GMT

Where Have My Earnings Gone?
The Land of the Setting Sun
The Swiss Start Their Engines
My One True Nightmare
New York, Vegas, and Happy Birthday, Tiffani

This week we look at the Land of the Rising Sun. Japan is going through major upheavals, and they will have consequences all over the world. And what are those wild and crazy Swiss central bankers up to? It's time for another round of competitive devaluation. And of course I have to look at the recent Barron's cover story, about how stocks are cheap. There's a lot to cover.

But first, and quickly, I just wanted to take a moment and remind you to sign up for the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner, all set for Saturday, April 4 at the Manchester Grand Hyatt in San Diego - if you haven't already. This is sure to be an extraordinary evening honoring a great friend and associate of mine, and yours as well. I do hope that you can join us for a night of memories, laughs, and good fun with fellow admirers and long-time readers of Richard's Dow Theory Letter. The room is filling up and there will be a very large crowd.

A significant number of my fellow writers and publishers have committed to attend. It is going to be an investment-writer, Richard-reader, star-studded event. You are going to be able to rub shoulders with some very famous analysts and writers. If you are a fellow writer, you should make plans to attend or send me a note that I can put in a tribute book we are preparing for Richard. And feel free to mention this event in your letter as well. We want to make this night a special event for Richard and his family of readers and friends. So, if you haven't, go ahead and log on to https://www.johnmauldin.com/russell-tribute.html and sign up today. The room will be full, so don't procrastinate. I wouldn't want any of you to miss out on this tribute. I look forward to sharing the evening with all of you.

Where Have My Earnings Gone?

Barron's probably jinxed the stock market by stating why they think the Dow won't fall to 5000, although we do have what I hope is the start of a nice bear market rally. Part of their reasoning is that stocks are cheap. They assign a price to earnings (P/E) ratio of a lowly 13, based upon 2009 estimated earnings of $51 in operating profits, which they suggest is historically low. And I agree that 13 is toward the low end and would represent a good long-term buying opportunity - if indeed it was 13.

Actually, if you want to get really bullish, go to S&P's web site and look at their estimated earnings for 2009. They calculate a P/E of 10.89 on 2009 estimated operating earnings.

As I have written over the years, the long-term P/E studies all use "as-reported" earnings, or earnings that are reported on tax returns. Operating earnings are of the EBBS variety, or Earnings Before Bad Stuff (or whatever you want to designate as the BS component). Companies like to tell us to ignore all those "one-time" writedowns, which seem to happen a lot more than once these days.

Going back a few decades, operating and as-reported earnings were very closely aligned. That relationship began to change in the mid-'90s, as management wanted to make a more bullish case, which certainly helped with their stock options. And the difference between operating and as-reported earnings is now wider than ever.

The difference between estimates for 2009 operating and as-reported earnings is almost exactly 100%. Which means that analysts are projecting there is going to be a lot of Bad Stuff in 2009 to be written down. The table below is a cut and paste from the S&P web site, where they calculate the earnings for the S&P 500. Notice the difference between the P/E ratios for operating and as-reported earnings. The latter P/E is based on the previous 12 months and used Thursday's price, so if you calculate it today it would be slightly higher.

Did you notice the as-reported estimated earnings P/E for the quarter ending September 30, 2009? In the 20 years of data on the web site, the highest it ever got to was 46, in the last recession. That P/E of 181 is because of the negative earnings for the 4^th quarter of 2008. Of course, this assumes that earnings estimates don't keep being revised downward, which is not a safe assumption. They have been revised downward every quarter for almost two years. Seemingly, past projections are not indicative of future results.

Now, to be fair, using the extremely bad earnings of the recent past as a one-time metric is not altogether indicative either. Robert Shiller of Yale uses ten-year average earnings to smooth out the business cycle, and this would give you a P/E of about 13.

My good friend Ed Easterling uses a different methodology to project earnings, involving the historical relationship between GDP and P/E ratios. This is based upon the historical fact that earnings more or less rise at the level of GDP plus inflation. This is a mean-reverting chart, as earnings cannot grow faster than GDP for too long, and also acknowledges that rough patches like the one we are in now will not last, and earnings will rebound. Using his methodology we end up with a P/E just south of 13.

So, I know a lot of you have stayed in the market the whole time it has been falling and are now wondering what to do. If you have a ten-year time horizon you probably can buy here and do OK. But I wouldn't. I think this market is going to have more problems as we confront the real possibility that we will get some really poor earnings for the first and second quarters. The economy is simply weak, and that weakness is hitting more and more companies. From exporting companies to the big international firms, a global slowdown is hitting almost everyone. Even hospitals are being challenged. We could see a real bear market rally lure investors back in, just to crush their hopes this summer.

Markets go from high valuations to low valuations and back again over long periods of time. I believe that we have a long time to go in the current secular bear cycle. As I have written for years, this one began in 2000 and could last until the middle of the next decade. While we will see a "bottom" in stock prices at some point, maybe even this year, we have a long way to go to get to a really low P/E ratio.

Big secular bull markets happen when P/E ratios drop below 10 (and even lower). That acts just like winding a spring. When it is let loose, it explodes for a very long time. There is another bull market in front of us. I would rather be patient and rely on an absolute-return style of investing for now. If I miss the first part of this run, so be it. I see more risk than reward in this latest run-up.

The Land of the Setting Sun

Japan has been in a malaise for 20 years. And just when it looked like the country might turn around, the bottom has seemingly fallen out. Japan's economy shrank a slightly revised 3.2% in the last quarter of last year, confirming the sharpest contraction since the oil crisis in 1974, and economists warn of further contraction in the next two quarters.

The Japanese economy, mired in its worst recession since World War II, is forecast to shrink a further 2.5% in the first quarter of this year and another 0.4% in the second quarter, a Reuters poll shows.

But if you look at the underlying data, it's even worse. Let's turn to a recent letter from my good friend and favorite data maven, Greg Weldon. (www.weldononline.com)

Japanese exports have fallen 54% in the last 6 months, an average of $40 billion a month, or down over a quarter of a trillion dollars. Greg notes that past 6-month changes in exports in Japan were hardly ever up or down more than a trillion yen. This is four times that level, about 4 trillion yen. To get a visual view, look at the graph below. That is called falling off a cliff.

The decline in exports is about 45% year over year. Japan is one of the countries that has run a very large trade surplus, allowing them to buy lots of dollars and lend a great deal of money. Their banks have been an engine for growth worldwide, but especially in Asia. And the graph below shows that trade surplus turning into a large trade deficit of 952 billion yen, or somewhere over 9 billion dollars.

To give that some perspective, the US trade deficit came in today and was "only" $36 billion, the lowest level in six years, mainly due to lower oil prices, as our exports have been shrinking as well (more on that below). The US economy is roughly three times the size of Japan's (and Japan is the world's second largest economy); so $9 billion is no small sum of money, relatively speaking.

(Quick note - while looking for that number on the web, I came across this tidbit in the China Daily. They project that the GDP of China will surpass Japan's next year.)

Inventory-to-shipping ratios in Japan are rising by over 50%, as industrial production is down more than 10% and likely to fall much further. Japanese auto exports are down 63% in just four months. Auto exports have literally fallen off a cliff, as inventories have doubled.

No surprise, Japan is promising even more government support programs, and aid to industries of all sorts. This from a government that has over 140% of debt to GDP, about twice that of the US. And their rapidly rising credit default swap rate is not helping. Who would have thought of Japan as a credit risk? Three years ago, almost no one. Now, rates are 30 times higher.

Japan's economy is driven by exports. And those exports were crushed as the yen rose in buying power and Japan's exports became less competitive in the last quarter, with calls for intervention to bring the yen back to a level where their industries can be more competitive. Look at the chart below of the Japanese yen versus the US dollar. (The moving average is 90 days.)

Note that less than two years ago the yen was over 124 to the dollar, and fell last quarter to below 87, and has risen back to 98 today. Think about the Japanese auto manufacturer. Two years ago he could sell his car in the US (or wherever) for $30,000 and get 3,750,000 yen. Today, that $30k only gets him a little under 3,000,000 yen. Think his costs dropped 20%? Think he can raise prices 25%?

If you sell machinery, you are competing with companies, countries, and currencies all over the world. If your currency rises, you are less competitive, or your profits have to fall.

Japan has problems, and not just in manufacturing. The population of the country is now literally shrinking, as they have the highest proportion of elderly people and the lowest proportion of children. By 2050, 70% of the labor force will have disappeared. While Toyota is the world's largest car company, auto sales in Japan peaked 18 years ago. Supermarket sales have fallen every year for the last 11 years. This is a country in a long-term decline, with massive debt. While there is still a lot of economic power there, it is not the country of the future. Unless they figure out how to grow their population, it will be a long slow slide.

The Swiss Start Their Engines

About five years ago Greg Weldon (mentioned above), a big NASCAR fan, introduced the idea of a competitive devaluation raceway among Asian countries trying to make sure they could compete against each other to produce "stuff" for the US consumer, with each "car" drafting the other as they went around the turns, trying to get a competitive advantage by manipulating their currencies.

Today, I heard a new engine roar, one that I have never heard before. It is a deep-throated and powerful new entry into the devaluation race, and one that will have large ramifications for world trade. Gentle reader, this is huge, and we visited Japan first to give you some idea of the problems all over the world, for indeed we could have picked any number of countries and told as sad a tale.

But who would have picked Switzerland? Yet we read this morning, "The Swiss franc posted its biggest weekly decline against the euro since 1999 after the country's central bank sold the currency to halt a 7.6 percent appreciation in the past six months.

"The franc was also near the lowest level versus the dollar in three months after the Swiss National Bank's (SNB) first solo intervention in foreign-exchange markets since 1992. The SNB also said yesterday it will buy corporate bonds as it cut the benchmark three-month Libor target rate to 0.25% from 0.5% to revive the economy."

This is tectonic. It is a game changer. First, they did it before the upcoming G-20 meeting. They clearly felt they could not wait. And they moved the currency big-time. Look at the chart below of the Swiss franc against the euro. The far right bar jumped 7 big "handles" in a few hours. (A handle is trader talk for a unit of movement.) Currency markets have been violent of late, but this is huge. Currencies are supposed to move at a glacial pace, not by 4-5% in a day!

The Swiss economy will slump by as much as 3% this year, the most since at least 1975, the central bank said yesterday. Price pressures evaporated in recent months as oil prices sank, the franc strengthened, and domestic demand dropped. Prices will probably decline this year and inflation will be "very close to zero" in 2010 and 2011, the SNB said. The franc's appreciation made Swiss products less competitive in Europe and the US, where deepening recessions were already curbing demand. (Bloomberg)

The story goes on to talk about numerous Swiss businesses that simply were not competitive with the rise in the value of the franc against the euro. With their economy slumping, with deflation knocking at their door, they clearly felt the need to act. Note they plan to buy corporate bonds to inject money into their economy. The Swiss, being frugal, don't have that many bonds, so the central bank may have some trouble finding enough to stimulate their economy - thus they are clearly prepared to use the currency tool in the cabinet to help stimulate their economy.

The last time a G-10 nation intervened in its currency was in 2003 when Japan tried, and oddly failed, as their currency had risen about 6% a year later. That caused me to write back then that their central bank established a new level of central bank ineffectiveness, because they could not figure out how to destroy their own currency, even when they wanted to.

The point is that such interventions by major developed countries are rare. Whatever their reasons, the Swiss have opened Pandora's box. Do Senators Schumer and Graham now start talking about that major currency manipulator, Switzerland, and start to introduce bills to punish them? Will Secretary Geithner come before a Congressional committee and call the Swiss currency manipulators? If not, then how do we deal with China?

Because China can now say, with some justification, that if the Swiss can manipulate their currency to make themselves more competitive, then why is it wrong for us? And how long do you think it will be until Japan tries once again to push the yen lower, with its export industries in tatters? And Korea? Taiwan?

You can almost hear the announcement over the loudspeakers: "Gentlemen, start your engines!"

My One True Nightmare

Let's be clear. As bad as things are, and they will probably get worse, I am a believer in free markets and the ability of people to figure out their own paths. And it is 300,000,000 people in the US and billions worldwide, each acting in their own interest, that will bring us back to a growing global economy.

But there is one thing that worries me above all else. For over six years I have been writing that the one thing that could truly derail the world economy is protectionism. Nothing would be more deleterious in today's global economy.

And that brings us to this stark note I read today on Bloomberg. It sent chills down my spine: "American exports have slumped at a 44% annual pace in the most recent six months of data, with imports shrinking 51%, probably the most since the Great Depression, according to Morgan Stanley analysts. The figures may add to pressure on the Obama administration to rework international agreements and include protections for US workers and the environment."

The US steel industry is planning to bring anti-dumping charges against foreign steel. India just raised steel tariffs. It seems like every day I read that someone somewhere is calling for their particular industry to be protected, bailed out, or subsidized. And it is not just the US. It is happening all over the world.

Right now, it is just small amounts and nothing that will rock the system. But these things can get a life of their own. If the Swiss can move to take their currency lower, then there will be a score of countries that will ask why they shouldn't be allowed to do the same. And the one currency they all want to be lower against? The dollar. Even though our economy is in shambles and consumer spending is falling, it is still a huge spending machine. And every export-growth-led country wants a piece of it.

We are getting ready to run a huge, $3-trillion deficit, and the Fed is going to print a lot of money and inject it into the economy. There is real reason to worry about the strength of the dollar. And yet, the dollar is the weakest currency except for all the others. As much as we in the US worry about the fall of the dollar, it could rise over the coming year.

That is going to put a lot of pressure from a lot of sources on President Obama, who ran as a populist. Here is hoping that his advisors steer him away from starting a round of trade protectionism that could beggar the world, just as Smoot-Hawley did 75 years ago. This bears watching closely.

New York, Vegas, and Happy Birthday, Tiffani

I will be in New York next week for a few days, and hope to have dinner with Art Cashin. I have a lot of meetings scheduled. Details are firming up. Then it's Doug Casey's "Crisis & Opportunity Summit," March 20-22 in Las Vegas, where I get to be the resident bull! Click to learn more about the Summit.

I will then go to La Jolla for my own Strategic Investment Conference, April 2-4. It is sold out; but as I mentioned at the top of the letter, you can still get tickets to the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner.

And today, Tiffani, my oldest daughter and business partner, is 32. She is holed up in the wilds of Kentucky working on our book. It is hard for me to express how great it is to be working with her. As all my partners know, she really does run the business, letting me do what I do and giving me the time to research and write to you.

And just to brag a little, here is a picture of my four girls. Dad is very lucky. And maybe this is just a little reason I remain so optimistic in spite of everything.

Time to hit the send button. Have a great week, and remember that we will all get through this together. That is what friends are for.

Your ready for some down time analyst,

John Mauldin

The Law of Unintended Consequences

John Mauldin — Sat, 07 Mar 2009 02:50:41 GMT

Unintended Consequences
The I-Factor
Rating Agencies Gone Wild
Knights to the Rescue

Rules have consequences. And sometimes they have unintended consequences. If I told you that the US government was going to give multiple tens of billions of taxpayer dollars to hedge funds and private investors, you would justifiably not be happy. I think the word angry would come to mind. But that is exactly what is happening, as a result of rules that were written for a time and place seemingly long ago and far, far away. Further, we are looking at potentially much larger sums being lost in the bank bailout (can we say hundreds of billions?), a reduced lending capacity at banks and, in general, a worsening of the very problems at the core of the crisis.

The good news is that it can be fixed, but the authorities need to get a sense of urgency. As Steve Forbes writes today in the Wall Street Journal, Obama is continuing with the worst of Bush's policies, making the crisis far worse than it should be. It is as if we are giving all 13-year-old kids a "F" in math because one kid failed.

Today's letter will look at some rather obscure rules which are having major unintended (and negative!) consequences, and what can be done. Then, if we have enough time, we will look quickly at Japan, unemployment, and a few more statistical predictions of when the recession will end that you should be very wary of. It's a lot to cover, but it should make for an interesting letter.

But first, and quickly, I just wanted to take a moment and remind you to sign up for the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner, all set for Saturday, April 4 at the Manchester Grand Hyatt in San Diego -- if you haven't already. This is sure to be an extraordinary evening honoring a great friend and associate of mine, and yours as well. I do hope that you can join us for a night of memories, laughs, and good fun with fellow admirers and long-time readers of Richard's Dow Theory Letter.

A significant number of my fellow writers and publishers have committed to attend. It is going to be an investment-writer, Richard-reader, star-studded event. If you are a fellow writer, you should make plans to attend or send me a note that I can put in a tribute book we are preparing for Richard. And feel free to mention this event in your letter as well. We want to make this night a special event for Richard and his family of readers and friends. So, if you haven't, go ahead and log on to https://www.johnmauldin.com/russell-tribute.html and sign up today. The room will be full, so don't procrastinate. I wouldn't want any of you to miss out on this tribute. I look forward to sharing the evening with all of you.

I am looking for a few sponsors to help with the costs, to make sure we do this evening right. A number of friends, along with EverBank (www.everbank.com) and ProFunds (http://www.profunds.com/), have already committed. Drop me a note if you would like to be a sponsor as well. And now to a discussion of the rules.

Unintended Consequences

(Let me state at the outset that I am going to oversimplify this story to keep it from getting too long and technical, because I think it will make it far more readable and understandable to the majority of readers.)

Let me note that while I am talking about rules that do not make sense, this in no way should be seen as a criticism of the regulators. It is their job to enforce the rules, not make them. The authorities at the top (including Congress and the administration) should be taking action.

In the beginning there were ratings agencies, and they rated corporate bonds from the very highest of credit quality (AAA) down to junk (CCC).

Now AAA means that the chances of losing money are very, very low. With each level of increased incremental risk comes a lower rating. If a corporate bond was at risk for losing just one dollar, it was rated all the way down to junk. And that was fine. Everybody knew the rules of the game.

But then investment banks asked the agencies to rate a large group of home mortgages in a pool known as a Residential Mortgage Backed Security (RMBS). The investment bank would divide the pool (the RMBS) into various tranches. The highest-rated tranche would be given a rating of AAA. Let's say that the AAA tranche was 92% of the loan pool. The AAA tranche would get the first 92% of all monies coming into the pool before the other investors were paid (again, really oversimplified, but that is the net effect). That would mean that the pool could have 16% of the home loans default and lose 50% of their value before the AAA tranche would lose even one dollar.

We all know now, though, that some of those AAA-rated tranches are in fact going to lose money. And the rating agencies are now writing down the ratings on the former AAA tranches.

I am not talking about the exotic CDOs and CDO squareds, or some of the truly toxic securitized assets which are going to zero. What I am writing about today are plain vanilla mortgages grouped together in securitized pools.

I wrote three weeks ago, "The downgrades by Moody's today of 2,446 different classes of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities will be a real blow. Moody's warned in a report last week that loss assumptions would be increased for RMBS and that downgrades could be expected. Moody's is projecting that alt-A deals originated in the second half of 2007 will experience 25.5% losses of original balance, compared to 23.9% of 1H07 deals, 22.1% for H206 deals, and 17.1% for 1H06 deals. The rating agency in May expected average losses for 2006 and 2007 vintage deals to reach 11.2% and 14.7%, respectively." (The Big Picture)

Fitch and S&P are also piling on with downgrades. Most of them see RMBS's go from AAA all the way down to junk. This has some very bad unintended consequences.

Let's say a bank has a loan portfolio of 1,000 individual mortgages valued at an average $200,000, for a total portfolio value of $200 million. The loan officers were not very good, and it turns out that 18% of the homes went into foreclosure and lost an average of 50%. That means 180 homes went into foreclosure and that the bank lost an average of $100,000 per home, or $18 million overall. The bank was charging 6% interest, so in a few years it would at least have its original investment back, although the losses would eat into capital.

To make those loans of $200 million, the bank would need at least $20 million in capital, and so would need to go raise some money or reduce its loan portfolio by selling the performing loans. The reality is that for a bank to have such a large mortgage book, it would probably be a much larger and better-capitalized bank. If it were not, it would soon be taken over by the FDIC.

Note that the remaining 82% of loans are still performing and are carried on the books at full value (again, oversimplified). There is real value in the remaining loan portfolio.

But what if the bank invested in a RMBS that was rated AAA, and 18% of the loans in the security went bad? Remember, the AAA tranche gets the first 92% of income. The loss to the RMBS is 9% of capital. The losses to the AAA tranche are only 1%. Hardly a catastrophe. Annoying, but something you can deal with. Except for some very nasty rules.

Remember, a bond is downgraded to junk if it loses even $1. Now, let's take it to the real world.

Say a bank buys a $1-million AAA portion of that large RMBS. It can use that AAA debt in its capital base, and can actually lever it up about five times, as the rules only make the bank take a 20% "haircut" on an AAA bond. But if the bond goes to CCC, the bank must now move the entire bond to its "risk-impaired" portfolio. And because most institutions cannot buy junk paper, there are very few buyers out there who will want to buy it -- mostly hedge funds and private capital. The price on that paper might easily drop to $.50 on the dollar because of the potential for a 1% loss.

The accountants, being conservative and living with new mark-to-market rules, make the bank take a $500,000 loss. This directly reduces regulatory capital by $500,000. Banks are required to have a maximum of 8% of risk-impaired assets as compared to solid capital to be considered adequately capitalized. Keeping the asset on the books means they have $1 million of risk-weighted assets. If they have to sell to get the capital required to follow the regulations, they will lose $500,000.

And they lose this on an asset that the rating agencies say might lose $1 ten years from now.

Again, at the risk of oversimplification, if they keep the security that also means that the bank loses roughly $10 million in lending capacity. They have to reduce their loan book or raise more capital.

Rating Agencies Gone Wild

Here's the truth. That bond should never have been rated AAA to begin with, and it shouldn't be rated CCC today. The ratings agencies took a perfectly fine corporate bond rating system and tried to bootleg it onto a security that has an entirely different set of circumstances. A corporate bond is a bond from one company or one obligor. An RMBS might have several thousand obligors. (An obligor is a person or entity that is obligated to pay back debt.)

It was very convenient for investment banks to get the rating agencies to use the corporate bond analogies, because that meant they did not have to explain a new system. Everyone knew what AAA meant, or AA or BBB. A bond buyer in Europe or at a pension fund simply looked at the rating and hit the buy button. Easy. No need for a lot of research. Make your purchases and go to lunch.

While I can't go into specifics, I have looked into these bonds with some real interest. Let's assume that you can actually buy an AAA tranche of an RMBS at $.60 on the dollar. That means that 80% of the mortgages would have to go into foreclosure and lose 50% before you would ever lose a penny.

There are AAA bonds selling at steep discounts that are composed of mortgages with 80% loan-to-value in 2005, a 7% interest rate, and 90+ percent performing loans. These loans are being called in as mortgagees take advantage of lower rates and refinance. And with Obama's new proposed lower rates, even more of these loans will be refinanced. If you buy the loan at $.60 on the dollar, and it gets refinanced, you get an immediate capital gain of almost 50%! If it keeps on being paid, you get an effective rate of about 10%.

So, why wouldn't there be a lot of institutions standing in line to buy such a dream investment? Because banks fear the danger that the security will get downgraded, just like the thousands of such instruments that have already been downgraded, and then their regulatory capital will be impaired. The technical banking term is that you would be screwed. So you don't buy what would be a very good performing asset, because of the rules.

So, who can (and does!) buy? Hedge funds and private investors with liquidity. But these "vulture capitalists" (among whom are many of my friends) know that the sellers are operating from a position of weakness. And because there are not enough of them to buy the bonds on offer, the prices of these bonds are very low. Smart money managers are raising money to exploit these distressed sellers.

So, in effect, we are giving banks taxpayer money while forcing them to sell assets that might be worth $.95 cents on the dollar in a less-stressed world. We are shoveling money in the front door while it is being pushed out the back door to my friends at the hedge funds.

How much are we talking about? US banks and thrifts have $315 billion in AAA non-agency (Fannie and Freddie) bonds, insurance companies have $190 billion, broker dealers have $75 billion. Overseas investors have $160 billion. Banks have written down about $700 billion in assets. The majority of those losses have been mark-to-market write-downs and not actual losses. Yet taxpayers are in essence paying them to sell, because the rules say they have to raise capital.

Some simple rules changes would solve a lot of this problem. First, let's recognize that the root of this particular problem is the ratings system. If an RMBS is likely to get $.95 of its capital, then it should be valued at some number below that, but don't make them assign it 100% to their risk capital. That is like making the bank with the 1,000 home loans in its portfolio write off all of them because 18% are bad. In principle, there should be no difference.

Then, the Federal Reserve should call in the rating agencies and have a "come to Jesus" meeting. They are at the heart of the problem, and they need to fix it. They need to change their ratings system for packaged securities like RMBS's.

The I-Factor

Let me throw out one idea (there are likely to be a lot better ones, but let's get some ideas on the table). Let's move away from using standard bond ratings for multi-obligor securities. Why not rate a bond by the percentage of capital likely to be returned? Let's call it the Impairment Factor, or I-Factor. If a bond is likely to lose 10% of its capital, then it would have an I-Factor of 10%. An I-Factor of 0% would mean the bond should see all its capital returned, and an I-Factor of 100% would mean that all the money will be lost.

Now, that tells investors something. That's a useful statistic, as opposed to "CCC." What does CCC mean? Am I going to lose $1 or $1,000 or all my money? CCC gives me no useful information if I want to buy or sell a bond. And without real transparency, you end up with a world in which a few very knowledgeable buyers can make a lot of money.

That is because there are a lot of AAA bonds that are going to zero, as in 100% loss. If you are on an institutional desk and would like to participate in getting some of the better values, unless you have a very sophisticated team with good analysis software, you simply can't take the risk.

Further, if the rating agencies do their homework to figure out what the I-Factor is, they will have all sorts of useful information that can be disclosed about the security, such as average loan balance, average loan-to-value, how many loans are at risk of default, where the loans are, and scores of other details. Armed with that information, buyers can make rational decisions.

And if you modify the rules so that banks and other institutions can use those bonds (with an appropriate haircut) as part of their regulatory capital, then you immediately get a large number of buyers into the market, and that will make prices go up and mean that banks will need less taxpayer money.

The current rules were written for a time when banks actually bought corporate bonds. They made sense back then, and still do. But applying those ratings to asset-backed securities makes no sense. We need to change those rules now.

Marking assets to market when there are no markets is illogical. I have spent some time looking at these securities. Like kids, they are all different. And some are really different. Yet we make a bank mark an asset down because one that is in the same broad class is impaired. Like giving every 13-year-old in school an "F" in math because one kid failed.

Further, we don't make a bank mark down the value of a loan on its books if interest rates increase. The loan, if sold into a market, would indeed not be sold for book value. But the bank keeps it at book value on its books, and simply realizes less interest. If we made banks mark down their assets because of interest-rate increases, we would lurch from one bank crisis to another with every interest-rate cycle.

Let me be clear. I am for full transparency. If an asset is only worth ten cents on the dollar, then mark it down. We do not need zombie banks. For whatever reason, the Obama administration seems to be afraid to use the "N" word (nationalization). If a bank is insolvent, yet deemed too big to fail, then take it over, repackage it, and sell it back to the private market with some options that will allow for taxpayers to at least have the potential to get their money back. But do it quickly rather than dithering, as is happening now, because that will just cost more in the long run.

But as a start, change the accounting rules so that we stop shoveling taxpayer money in the front door to banks and out the back door to hedge funds. That can be done quickly if the administration simply says "do it."

Let me quote this note from Gary Townsend, which I wholeheartedly agree with:

"The problem, of course, is that the MTM (mark-to-market) results have little to do with the intrinsic value to a bank of a loan or a security that it plans to hold to maturity. In a bank, the decline in a loan's value is offset with a forward-looking provision for loan losses. The decline in the loan prices net of loan loss allowances is not due to credit deterioration; it's the result of the distortions and speculation in the world's financial markets. Mark-to-market accounting isn't improving the transparency of bank accounting. It has reduced it, with enormous and growing damage to our economy and prospects.

"The Financial Accounting Standards Board has said that it will issue new guidance on the application of FAS 157. That's encouraging, but can anyone recall when the FASB has been timely? The damage from this misguided rule is already huge, widespread, and growing daily. Mark-to-market accounting creates a powerful negative feedback loop. Actual or imputed FAS 157-related losses weaken capital ratios and undermine confidence in the financial system generally, which weakens the economy and adds pressure on loan pricing, causing more FAS 157 losses, and around we go.

"This cycle needs to be broken. Mary Schapiro? Tim Geithner? Are you listening?"

And let's add President Obama, Ben Bernanke, Barney Frank, Chris Dodd, and Larry Summers to the list of those who should be listening. I know that some of my readers will have access to these people. See if you can get them to focus on this problem, and let's move on to the next problem -- housing.

As a final note, I know that some regulatory bodies are in fact paying attention to this while others are not. Good on the ones who are listening. As for the others, the adults in charge need to make sure the kids are playing nicely in the sandbox. This is an argument for a significant review and reform of our regulatory system. But right now, we need some immediate action.

Knights to the Rescue

The world is in the throes of a global recession. But as usual, the very poorest are being hurt the most. I want to close by quickly asking you to consider helping one of my favorite causes, emergency relief for the poorest of the poor. My friends at Knightsbridge (Ed Artis, et al.) currently have three hundred thousand dollars of medical equipment and supplies (relief) sitting in two separate locations here in the United States. It's worthless while stored here but "gold" in the developing world. We need $37,000 to ship these items to the Philippines, where we can stage them for delivery to clinics in Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar, and the Philippines. This medical relief, when delivered, will save the lives of thousands of people affected by disease and poverty.

Knightsbridge works with many people around the world who volunteer their time to help us hand-deliver this relief, as you can see in Adrian Belic's multi-award-winning documentary film Beyond The Call (http://www.beyondthecallthemovie.com/) and (http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/beyondthecall/).

For every additional $18,500 that is raised, we can obtain and ship 40 cargo containers of valuable medical supplies and equipment, worth between $150,000 and $500,000, to the staging area in the Philippines.

We have almost unlimited resources here in America for the collection and staging of medical equipment and supplies to be shipped overseas. We will run out of shipping dollars long before we ever run out of medical relief goods in need of shipping.

Each dollar that you donate will ship many times that much in lifesaving medical relief. Your donations can be sent to Knightsbridge in two ways:

* Online donations are immediate and can be sent to us via the PayPal / DONATION icon located on our website at www.kbi.org

* Checks should be made out to our NEW partner NGO, A Prescription for Peace, in the US (http://www.APrescriptionForPeace.org).

These checks will be processed, appropriate receipts issued, and the proceeds deposited to our credit.

A Prescription For Peace (a California 5013)
P.O. Box 67696
Century City, CA 90067

Buy and Hope Investing

John Mauldin — Sat, 28 Feb 2009 04:16:49 GMT

More About the Long Run
Stocks for the REALLY Long Run
If You Don't Like the Numbers, Then Change Them
Buy and Hope
A Few Thoughts on Taxes and Budgets
Nouriel Roubini, Yahoo Tech Ticker, and Me
New York, Las Vegas, and La Jolla

This week Professor Jeremy Siegel (author of Stocks for the Long Run) had an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal showing that stocks are now cheap. I was on Tech Ticker, and Henry Blodgett challenged me about my e-letter last week, where I talked about how expensive stocks are. So which is it? We look at Professor Siegel's work -- and I let you decide.

But first, and quickly, I just wanted to take a moment and remind you to sign up for the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner, all set for Saturday, April 4 at the Manchester Grand Hyatt in San Diego -- if you haven't already. This is sure to be an extraordinary evening honoring a great friend and associate of mine, and yours as well. I do hope that you can join us for a night of memories, laughs, and good fun with fellow admirers and long-time readers of Richard's Dow Theory Letter.

A significant number of my fellow writers and publishers have committed to attend. It is going to be an investment-writer, Richard-reader, star-studded event. If you are a fellow writer, you should make plans to attend or send me a note that I can put in a tribute book we are preparing for Richard. And feel free to mention this event in your letter as well. We want to make this night a special event for Richard and his family of readers and friends. So, if you haven't, go ahead and log on to https://www.johnmauldin.com/russell-tribute.html and sign up today. I wouldn't want any of you to miss out on this tribute. I look forward to sharing the evening with all of you.

There are a lot of new readers to Thoughts from the Frontline, and let me welcome you. For those of you who are not already getting your copy directly, you can get it sent to your email inbox for free, simply by going to www.investorsinsight.com and typing in your email address.

Stocks for the REALLY Long Run

Last week we started a series on the basics of investing. ( You can read the first part here.) Quick review: It is my contention that the initial valuation of the stock market when you invest plays an enormous part in your subsequent long-term returns. This is clearly borne out by the data. Let me reproduce one table below. This is a critical point. It clearly demonstrates that the lower the valuation of the S&P Index in terms of the price to earnings ratio (P/E), the greater your subsequent 20-year returns.

I think most people think 20 years should be considered long-term. Looking at the S&P 500 over the past 109 years, you can find many 20-year periods where returns were less than 2-3%. And if you take into account inflation, you can find many 20- and 30-year periods where returns were negative!

So, knowing where we are in terms of P/E ratios today is very important, as it gives us a small clue as to what our prospects for returns are in the next few decades.

My good friend Peter Bernstein (who at 89 is still one of the most insightful and important analysts in the world) wrote a very insightful essay in the Financial Times called "The Flight of the Long Run." Let me quote a few selected paragraphs:

"The cold statistics have hardly been encouraging for the traditional [buy and hold] view. On a total return basis, the Ibbotson data show that the S&P 500 has underperformed long-term Treasury bonds for the last five-year, 10-year, and 25-year periods, and by substantial amounts.

"These data are not to be taken lightly. If the long-run expected return on bonds in the future were higher than the expected return on equities, the capitalist system would grind to a halt, because the reward system would be completely out of whack with the risks involved. After all, from the end of 1949 to the end of 2000, the S&P 500 provided a total annual return of 13.1 per cent, while long Treasuries could grind out only 5.8 per cent a year.

"But does this history really tell us anything about what lies ahead? Neither the awesome historical track record of equities nor the theoretical case is a promise of a realized equity risk premium. John Maynard Keynes, in an immortal observation about the future, expressed the matter in simple but obvious terms: "We simply do not know."

"Relying on the long run for investment decisions is essentially relying on trend lines. But how certain can we be that trends are destiny? Trends bend. Trends break. Today, in fact, we have no idea where any trend lines might begin or end, or even whether any trend lines still exist. (Emphasis mine)

Gentle Reader, pay special attention to this next paragraph: "... There is an even deeper reason to reject the long run as a guide to future investment policy. The long-run results we can discern in the data of stock market history are not a random set of numbers: each event was the result of a preceding event rather than an independent observation. This is a statement of the highest importance. Any starting conditions we select in the historical data cannot replicate the starting conditions at any other moment because the preceding events in the two cases are never identical. There is no predestined rate of return. There is only an expected return that may not be realized."

For those of you who invested in 1997, with expectations of 15% forever, you can sadly confirm that last sentence.

If You Don't Like the Numbers, Then Change Them

Let's be clear. I like Jeremy Siegel. He is a very nice and very smart gentleman. But in his op-ed piece, I think he was talking his book, if you can pardon the pun.

I have been writing for a long time about the rather dismal forecasting ability of the analysts who predict the earnings for the S&P 500. Each month it gets uglier. But just for fun, let's review a few charts. This first chart shows analysts' estimates for 2008. The last number is with 94% of the 500 companies reporting. Earnings forecast have been knocked down by over 70% since the end of 2007. That is a monumental miss.

Now let's look at forecasts for 2009.

Based on 2008 as-reported earnings, the S&P 500, which closed at 735 today, has a trailing P/E of 52. The forward P/E, based on 2009 projected earnings, is 22.7. But the trailing 12-month P/E for the end of the second quarter, based on the last half of 2008 and projections for 2009, is a nosebleed 51.2. (The combination of actual and projected earnings is $14.36 per share.) Mind you, that is after a rather healthy drop in the price of the index!

In his op-ed, Jeremy says that looking at the earnings for the entire index can be misleading. "What this dismal news actually reflects is the bizarre way in which the S&P (and most other index providers) calculate "aggregate" earnings and P/E ratios for their indexes. Unlike their calculations of returns, S&P adds together, dollar for dollar, the large losses of a few firms without any regard to the market weight of the firm in the S&P 500. If they instead weight each firm's earnings by its relative market weight, identical to how they calculate returns on the S&P 500, the earnings picture becomes far brighter."

He uses the illustration of Exxon and Jones Apparel Group, the largest and smallest, respectively, two stocks in the index. Exxon has a weighting 1,381 times that of JAG. If by some chance one made $10 billion and the other lost $10 billion, the effect on aggregate earnings would add up to zero. But if you counted earnings relative to size, you would get a much different picture.

There are 80 companies which had a combined (so far) loss of $240 billion in 2008, which takes about $27 per share of the total earnings, although these companies only account for 6.4% of the index. If you figured earnings by market capitalization, you would get earnings at $71.10, says Jeremy. At today's close, that makes the P/E closer to 10! And that does sound better than my analysis above. He concludes:

"No one can deny that the recent economic downturn has badly hurt corporate earnings. But let's not fool ourselves into thinking that this is an expensive market. When computed accurately, P/E ratios show that this market is much cheaper than is currently being reported by the S&P. Those who venture into today's stock market are indeed buying good values."

So which is it? A P/E of 10? Or 20? Or 50?!?!? Who is fooling whom?

First, let me state unequivocally that there are stocks in the S&P 500 that are good values. If you buy them today you will be rewarded in the medium and long run. Don't ask me which ones, because I don't do stocks -- I have enough on my plate looking at investment managers and the economy. But there are value managers who will do well from this point. The fact that they have been hammered by 50% or more in the past year is another story for another letter. (But nearly all of them made the case that "today" was a good time to buy their fund and did so every day for the last year.)

I think there are some problems with Jeremy's methodology. Do you weight CITI, for instance, at their market cap at the beginning of the quarter, or at the end? AIG? B of A? That could make a huge difference. And what about when the financials were contributing so much to earnings just a few years ago?

Financial stocks were 22% of the index at their highs, and an even greater share of the earnings. They are now down to 10%, and Mary Ann Bartels of Bank of America thinks they will slip to 7%. Using Jeremy's methodology, one would overweight their earnings in the go-go years and then all but ignore their losses this last year as they slipped 78% (and still falling).

Buy and Hope

Stocks that lose money fall in price. That is no mystery. And if you are an index investor, you want to know what the index is going to do, not what just some of the stocks are going to do. If the market cap of Citibank drops by 90%, it is going to affect the index. In Jeremy's system, the positive earnings of Citibank in 2006 would be weighted 10 times more than the losses in 2008. That does not help you assess overall index value going forward.

Further, if you wanted to weight earnings by capitalization and use that number for comparison, you would need 100 years of such analysis to come up with an average trend P/E. Comparing Jeremy's cap-weighted index to aggregate data is simply apples and cumquats. It could be hugely misleading.

Quick aside: AIG has now lost over 99% of its value. It is down to $0.42, yet next week will report a loss of $60 billion, which I admit will skew the data even more. It makes it tough to get a real sense of it all. But even if you ignore last quarter, we are still at high valuations going forward, and as we saw from the previous charts, those earnings estimates are a moving target. They are likely to fall further.

Who might want to use such a different weighting methodology? Someone who was committed to buy and hold, has seen their portfolio trashed, and wants to hold on to some hope that their stock is going to come back. Such statistics are a kind of feel-good narcotic for the buy and hope crowd.

For the last 18 months there has been a parade of analysts, mutual fund managers, brokers, and their kin, telling you that stocks are a reasonable value "today." And they trot out "data" (with lots of charts) which supports their position and then ask you to invest "now."

"The stock market turns up six months before the end of the recession. This recession is already almost the longest, so now is the time to buy." The bullish cheerleaders said that six months ago, they say it today, and they will say it in six months. One day they will be right. Care to make a bet?

Now let's reread the last paragraph I quoted from Peter's Financial Times article.

"... There is an even deeper reason to reject the long run as a guide to future investment policy. The long-run results we can discern in the data of stock market history are not a random set of numbers: each event was the result of a preceding event rather than an independent observation. This is a statement of the highest importance. Any starting conditions we select in the historical data cannot replicate the starting conditions at any other moment because the preceding events in the two cases are never identical. There is no predestined rate of return. There is only an expected return that may not be realized."

We are in an economic period unlike any other we have faced. I think we are likely to have a long, slow recovery after the recession ends some time (hopefully early) next year. However, to suggest that corporate earnings are going to show the same type of resilience in 2010-2012 that they have after every other recession since WWII is ignoring the macroeconomic picture surrounding the potential for earnings growth. "Any starting conditions we select in the historical data cannot replicate the starting conditions at any other moment because the preceding events in the two cases are never identical."

We are in a synchronized global recession. Yes, we will recover, but the causes are not those of the typical business-cycle recession. We are seeing massive debt deflation, deleveraging on a scale never witnessed, a financial industry that has to be rebuilt, and a housing industry that is reeling all over the world. We created a lot of excess in a number of industries. We decimated the savings of a generation that was hoping to retire soon, and now will have to work longer and save more.

This is not a typical recession. And for any analyst, writer, or pundit to trot out past historical data to demonstrate that the stock market is going to rebound at such and such a time and at such and such a pace simply ignores the fact that the future is unlikely to look like the past for at least the next 2-3 years. We are in a brand-new world, macro-economically speaking.

And let me also suggest that when we do get the problems worked out, and we will, the recovery that ensues may be breathtaking in its scope, as the technological changes that will be coming down the pike in the next 5-10 years are simply going to dwarf what we have seen in the past 30. Ray Kurzweil predicts that we will see twice as much change in the next 20 years as we saw all of last century. Think about the implications of that.

Just as we cannot let past performance and wishful thinking blind us to the reality that we confront today, we must not let 3-4 years of a slow Muddle Through world after this recession ends blind us to future opportunity. Projecting the current trends into the long future is nearly always a mistake. And the longer the trend goes, the more complacent (or negative) we get. But trends change. Remember that.

Just because a stock is down by 50% does not mean it cannot go down further. Think back to all the people who said Citi was a screaming buy at $20 or ... (pick a stock!). I want to see earnings start to settle down and maybe even rise. Given the nature of what could be the negative environment for earnings in the second quarter, there could be one more leg to this bear market. Though I must admit that I am surprised we haven't seen some type of tradable rally. I thought the money coming back into the market from hedge fund redemptions might have been a boost, but evidently it has not been. Caution is the word today.

A Few Thoughts on Taxes and Budgets

This week saw President Obama give us a budget with a projected deficit of $1.75 trillion dollars, and a massive tax increase on the "wealthy." But hidden in the details was an even larger tax increase on everyone. Obama wants to create a cap-and-trade program for carbon emissions. This is expected to generate $79 billion in 2012, $237 billion by 2014, and grow to $646 billion by 2019. These will be payments by energy (primarily utility) companies to the government. That will cause utilities to have to raise the prices they charge customers for energy. Such a level of taxation is eventually 4-5% of total US GDP. That is not small potatoes. And since the wealthy do not use all that much more power than the rest of us, it will affect the lower incomes disproportionately.

It will take money out of consumers' pockets and transfer it to the government. You can call it cap-and-trade, but it is a tax. And a huge one. Anything that will take 4% of GDP away from consumer spending is not business friendly. And by driving the cost of energy up, it will drive high-energy-using businesses away from the US to developing countries where energy is cheaper. It will make it even harder for people to save money and drive up costs for the elderly and retired. But it will make the environmental lobby happy.

Further, Obama's accounting magicians assume that the US economy is going to grow by 1.2% this year and 3.2% next year and at a blistering 4% pace after that. Since that is not likely to happen, the deficits will be far worse than projected. Since large taxpayers can see the tax increase coming, it is likely that they will shift behavior, and tax revenues will be less than projected.

Several analysts have noted that you could tax 100% of the income of the "wealthy" and still not balance this budget. While the bottom 95% may not see their taxes rise this year, you can bet they will see them rise in the future. While the US can run multi-trillion-dollar deficits for a few years, it cannot run them for long without serious consequences for interest rates and inflation. And when our entitlement program problems hit in the middle of the next decade? You can count on higher taxes.

Just as a fragile economy is ready to pick itself back up, a large series of tax increases will help slow it down and may push us back into recession.

Which brings me back to my earlier point. Buying a stock market index in today's environment is as much a matter of hope as it is anything else. I readily admit you can make a case for individual stocks, but a large index is a reflection of the broad economy, whether in the US or Japan or Europe. The global economy is weak and likely to be so for some time. Just as Peter pointed out at the beginning of the letter, bonds have outperformed stocks for the last 25 years, and we may see that situation continue for another few years. We are in a period where you should be seeking absolute returns and looking for real value.

The day will come when we can start to put risk capital to work in the stock market. Today, look for ways to get absolute returns. As an example, I am reading of investors who are buying homes at deep discounts and can rent them and get 20-25% returns. That is real value. There are bonds you can get at real discounts to reasonable value because of forced sales.

Nouriel Roubini, Yahoo Tech Ticker, and Me

Last Friday we recorded a "Conversations with John Mauldin" with Nouriel Roubini. The complete audio and transcript are already in the Membership Library. We are getting very favorable reviews. Multiple readers have let us know that the first Conversation was worth their entire year's membership, and hearing Nouriel is a special experience which you will enjoy. After the release of banking data in early March, I will do a Conversation with good buddy Chris Whalen and a few real banking experts, on where the US banking system really is. I will offer it as a bonus to those who have already subscribed, as it will be more me asking questions than a real Conversation. I expect it to be very informative.

The regular price for a yearly subscription is $199, but you can subscribe now for $109 and still get access to the timely Conversation with Ed Easterling and Lacy Hunt. Don't wait, as I am sure my staff will only keep raising the price. To find out more, just click on the link and put in code JM75, which will give you the discounted price. https://www.johnmauldin.com/newsletters2.html

I did a marathon recording session with Henry Blodgett and Aaron Task of Yahoo! Tech Ticker. They cut it up into three segments. You can view them at:

Don't 'Buy and Hope:' How to Survive Until the Next Bull Market
http://bit.ly/BHGIF

Europe's Crisis: Much Bigger Than Subprime, Worse Than U.S.
http://bit.ly/15xoFX

$1.75T Deficit, Higher Taxes, "Bogus" Stimulus: But John Mauldin Sees a Silver Lining
http://bit.ly/nI2aD

New York, Las Vegas, and La Jolla

I will be in New York in mid-March. Details are firming up. Then it's Doug Casey's "Crisis & Opportunity Summit," March 20-22 in Las Vegas, where I get to be the resident bull! Click to learn more about the Summit.

I will then go to La Jolla for my own Strategic Investment Conference, April 2-4. It is sold out, but as I mentioned at the top of the letter, you can still get tickets to the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner.

It is time to hit the send button. The Dallas Mavericks are playing tonight and my tickets are calling. It will be a busy weekend with family and lots of chores, plus more time than I would like in the office trying to catch up. Have a great week.

Your ready to have a growing economy again analyst,

John Mauldin

While Rome Burns

John Mauldin — Sat, 21 Feb 2009 03:56:20 GMT

While Rome Burns
The Risk in Europe
The Euro Back to Parity? Really?
Back to the Basics
Living in Paradise
The 20-Year Horizon
If I Had a Hammer
New York, Las Vegas, and La Jolla

When I sit down each week to write, I essentially do what I did nine years ago when I started writing this letter. I write to you, as an individual. I don't think of a large group of people, just a simple letter to a friend. It is only half a joke that this letter is written to my one million closest friends. That is the way I think of it.

This week's letter is likely to lose me a few friends, though. I am going to start a series on money management, portfolio construction, and money managers. It will be back to the basics for both new and long-time readers. I am not sure how long it will take (in terms of weeks), but it is likely to make a few people upset and provoke some strong disagreements. Let's just say this is not stocks for the long run.

And because many of you want some continuing analysis of the current crisis, each week I will throw in a few pages of commentary at the beginning of the letter.

But first, and quickly, I just wanted to take a moment and remind you to sign up for the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner, all set for Saturday, April 4 at the Manchester Grand Hyatt in San Diego -- if you haven't already. This is sure to be an extraordinary evening honoring a great friend and associate of mine, and yours as well. I do hope that you can join us for a night of memories, laughs, and good fun with fellow admirers and long-time readers of Richard's Dow Theory Letter.

A significant number of my fellow writers and publishers have committed to attend. It is going to be an investment-writer, Richard-reader, star-studded event. If you are a fellow writer, you should make plans to attend or send me a note that I can put in a tribute book we are preparing for Richard. And feel free to mention this event in your letter as well. We want to make this night a special event for Richard and his family of readers and friends. So, if you haven't, go ahead and log on to https://www.johnmauldin.com/russell-tribute.html and sign up today. I wouldn't want any of you to miss out on this tribute. I look forward to sharing this evening with all of you.

And now, let's turn our eyes to Europe.

The Risk in Europe

I mentioned last week that European banks are at significant risk. I want to follow up on that point, as it is very important. Eastern Europe has borrowed an estimated $1.7 trillion, primarily from Western European banks. And much of Eastern Europe is already in a deep recession bordering on depression. A great deal of that $1.7 trillion is at risk, especially the portion that is in Swiss francs. It is a story that could easily be as big as the US subprime problem.

In Poland, as an example, 60% of mortgages are in Swiss francs. When times are good and currencies are stable, it is nice to have a low-interest Swiss mortgage. And as a requirement for joining the euro currency union, Poland has been required to keep its currency stable against the euro. This gave borrowers comfort that they could borrow at low interest in francs or euros, rather than at much higher local rates.

But in an echo of teaser-rate subprimes here in the US, there is a problem. Along came the synchronized global recession and large Polish current-account trade deficits, which were three times those of the US in terms of GDP, just to give us some perspective. Of course, if you are not a reserve currency this is going to bring some pressure to bear. And it did. The Polish zloty has basically dropped in half compared to the Swiss franc. That means if you are a mortgage holder, your house payment just doubled. That same story is repeated all over the Baltics and Eastern Europe.

Austrian banks have lent $289 billion (230 billion euros) to Eastern Europe. That is 70% of Austrian GDP. Much of it is in Swiss francs they borrowed from Swiss banks. Even a 10% impairment (highly optimistic) would bankrupt the Austrian financial system, says the Austrian finance minister, Joseph Proll. In the US we speak of banks that are too big to be allowed to fail. But the reality is that we could nationalize them if we needed to do so. (And for the record, I favor nationalization and swift privatization. We cannot afford a repeat of Japan's zombie banks.)

The problem is that in Europe there are many banks that are simply too big to save. The size of the banks in terms of the GDP of the country in which they are domiciled is all out of proportion. For my American readers, it would be as if the bank bailout package were in excess of $14 trillion (give or take a few trillion). In essence, there are small countries which have very large banks (relatively speaking) that have gone outside their own borders to make loans and have done so at levels of leverage which are far in excess of the most leveraged US banks. The ability of the "host" countries to nationalize their banks is simply not there. They are going to have to have help from larger countries. But as we will see below, that help is problematical.

Western European banks have been very aggressive in lending to emerging market countries worldwide. Almost 75% of an estimated $4.9 trillion of loans outstanding are to countries that are in deep recessions. Plus, according to the IMF, they are 50% more leveraged than US banks.

Today the euro rallied back to $1.26 based upon statements from German authorities that were interpreted as a potential willingness to help out non-German (in particular, Austrian) banks.

However, this more sobering note from Strategic Energy was sent to me by a reader. It nicely sums up my concerns:

"It is East Europe that is blowing up right now. Erik Berglof, EBRD's chief economist, told me the region may need €400bn in help to cover loans and prop up the credit system. Europe's governments are making matters worse. Some are pressuring their banks to pull back, undercutting subsidiaries in East Europe. Athens has ordered Greek banks to pull out of the Balkans.

"The sums needed are beyond the limits of the IMF, which has already bailed out Hungary, Ukraine, Latvia, Belarus, Iceland, and Pakistan -- and Turkey next -- and is fast exhausting its own $200bn (€155bn) reserve. We are nearing the point where the IMF may have to print money for the world, using arcane powers to issue Special Drawing Rights. Its $16bn rescue of Ukraine has unravelled. The country -- facing a 12% contraction in GDP after the collapse of steel prices -- is hurtling towards default, leaving Unicredit, Raffeisen and ING in the lurch. Pakistan wants another $7.6bn. Latvia's central bank governor has declared his economy "clinically dead" after it shrank 10.5% in the fourth quarter. Protesters have smashed the treasury and stormed parliament.

"'This is much worse than the East Asia crisis in the 1990s,' said Lars Christensen, at Danske Bank. 'There are accidents waiting to happen across the region, but the EU institutions don't have any framework for dealing with this. The day they decide not to save one of these one countries will be the trigger for a massive crisis with contagion spreading into the EU.' Europe is already in deeper trouble than the ECB or EU leaders ever expected. Germany contracted at an annual rate of 8.4% in the fourth quarter. If Deutsche Bank is correct, the economy will have shrunk by nearly 9% before the end of this year. This is the sort of level that stokes popular revolt.

"The implications are obvious. Berlin is not going to rescue Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal as the collapse of their credit bubbles leads to rising defaults, or rescue Italy by accepting plans for EU "union bonds" should the debt markets take fright at the rocketing trajectory of Italy's public debt (hitting 112pc of GDP next year, just revised up from 101pc -- big change), or rescue Austria from its Habsburg adventurism. So we watch and wait as the lethal brush fires move closer. If one spark jumps across the eurozone line, we will have global systemic crisis within days. Are the firemen ready?"

While Rome Burns

I hope the writer is wrong. But the ECB is dithering while Rome burns. (Or at least their banking system is -- Italy's banks have large exposure to Eastern Europe through Austrian subsidiaries.) They need to bring rates down and figure out how to move into quantitative easing. Europe is at far greater risk than the US.

Great Britain and Europe as a whole are down about 6% in GDP on an annualized basis. The Bank Credit Analyst sent the next graph out to their public list, and I reproduce it here. (www.bcaresearch.com) In another longer report, they note that the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Switzerland have the greatest risk of widespread bank nationalization (outside of Iceland). The full report is quite sobering. The countries on the bottom of the list are also in danger of having their credit ratings downgraded.

This has the potential to be a real crisis, far worse than in the US. Without concerted action on the part of the ECB and the European countries that are relatively strong, much of Europe could fall further into what would feel like a depression. There is a problem, though. Imagine being a politician in Germany, for instance. Your GDP is down by 8% last quarter. Unemployment is rising. Budgets are under pressure, as tax collections are down. And you are going to be asked to vote in favor of bailing out (pick a small country)? What will the voters who put you into office think?

We are going to find out this year whether the European Union is like the Three Musketeers. Are they "all for one and one for all?" or is it every country for itself? My bet (or hope) is that it is the former. Dissolution at this point would be devastating for all concerned, and for the world economy at large. Many of us in the US don't think much about Europe or the rest of the world, but without a healthy Europe, much of our world trade would vanish.

However, getting all the parties to agree on what to do will take some serious leadership, which does not seem to be in evidence at this point. The US almost waited too long to respond to our crisis, but we had the "luxury" of only needing to get a few people to agree as to the nature of the problems (whether they were wrong or right is beside the point). And we have a central bank that could act decisively.

As I understand the European agreement, that situation does not exist in Europe. For the ECB to print money as the US and the UK (and much of the non-EU developed world) will do, takes agreement from all the member countries, and right now it appears the German and Dutch governments are resisting such an idea.

As I write this (on a plane on my way to Orlando) German finance minister Peer Steinbruck has said it would be intolerable to let fellow EMU members fall victim to the global financial crisis. "We have a number of countries in the eurozone that are clearly getting into trouble on their payments," he said. "Ireland is in a very difficult situation.

"The euro-region treaties don't foresee any help for insolvent states, but in reality the others would have to rescue those running into difficulty."

That is a hopeful sign. Ireland is indeed in dire straits, and is particularly vulnerable as it is going to have to spend a serious percentage of its GDP on bailing out its banks.

It is not clear how it will all play out. But there is real risk of Europe dragging the world into a longer, darker night. Their banks not only have exposure to our US foibles, much of which has already been written off, but now many banks will have to contend with massive losses from emerging-market loans, which could be even larger than the losses stemming from US problems. Plus, they are more leveraged. (This was definitely a topic of "Conversation" this morning when I chatted with Nouriel Roubini. See more below.)

The Euro Back to Parity? Really?

I wrote over six years ago, when the euro was below $1, that I thought the euro would rise to over $1.50 (it went even higher) and then back to parity in the middle of the next decade. I thought the decline would be due to large European government deficits brought about by pension and health care promises to retirees, and those problems do still loom.

It may be that the current problems will push the euro to parity much sooner, possibly this year. While that will be nice if you want to vacation in Europe, it will have serious side effects on international trade. It clearly makes European exporters more competitive with the rest of the world, and especially the US. It also means that goods coming from Asia will cost more in Europe, unless Asian countries decide to devalue their currencies to maintain an ability to sell into Europe, which of course will bring howls from the US about currency manipulation. It is going to put pressure on governments to enact some form of trade protectionism, which would be devastating to the world economy.

Large and swift currency swings are inherently disruptive. We are seeing volatility in the currency markets unlike anything I have witnessed. I hope we do not see a precipitous fall in value of the euro. It will be good for no one. It is a strange world indeed when the US is having such a deep series of problems, the Fed and Treasury are talking about printing a few trillion here and a few trillion there, and at the very same time we see the dollar AND gold rising in value. Which all serves as a good set-up to the next section.

Back to the Basics

"Stocks for the long run" has been weighed in the balance in Baby Boomers' retirement accounts all over the world and has been found wanting. The S&P 500 is now roughly where it was 12 years ago, although earnings in 1997 were higher than those projected for 2009. The Dow closed at 7466 on Thursday, a six-year low, giving all those who follow Dow Theory a clear bear market signal, suggesting there is more pain ahead.

In 1997 I was a young 49. For me to make the advertised 8% average annual returns in my equity portfolio, the Dow would have had to go on a tear for the next 8 years. 8% compound from 1997 would have the Dow well over 30,000 now. Remember those silly books which predicted such nonsense? (Seriously, what statistically flawed analysis, yet people bought it.) Now the market would have to do 18% a year for the next 8 years to get to 30,000. Anyone want to make that bet? Let's look at a few paragraphs I wrote in Bull's Eye Investing.

Living in Paradise

Would you like to live in paradise? There's a place where the average daily temperature is 66 degrees, rainy days only occur on average every five days, and the sun shines most of the time.

Welcome to Dallas, Texas. As most know, however, the weather in Dallas doesn't qualify as climate paradise. The summers begin their ascent almost before spring arrives. On some days the buds almost wilt before turning into blooms. During the lazy days of summer, the sun frequently stokes the thermometer into triple digits, often for days on end. There are numerous jokes about the Devil, hell, and Texas summers.

Once winter arrives, some days are mild -- perfect golf weather. Yet the next day might be frigid, with snow or the occasional ice storm. That's good for business at the local auto body shops, though it makes for sleepless nights for the insurance companies. Certainly the winters don't match the chilly winds of Chicago or the blizzards of Buffalo, but Dallas is far from paradise as its seasons ebb and flow.

For the year though, the average temperature is paradisical.

Contrary to the studies that show investors they can expect 7% or 9% or 10% by staying in the market for the long run, the stock market isn't paradise either. Like Texas summers, the stock market often seems like the anteroom to investment hell.

Historically, average investment returns over the very long term (we're talking 40-50-70 years) have been some of the best available, but the seasons of the stock market tend to cycle with as much variability as Texas weather. The extremes and the inconstancies are far greater than most realize. Let's examine the range of variability to truly appreciate the strength of the storms.

In the 103 years from 1900 through 2002, the annual change for the Dow Jones Industrial Average reflects a simple average gain of 7.2% per year. During that time, 63% of the years reflect positive returns, and 37% were negative. Only five of the years ended with changes between +5% and +10% -- that's less than 5% of the time. Most of the years were far from average -- many were sufficiently dramatic to drive an investor's pulse into lethal territory!

Almost 70% of the years were "double-digit years," when the stock market either rose or fell by more than 10%. To move out of "most" territory, the threshold increases to 16% -- half of the past 103 years end with the stock market index either up or down more than 16%!

Read those last two paragraphs again. The simple fact is that the stock market rarely gives you an average year. The wild ride makes for those emotional investment experiences which are a primary cause of investment pain.

The stock market can be a very risky place to invest. The returns are highly erratic; the gains and losses are often inconsistent and unpredictable. The emotional responses to stock market volatility mean that most investors do not achieve the average stock market gains, as numerous studies clearly illustrate.

Not understanding how to manage the risk of the stock market, or even what the risks actually are, investors too often buy high and sell low, based upon raw emotion. They read the words in the account-opening forms that say the stock market presents significant opportunities for losses, and that the magnitude of the losses can be quite significant. But they focus on the research that says, "Over the long run, history has overcome interim setbacks and has delivered an average return of 10% including dividends" (or whatever the number du jour is. and ignoring bad stuff like inflation, taxes, and transaction costs).

The 20-Year Horizon

But how long is the "long run"? Investors have been bombarded for years with the nostrum that one should invest for the "long run." This has indoctrinated investors into thinking they could ignore the realities of stock market investing because of the "certain" expectation of ultimate gains.

This faulty line of reasoning has spawned a number of pithy principles, including: "No pain, no gain," "You can't participate in the profits if you are not in the game," and my personal favorite, "It's not a loss until you take it."

These and other platitudes are often brought up as reasons to leave your money with the current management which has just incurred large losses. Cynically restated: why worry about the swings in your life savings from year to year if you're supposed to be rewarded in the "long run"? But what if history does not repeat itself, or if you don't live long enough for the long run to occur?

For many, the "long run" is about 20 years. We work hard to accumulate assets during the formative years of our careers, yet the accumulation for the large majority of us seems to become meaningful somewhere after midlife. We seek to have a confident and comfortable nest egg in time for retirement. For many, this will represent roughly a 20-year period.

We can divide the 20^th century into 88 twenty-year periods. Though most periods generated positive returns before dividends and transaction costs, half produced compounded returns of less than 4%. Less than 10% generated gains of more than 10%. The P/E ratio is the measure of valuation reflected in the relationship between the price paid per share and the earnings per share ("EPS"). The table below reflects that higher returns are associated with periods during which the P/E ratio increased, and lower or negative returns resulted from periods when the P/E declined.

Look at the table above. There were only nine periods from 1900-2002 when 20-year returns were above 9.6%, and this chart shows all nine. What you will notice is that eight out of the nine times were associated with the stock market bubble of the late 1990s, and during all eight periods there was a doubling, tripling, or even quadrupling of P/E ratios. Prior to the bubble, there was no 20-year period which delivered 10% annual returns.

Why is that important? If the P/E ratio doubles, then you are paying twice as much for the same level of earnings. The difference in price is simply the perception that a given level of earnings is more valuable today than it was 10 years ago. The main driver of the last stock market bubble, and every bull market, is an increase in the P/E ratio. Not earnings growth. Not anything fundamental. Just a willingness on the part of investors to pay more for a given level of earnings.

Every period of above-9.6% market returns started with low P/E ratios. EVERY ONE. And while not a consistent line, you will note that as 20-year returns increase, there is a general decline in the initial P/E ratios. If we wanted to do some in-depth analysis, we could begin to explain the variation from this trend quite readily. For instance, the period beginning in 1983 had the lowest initial P/E, but was also associated with a two-year-old secular bear, which was beginning to lower 20-year return levels.

Look at the following table from my friend Ed Easterling's web site at www.crestmontresearch.com (which is a wealth of statistical data like this!). You can find many 20-year periods where returns were less than 2-3%. And if you take into account inflation, you can find many 20-year periods where returns were negative!

Look at the 20-year average returns in the table above. The higher the P/E ratio, the lower (in general) the subsequent 20-year average return. Where are we today? As I have made clear in my last two letters, we are well above 20. Today we are over 30, on our way to 45. In a nod to bulls, I agree you should look back over a number of years to average earnings and take out the highs and lows of a cycle. However, even "normalizing" earnings to an average over multiple years, we are still well above the long-term P/E average. Further, earnings as a percentage of GDP went to highs well above what one would expect from growth, which is usually GDP plus inflation. Earnings, as I have documented in earlier letters, revert to the mean. Next week, I will expand on that thought.

And given my thesis that we are in for a deep recession and a multi-year Muddle Through Recovery, it is unlikely that corporate earnings are going to rebound robustly. This would suggest that earnings over the next 20 years could be constrained (to say the least).

In all cases, throughout the years, the level of returns correlates very highly to the trend in the market's price/earnings (P/E) ratio.

This may be the single most important investment insight you can have from today's letter. When P/E ratios were rising, the saying that "a rising tide lifts all boats" has been historically true. When they were dropping, stock market investing was tricky. Index investing is an experiment in futility.

You can see the returns for any given period of time by going to http://www.crestmontresearch.com/content/Matrix%20Options.htm .

Now let's visit a very basic concept that I discussed at length in Bull's Eye Investing. Very simply, stock markets go from periods of high valuations to low valuations and back to high. As we will see from the graphs below, these periods have lasted an average of 17 years. And we have not witnessed a period where the stock market started at high valuations, went halfway down, and then went back up. So far, there has always been a bottom with low valuations.

My contention is that we should not look at price, but at valuations. That is the true measure of the probability of success if we are talking long-term investing.

Now, let me make a few people upset. When someone comes to you and starts showing you charts that tell you to invest for the long run, look at their assumptions. Usually they are simplistic. And misleading. I agree that if the long run for you is 70 years, you can afford to ride out the ups and downs. But for those of us in the Baby Boomer world, the long term may be buying green bananas.

If you start in a period of high valuations, you are NOT going to get 8-9-10% a year for the next 30 years; I don't care what their "scientific studies" say. And yet there are salespeople (I will not grace them with the title of investment advisors) who suggest that if you buy their product and hold for the long term you will get your 10%, regardless of valuations. Again, go to the Crestmont web site, mentioned above. Spend some time really studying it. And then decide what your long-term horizon is.

If I Had a Hammer

Let me be very candid. As the saying goes, if you only have a hammer, the whole world looks like a nail. Many investment professionals only have one tool. They live in a long-only world. If the markets don't go up, they don't make a profit. So, for them the markets are always ready to enter a new bull phase, or stocks are always a good value. That is what they sell, and that's how they make their money. What mutual fund manager would keep his job if he said you should sell his fund? Frankly, it is a tough world.

About half the time they are right. The wind is at their backs and they look very, very good. Genius is a riding market. And then there are those times when it is just no fun to be them OR their clients. Driving to the airport today, I had CNBC on. They had a mutual fund manager on who was talking about why you should ignore the down periods and invest today. He used every hackneyed bromide I have heard and a few new ones. "You have to do it for the long run." "If you aren't invested, you miss the bull when it comes." (Which is SO statistically misleading! Maybe next week I will go at that one!) "Long-term valuations are very good." "The economy looks to turn around in the latter half of the year, so now is the time to buy, as the market anticipates the rebound by six months." Etc. He was selling his book.

Again, back to basics. In terms of valuations, markets cycle up and down over long periods of time. These are called secular cycles. You have bull and bear secular cycles. In a period of a secular bull, the best style of investing is relative value. You are trying to beat the market. These periods start with low valuations, and you can ride the ups and downs with little real worry. Think of 1982 though 1999.

But in secular bear cycles, the best style of investing is absolute returns. Your benchmark is zero. You want positive numbers. It is much harder, and the longer-term returns are probably not going to be as good. But you are growing your capital against the day the secular bull returns. And, as bleak as it looks right now, I can assure you that bull will be back. Some time in the middle of the next decade, maybe a little sooner, we will see the launch of a new secular bull.

Why? Because low valuations act just like a coiled spring. The tighter it gets wound, the more explosive the result. You just have to have patience.

Now let's look at two charts from Vitaliy Katsenelson. They illustrate my basic point: markets go from high valuations to low valuations and then back. The first uses one-year trailing earnings and the second uses a smoothed 10-year trailing earnings stream. But however you look at them, you see a very clear cycle. By the way, the one-year chart is a few months old, so the numbers would look even worse after the horrific earnings from the 4^th quarter of last year.

It is time to hit the send button. Next week, we will look at a very simple method for timing the markets within the cycles, which can help you avoid the real downturns. While it may seem obvious that avoiding bear markets will do wonders for your portfolio, a lot of investment professionals say you can't do it. To that I politely say, garbage.

The tables above clearly lay out how you can time the markets in broad patterns. You can't pick the absolute highs and lows, but you don't need to. You just need to know the direction of the wind and where you want to sail.

New York, Las Vegas, and La Jolla

And allow me a quick commercial. Not all money managers and funds have had losses last year, though it may seem like it. My partners around the world can introduce you to some alternative funds, commodity funds, and managers that you may find of interest as you rebalance your portfolio this year. You owe it to yourself to check them out.

If you are an accredited investor (net worth roughly $1.5 million), you should check out my partners in the US, Altegris Investments (based in La Jolla) and my London partners (covering Europe), Absolute Return Partners. If you are in South Africa, my partner there is Plexus Asset Management. You can go to www.accreditedinvestor.ws and fill out the form, and someone from their firms will be in touch. All three shops specialize in alternative investments like hedge funds and commodity funds, on a very selective basis. We will soon be announcing new partners in other parts of the world. And if you are an advisor or broker, you should call them (or fill out the form) and find out how you can plug your clients into their network of managers.

If your net worth is less than $1.5 million, I work with Steve Blumenthal and his team at CMG. I suggest you go to his website, register, and then let them show you what the blend of active managers on his platform would have done over the past few months and years. These are primarily managers who will trade a managed account (using various proprietary styles) in your name, and they are quite liquid. Again, if you are an advisor or broker and would like to see the managers on the CMG platform and how you can access them for your clients, sign up and let Steve and his team know you are in the business. The link is http://www.cmgfunds.net/public/mauldin_questionnaire.asp.

If you are still here, I assume that you are still one of my one million closest friends. Have a great week, and take some time to enjoy life.

Your worried about Europe analyst,

John Mauldin

Further Thoughts on the Continuing Crisis

John Mauldin — Sat, 07 Feb 2009 05:56:53 GMT

Thoughts on the Continuing Crisis
The Right Direction, At Least
The Jobs Will Come
Can We Have a Little Inflation, Please?
Those Wild and Crazy Analysts
La Jolla, Conversations, and Richard Russell

When confronted about an apparent change of his opinions, John Maynard Keynes is reported to have said, "When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?" The earnings season for the 4^th quarter is almost 80% complete, and the facts are dismal. It is worse than the current data shows, and could get uglier. Unemployment is increasing, and consumers are both saving more and spending less as incomes are not keeping pace with what little inflation there is. All in all, a very different set of facts than a few quarters ago. This week we examine some of the new facts, and start out by analyzing how Thoughts from the Frontline has done over the past two years with some of the more important predictions. It should make for an interesting letter.

At the end of the letter, I have a few notes on my upcoming Strategic Investment Conference in La Jolla, April 2-4 (which looks like it will sell out), information on the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner, a mention of my new Conversations service (which is getting very good reviews), and the need for one or two part-time editors.

The Right Direction, At Least

Over the last year, I have become increasingly more bearish on the economy than I was in January of 2007. In my 2007 annual forecast issue, I said that we would be in a recession by the end of the year (we were), and that it would be a long but not too deep recession, with a multi-year below-trend Muddle Through period to follow. I was thinking GDP would maybe be down 2-3%. As I have repeatedly written in this letter and said in speeches, the US stock market drops by an average of 43% in recessions. I saw no reason to be in the stock market, as there was just too much risk of a serious bear market. Further, since international markets now have close to a full correlation with the US markets, foreign stock indexes would be in trouble as well. I also said interest rates would be coming down and deflation would be a problem before we got through this recession.

(As an aside, there are a lot of very well-known perma-bearish analysts who called the recession, but were very bearish on the US dollar and positioned their clients in emerging-market stocks or other markets. Their clients have been mauled. Just because you get the economy call right doesn't necessarily mean you can call the right investment shots. Before you invest with a manager because he seems to have been right about something, look to see what his actual investment strategy has done. And that includes me or my partners.)

I also predicted the bursting of the housing bubble and the subprime credit crisis in late 2006 and 2007. While I was completely wrong about the severity of the current recession, at least I got the direction right. My advice would have been the same, which was avoid long-only stock portfolios and mutual funds, be long bonds, and access active, absolute-return managers and funds.

But the facts have changed. The reality is that we are in a much worse recession than I thought it would be two years ago. And as I wrote last month, we will probably be in recession for the full calendar year 2009, with the same lengthy multi-year Muddle Through Economy I originally envisioned, albeit from a lower base. So, what does that look like? Let's look at a likely set of facts, in no particular order.

1. Consumers are going to save more and spend less. It is likely that US consumers are going to push the savings rate back up to 6% (or more). Total US net worth decreased by $7.1 trillion through the third quarter of 2008, from housing and stock market losses. The trend suggests that could easily be up another $6-7 trillion by the end of this quarter. Greg Weldon speculates that is could easily be $15 trillion by the end of the cycle. That is a massive amount of wealth destruction. And while the absolute numbers are not as large in the rest of the world, the relative magnitudes are. This is a truly global recession. Economists say that anything below 2.5% in world growth is a global recession. We are down to 0.5% and falling.

2. The stimulus package is simply a pork-laden, misguided piece of legislation. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office released a report (I think yesterday) that says "CBO estimates that this Senate legislation would raise output and lower unemployment for several yearsÉ In the longer run, the legislation would result in a slight decrease in gross domestic product (GDP)." There is way too much spending on items that have very little current effect on the economy.

I am in principle in favor of a deep and large stimulus package. We need one, but what is on tap is not what will stimulate real job growth. All it does is create more debt that will have to be paid later by our kids. What else could we do? For instance, US companies have so much money squirreled away that Allen Sinai of Decision Economics concluded that, if the US lowered tax rates temporarily on repatriated earnings, companies would repatriate US$545 billion. There is a precedent for this: we saw US companies bring home $360 billion in 2004 as a result of the temporary 5% tax rate contained in the American Jobs Creation Act. (Sent to me by Louis Gave of GaveKal, whose work will be highlighted in next Monday's Outside the Box)

Why not set a 10% tax rate to simply bring the money home, and a 5% rate if they use it for capital spending or to create jobs? Now that is stimulus that would actually result in more taxable income! And that money did help to create a boom in 2004. On an aside, this just goes to show how out of balance the US corporate tax system is.

What little real stimulus is in the bill will not hit all that much in the first half of this year. The fourth quarter of 2009 is likely to look better than the first quarter, but it is also likely to have a negative sign in front of it. I hope I am forced by the facts to change that prediction.

3. I am somewhat more hopeful about the Federal Reserve and Treasury programs, although all they really do is buy time for financial corporations to heal themselves. That is not all a bad thing, though. Volker did it in the early 1980s by allowing banks to carry debt from Latin American countries that was in default at full loan value. Otherwise every major bank in America would have been bankrupt.

And I agree that a lot of the process will be wasteful and unproductive. But such is the nature of crisis planning. Hopefully, they will not put into service the notion of a large "bad bank," but rather go ahead and put the zombie banks to sleep and help the healthy ones survive. But if US taxpayer money is involved, then shareholders should be wiped out first. If the rest of us have to lose on our stock investments, then bank investors should not be in a special protected class.

The downgrades by Moody's today of 2,446 different classes of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities will be a real blow.

"Moody's warned in a report last week that loss assumptions would be increased for RMBS and that downgrades could be expected. Moody's is projecting that alt-A deals originated in the second half of 2007 will experience 25.5% losses of original balance, compared to 23.9% of 1H07 deals, 22.1% for H206 deals and 17.1% for 1H06 deals. The rating agency in May expected average losses for 2006 and 2007 vintage deals to reach 11.2% and 14.7%, respectively." (The Big Picture)

These losses are just going to keep coming. Commercial mortgage paper will soon be written down as well. Banks will likely need at least $1.5 trillion in private investment and government funding.

4. As I have noted for almost two years, it will take until at least 2011 for the housing market in the US (and bubbles elsewhere, as in England and Spain, etc.) to stabilize. It will take several years for the creation of a new credit system to rationally replace the old "shadow banking system." This is why the recovery will take so long.

For an economy to grow over time, you need some combination of increasing population, productivity increases, and credit creation. We have destroyed a large part of our credit creation model (which was deeply flawed, even though for awhile it seemingly worked well) here in the developed world, and simply have to build a new one. That is why I believe we are going to see the creation of a massive new Private Credit Market that will compete with banks. You can see this developing here and there, but it is going to take time. The Fed is stepping in now and buying mortgages, credit card debt, student loans, etc., which is useful in the interim, but they need to make sure they do it at rates that will attract private capital and capital formation. We do not want to turn the Fed or Treasury into a national mortgage bank subject to political whim. That would be worse than what we have now. As an example, the government is now nearly the only source for student loans, as they set prices which just did not allow private companies to compete. We must not do that with mortgages.

5. The US government will run multi-trillion-dollar deficits for at least two years. As noted above, I think the current stimulus package will not be deemed sufficient by the third quarter, and the compelling need politicians will feel to do more will be almost uncontrollable.

Interestingly, the increase in federal spending is going to be accompanied by a substantial decrease in state and local spending, as almost all nonfederal entities must balance their budgets, and tax receipts are way down. If consumers are spending 5% less, it stands to reason sales taxes are down by 5%. Property taxes will be down, as will the state portion of income taxes. Increasing taxes will bring about local voter rebellion, so spending cuts will be the order of the day. As an example, state employees in California have every other Friday off, which cuts their pay by 10%. Expect more such cuts everywhere and on everything.

And while I am on the subject, state, county, and municipal pension plans are woefully underfunded. As in by trillions of dollars -- much as I wrote in Bull's Eye Investing in 2003. The signs were so there, and in a few years governments are going to have to figure out how to deal with major shortfalls in funding, as many municipal pension plans will be technically bankrupt.

Accompanying the increase in federal spending will be a real decrease in federal tax receipts, which will make the deficits worse.

6. The main driver in the economic world is deflation, as I have been writing for a long time. Yes, we had a brief whiff of inflation last year, but that was primarily commodity-driven, and that force is now spent. Commodities are likely to rise in price again, but not in the near future.

This is going to give the Fed the room to print money to monetize the federal deficit, and indications are that Bernanke will do it with a vengeance. He will do everything in his power to keep the US economy from catching "Japanese Disease," that is, descending into a deflationary spiral. I fully expect them to "move out the yield curve" and set longer rates at some lower number as well.

All of the above leads me to the following conclusions.

We are going to some new lower level of GDP and consumer spending, maybe as much as 5% lower, which is a serious recession. And the "recovery" is going to be slow. We don't get back to 3% GDP growth in 2010. Let me once again print a graph I have used several times, but it is just so important. You need to think about this one. This shows what the US economy would have been without mortgage equity withdrawals from 2001 to 2006.

Notice that the US economy would have grown less than 1% a year for five years, and barely that by 2006. And that is with consumers saving less than 1-2%! Now, let's imagine a world with savings going to 6% (or more), because shell-shocked US consumers now realize they may actually have to save to be able to retire. And what is it going to feel like when housing drops another 10-15%? Or more?!?!? And what if we have a repeat of a major summer bear market – which I make the case for in a few pages?

The Jobs Will Come

We could see well-below-trend growth for several years. I spoke this week to a small group of entrepreneurs that my daughter is involved with. (It is a business development/mentoring program called Vistage. I know several people who have seen their businesses really take off because of what they learned. If you are running your own business, I highly recommend it. I can see the differences it is making in my business because of Tiffani and other people I know who are involved. Their web site is www.vistage.com)

What I told them is that for those businesses which are dependent on the US consumer, their world is going to be smaller for a long time. We are in a period where the economy is going through what economists call rationalization. We are going to have to reduce the number of retail stores, coffee shops, automobile plants, fast food restaurants, car dealerships, etc., until we get to a level that makes rational sense for the size of the economy. We just built too much stuff, launched too many stores, and created too much capacity for almost everything.

The idea for the business person today is to still be standing when we get through this, as we will. That is what free market economies do. The day will come when we get back to 3-4% GDP growth. But it will be a rational growth based in real fundamentals, one that will last a long time. So hope is not a business strategy. You need to be planning for a lengthy recession and a slow recovery.

And if your business is one that helps producers cut costs? Or improve production? Then this is your time to shine. It is not clear what the stimulus plan will be, but look at it to see if there is something you can do to get in the flow of that money. There are opportunities out there.

We were in a similar period of malaise in the late 1970s. Everyone wondered where the new jobs would come from. The correct answer was, "I don't know, but they will." As it turned out, we saw the creation of whole new industries, which the government had little to do with. It is still the right answer. The new industries that we will see next decade? Biotech? Energy? A new wireless telecom build-out? Something out of left field? The correct stance is to be cautiously optimistic.

I am seeing some amazing private equity deals and new ventures. It is really a great time if you have capital, as you can pick among some very nice opportunities.

Can We Have a Little Inflation, Please?

Getting back to the Fed and deflation, there will come a point (I hope) when the Fed will actually bring about some inflation. That means they will have to tap on the brakes to keep from letting that get out of hand. That of course will slow any recovery, which is another reason I think the recovery from the current recession will be a lengthy one. It is asking too much for them to get it "just right." There is no formula here. They really do have to make it up as they go.

And while I don't think it is the likely case, it is quite possible that we could see a repeat of '70s-style stagflation. We could also slip into Japanese-style deflation, as the Fed may be pushing on a string. There is just no way of truly knowing. You have to stay nimble and go with the facts as they come down the road.

As investors, your goal is also to be standing when we get through this. There is another bull market in our future, as hard as that may be to imagine now. But it is several years off. Now is still a time for absolute returns and active management. You want to arrive at the dawn of the next bull with as much of your assets as possible. How will we know when we are there? Because valuations will be low. Which is a perfect time to segue into an analysis of current market valuations, as we close the letter.

Those Wild and Crazy Analysts

I have been writing about analyst earnings forecasts for some time. Earnings forecasts just keep dropping. I talked with the very interesting and gentlemanly Howard Silverblat from Standard & Poors, who is in charge of assembling the data for the S&P earnings. When I went to the web site, I noticed that "core" earnings were not on the spreadsheet. Core earnings take into account pension fund commitments and other items that sometimes do not make it into reported or operating earnings. During the last bear market, core earnings were a lot lower than reported earnings, as companies adjusted their pension commitments to make things look better than they were. I was wondering if we would see the same thing happening now.

I asked Howard about that, and he said they were having some issues in calculating them but expected the core earnings numbers to be back up in a month or so. And he quoted sources that suggested S&P companies were underfunded by $250 billion in their defined-benefit pension plans. Late last year, the Bush administration waived the requirement that companies fund their pensions to at least 92% of needed capital. It is now down to 80%. That leaves companies some room to play with on their balance sheets.

I commented on how bad earnings were last quarter. The web site shows earnings were a negative $3.14 a share, the first time they have ever been negative for a quarter. Ever! That was with 65% of companies reporting. He commented that it was worse than that. They don't have it up yet, but with 78% of companies reporting, losses are now a staggering -$8.56 a share. And it could get worse. The write-offs this quarter are just huge.

As he wrote, companies are not only throwing in the kitchen sink, but the refrigerator, washer, and anything else they can find as they seek to write off everything they can, to get it over with and start the new year fresh. They need to do a kitchen remodel, but there is no financing available.

So, how does that affect total earnings for 2008? The table above shows analyst projections from March of 2007 through today. Notice how they kept falling over time. They are now down 70% from what was expected two years ago. Earnings for 2008 are a paltry $29.57 and dropping. The S&P 500 closed at 868.60. That makes the P/E (price to earnings) ratio 29.4. (I use a decimal to show I have a sense of humor.)

So, what are they projecting for 2009? Let's take a look. Notice that they too have been falling over time.

If the S&P 500 were to close where it is today, and using the estimates for the first two quarters of 2009, the P/E ratio would be 36.4 on July 1.

But what if earnings merely fall to where they were in the last recession, or about 55-60% of where the projections are today? That would drop the 12-month trailing earnings for the four quarters ending June 30 to $15.90 and result in a nose-bleed P/E of 54.7 by the middle of the year.

If earnings don't come in dramatically better for the first quarter as opposed to last quarter, we could be setting up for a nasty summer bear market. Even in the bear market of 2001-2, the P/E did not get above 47. Which, by the way, at a 47 multiple would correspond to a range for the S&P of either 1111 if the earnings come in as projected or 731 if they come in at the lower range.

I see nothing on the horizon which suggests the economy is going to get manifestly stronger in the next two quarters. The real risk is that earnings come in weak for both quarters and investors simply despair this summer, throwing in the towel and bringing about a vicious bear market. I would seriously consider hedging any long positions you have before earnings season this next April. If they come in stronger, then we will see.

La Jolla, Conversations, and Richard Russell

As I mentioned at the beginning of this letter, along with my partners Altegris Investments, I will be co-hosting our 6th annual Strategic Investment Conference in La Jolla, California, April 2-4. I have invited some of the top economic minds in the country to come and address us, giving us their views on what seems to be a continuing crisis. It will be a mix of economic theory and practical investment advice. WE WILL SELL OUT, so do not procrastinate if you intend to register.

Already committed to speak are Martin Barnes, Woody Brock, Dennis Gartman, Louis Gave, George Friedman (of Stratfor), and Paul McCulley. I anticipate adding another stellar name or two, as a lot of very famous people are coming for the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner (see below). This is as strong a lineup as we have ever had, and on par with any conference I know of anywhere. And as a special bonus, we have invited Fredrik Haren from Sweden. I heard him speak at a conference in Stockholm last year and was blown away. You can click on the link below to learn more about the speakers.

Due to securities regulations, attendance is limited to qualified high-net-worth investors and/or institutional investors, because we will be showcasing a select number of commodity fund managers and other alternative strategies. Early registrants will get a discount. Last year we had to close registration, and I anticipate we will run out of room again, so I would not procrastinate. Click this link to find out more and register: https://hedge-fund-conference.com/register.aspx. And if you cut and paste this link, make sure you copy the "https:" so you go to the secure site.

And the first of the "Conversations with John Mauldin" is up! We recorded it last week, with Ed Easterling and Dr. Lacy Hunt. I thought it went very well for an inaugural talk. The complete audio and transcript are in the Membership Library already. For those who have subscribed, you should have received an email and be able to log in and listen or read the transcript. We are getting very favorable reviews. Multiple readers have let us know that the first Conversation was worth their entire year membership. I am quite pleased with the first transcript and the response to it. My next Conversation is in two weeks, with Nouriel Roubini; and then after the release of banking data in early March, I will do a Conversation with good buddy Chris Whalen and a few real banking experts, on where the US banking system really is. I will offer it as a bonus to those that have already subscribed, as it will be more me asking questions than a real Conversation. I expect it to be very informative.

The regular price for a yearly subscription is $199, but you can subscribe now for $109, and still get access to the timely Conversation with Ed and Lacy. Don't wait, as I am sure my staff will only keep raising the price. To find out more, just click on the link and put in code JM77, which will give you the discounted price. https://www.johnmauldin.com/newsletters2.html

Now, about the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner on Saturday, April 4. It will be at the Hyatt in San Diego. We are going to be sending out invitations early next week to everyone who has responded so far, which is well over 500 people. If you have already responded, you will get a chance to register first, before we open it up again. Next week we will have a page where you can sign up; but when you get the invitation, I suggest you act quickly, as it really could sell out. This is going to be a very special night. If you are one of Richard's many thousands of fans you will not want to miss this. As I said, there are going to be a lot of well-known names there. We are still planning the program, but it will be special. (Note: to those who are attending my conference, noted above, this is a separate event, with separate tickets, in a different Hyatt.)

If you would like to attend, just contact us and we will get you an invitation. The cost will be $195.

And finally, Tiffani and I need an editor or two to help us in the process of editing our taped interviews with millionaires. Drop us a note.

It is time to hit the send button. Have a great week!

Your really optimistic for the long run analyst,

John Mauldin

Forecast 2009: Deflation and Recession

John Mauldin — Sat, 10 Jan 2009 14:38:00 GMT

Forecast 2009: Deflation, Deleveraging, and the Stimulus Effect
Muddle Through on Hold
Lies, Damned Lies, and Government Unemployment Numbers
Central Bankers of the World, Unite!
Predictions 2009
La Jolla, Bermuda, and Europe

Where are we headed in 2009? We will explore that in detail over the next few issues of Thoughts from the Frontline, but today we will start with some of the larger forces which will have a major impact on the economies of the world, and I will end with my usual attempt to forecast the various markets. We will look at deflation, deleveraging, the fallout from the stimulus plans (note plural), housing, consumer spending, unemployment, and a lot more. There is a lot to cover. But first two quick announcements.

Along with my partners Altegris Investments I will be co-hosting our 6^th annual Strategic Investment Conference in La Jolla, California, April 2-4. I have invited some of the top economic minds in the country to come and address us, giving us their views on what seem to be a continuing crisis. It will be a mix of economic theory and practical investment advice. Already committed to speak are Martin Barnes, Woody Brock, Dennis Gartman, Louis Gave, George Friedman (of Stratfor), and Paul McCulley. I anticipate adding another stellar name or two. This is as strong a lineup as we have ever had, and on par with any conference I know of anywhere.

Due to securities regulations, attendance is limited to qualified high-net-worth investors and/or institutional investors. Early registrants will get a discount. Last year we had to close registration, and I anticipate we will run out of room again, so I would not procrastinate. Simply click on the link below, give us your name and email, and you will be sent a form next week to register.

https://hedge-fund-conference.com/2009/interest.aspx?m=t

I should note that most attendees say this conference is the best investment conference they have ever been to. One of the benefits is being with several hundred very nice people in a relaxed setting. We do it up right.

Second, I and some of my fellow newsletter writers (Bill Bonner and Dennis Gartman, among others, are slated to be there) are going to be hosting a special tribute dinner to honor Richard Russell for his outstanding contribution of over 50 years to not only the craft of investment writing but also to the lives and investment portfolios of his readers. He is one of my personal heroes as well as a good friend. At 84, his writing today is better than ever, and now he writes every day, not just once a month! Richard is an institution in the investment writing world, and after talking with his wife Faye he has said he will let us plan the dinner.

Richard has some of the most loyal readers anywhere. I have personally talked to people who have been reading Dow Theory Letters almost since the beginning (1956), and their enthusiasm for all things Richard has not waned. We have a long list of people who want to attend.

Based on the response so far, we believe we can get a large roomful of Richard's friends, writing colleagues, and fans who have benefitted from his wisdom over the years, to honor him for a life well-lived and a true servant's spirit, as well as being a guide not just in the markets but in life. The dinner will be Saturday evening, April 4, 2009 in San Diego. In order to know how many people we should plan for, please send an email to russelltribute@2000wave.com indicating how many tickets you would like. If you have already responded, you will get an email with a link next week for you to register. If you have not and want to come, I suggest you do so quickly, as again we anticipate a packed room. The tickets will be $195, with any money left over going to Richard's favorite charity.

(Note: If you register for my conference, you must register separately for the Russell Tribute Dinner, which will be held at a different venue, after the close of my conference on Saturday. Thanks!)

And for new readers and those who get this letter forwarded to them, you can get a free subscription of your own just by going to www.frontlinethoughts.com. And now to our regular letter.

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Muddle Through on Hold

First, a quick look back at how I did in my 2008 forecast issue. In general, it was not a bad year in terms of getting the direction right on many of the markets, including gold, oil, the dollar (especially against the pound sterling), and stocks. Some predictions were on target, like a second-half rebound in the dollar.

But I missed the economy. I noted then that I believed we were already in recession (which we have now found out that we were), and I wrote that a recovery would begin by the end of the year, but that it would be a very weak one for a long time -- my basic Muddle Through scenario. Obviously, the recession is a lot worse than I thought it would be at the time. Looking to the end of this letter, I now think we will be in recession through at least 2009 before we begin a recovery, which will again be a rather anemic Muddle Through period of maybe two years, for a variety of reasons, some of which I cover today and others over the next few weeks.

And I should note that it was not long into the year before I began to get decidedly more gloomy, as many of you noted. And I expect that this year will bring a few surprises that will cause me to change my opinions yet again. When the facts change, I will try and change with them.

Forecast 2009: Deflation, Deleveraging, and the Stimulus Effect

For a very long time, I have been adamant that deflation is in our future. In the next few pages I outline how inflation might come back, but I doubt it will be this year. For now, deflation is the economic factor that the Fed and central banks will be battling. And believe me, it will be a very large and controversial battle.

We had a brief period last summer where inflation (as measured by the Consumer Price Index or CPI) was over 5%, and the trend was clearly up. The increase was almost entirely due to food and energy costs. Core inflation (less food and energy) was around 2%. Many commentators noted that real people actually bought gas and food and we should look at overall CPI and not just core. Now, with the drop in food and energy costs, their impact has vanished.

For the three months ending last November, the compound annual rate for the CPI was a negative(!) -10.2%, reflecting the almost 70% drop in energy. Annualized core CPI for the last three months ending November was a very low 0.4%. November CPI was a flat 0.0%. It has been falling steadily for the last five months.

December is likely to be negative. There is a trend here, and if you are a central banker it is not one you like. And that trend is being manifested in every part of the developed and much of the developing world. It is a global problem.

Given how high inflation was last summer, how could I credibly maintain that deflation was in our future? For reasons that I wrote about extensively then. Briefly, we were in a recession. Recessions are almost by definition deflationary. We had two massive bubbles bursting: the very visible housing bubble which was massively destroying wealth, and the less visible but even more powerful bursting of the credit bubble, which was accompanied by profound deleveraging and the destruction of what Paul McCulley termed the Shadow Banking System.

It would be a strange, strange world indeed if inflation could get any real traction in such an environment, and it didn't.

But now we have a structural problem in that deflation has the potential to get some very real traction going forward. Why? Because not just in the US, but all over the world, we built too much of almost everything. Too many houses, too many manufacturing plants, too many retail stores -- and just too much stuff.

In the US, capacity utilization is falling rapidly. Typically, if we produce "stuff" (cars, food, lumber, etc.) in the range of 80% of potential capacity, that is considered to be a good economy. Capacity utilization has been dropping for some time and is down below 75% for all industries, but in many industries is close to 70%. And the clear trend when looking at ISM manufacturing statistics is that it has a lot further to fall.

That means industries have no pricing power, as they can make a lot more "stuff" than they can sell. And when demand due to the recession drops as well, prices fall as producers try to stay in business.

As a very visible example, global output capacity for automobiles is 92 million cars, but sales will probably be around 60 million. Output in the US will be around 12 million, but right now sales are only about ten million. The average American household has 2.2 cars. Evidently, consumers are reducing the number of cars they own, buying used cars, and making their current vehicles last an average of 6 months longer -- all in just the last year.

Many auto plants, both in the US and abroad, are simply going to have to be closed. "Super-efficient Toyota expects its first operating loss in 70 years in the fiscal year ending March 31. Weak sales in China will probably force many of her 80 automakers to merge. Russian sales dropped 15% in November and 25% in Brazil from a year earlier." (Gary Shilling)

Just as there are too many auto dealers and too much auto manufacturing capacity, there are too many stores for a country whose consumers are in retreat. Consumer spending could easily drop 7% as the saving rate heads back up to 5% (or even more). It is estimated that over 70,000 retail stores will go out of business in the next six months. That would be in line with the 140,000 that closed doors last year. The economy and its businesses have to adjust to a new level of spending that will be the first serious consumer recession in 26 years.

Looking at Federal Reserve data, both total household debt and mortgage debt outstanding dropped in the third quarter, for the largest drop in 40 years. As I wrote almost two years ago, the disappearance of Mortgage Equity Withdrawals is having a negative impact of about 3% on US GDP. Evidence shows that this is also happening in Great Britain and other parts of Europe where there was a housing bubble.

Lies, Damned Lies, and Government Unemployment Numbers

There are some who see a ray of hope in the recent jobless claims reports, which have dropped back to "only" 467,000 in initial unemployment claims, down from 491,000 for the last week, after being over 500,000 for several weeks. Those numbers are seasonally adjusted. That hope disappears if you look at the actual numbers. For the current reporting week ending January 3, 2009, the advance number of initial claims came in at 726,420. Last week's advance number was 717,000. We have been above 600,000 new initial claims every week since the third week of November. Continuing claims jumped massively, by 744,000 to 5,316,124.

No conspiracy here. This is what happens when you try to smooth a volatile trend by using seasonal adjustments. If you use past performance as the tool by which you smooth the trend, when the trend changes, the seasonally adjusted numbers will be either too large or too small. Thus, the data understated the growth of jobs in 2003 because recent past performance had been bad, and it is now understating the number of unemployment claims and actual unemployment.

In December, the number of unemployed persons increased by a seasonally adjusted 632,000 to 11.1 million and the unemployment rate rose to 7.2%. Since the start of the recession in December 2007, the number of unemployed persons has grown by 3.6 million, and the unemployment rate has risen by 2.3% and is now at 7.2%.

I happened to be watching CNBC at the time of the release of the data, and several commentators remarked how much better the number was than they thought it would be. I wish they were right, but again, the actual numbers showed a loss of 954,000 jobs, over 50% more than the headline number reported in the press release. And that assumes that new businesses created 72,000 jobs from the birth/death model that I so frequently write about. It is possible that almost 1 million jobs were lost in December. I doubt the market would have liked that number.

I should note that the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not hide that number. You can find it if you dig for it. But most analysts seem to prefer just to take the press release and go with it. And most of the time that is fine. But in times like this, when trends are changing, you miss the bigger picture and get misleading data.

Unemployment could rise to 9-10% or more this year and on into 2010. That means we could easily see another 3 million lost jobs over the next year. That is going to put a lot of negative pressure on consumer spending. It also means that wages are not likely to rise, and we have already hard evidence of wages falling in many industries as companies try to find ways to remain solvent.

And that 9% will be the headline number. If you add people who have part-time jobs but would like a full-time job, and what are called marginally attached workers, the current rate is already 13.5%.

Average hours worked dropped to the lowest level since they began collecting data in 1964, as did hourly income. Given the increasing difficulty for consumers to borrow money and with income dropping, plus increased savings on the part of consumers, it is difficult to see how pricing power is going to come back any time soon.

This problem is multiplied throughout the developed world. The developing world, which sells products and goods to the US and European consumers, is starting to feel the pinch. Chinese and other Asian exports are dropping (more on that in future letters, but the data is ugly).

Overcapacity, rising unemployment, imploding leverage, lack of borrowing and/or lending, a serious retreat by consumers, and increased savings are all the conditions needed to bring about deflation. Left unchecked, we could soon see something like what Japan has experienced, and even potentially worse, as they started with a savings rate of 13%.

But deflation is not going to be left unchecked. It will be fought by central banks everywhere with low rates and the printing press, as well as government spending. And so, let's turn our attention to that process.

Central Bankers of the World, Unite!

There are many people who believe that the Fed and the Treasury increasing the money supply will bring about uncomfortably high inflation. And it is indeed their intention to "reflate" the economy. They are well aware of the problems that would develop if the US (and Europe!) caught "Japanese disease" or a prolonged bout of deflation. Bernanke has made it clear that "it" (as he called deflation in his 2002 speech) would not be allowe to happen on his watch.

And we have already seen a rather large growth in the monetary base. But as I wrote a few weeks ago, the velocity factor of money is slowing rapidly, creating the ability -- or dare I say it? -- the actual need to expand the money supply (you can read that in my December 5, 2008 post). But is it having an effect?

Good friend Gary Shilling raises some doubts (emphasis mine):

"Central banks around the world continue to cut their target rates, although in today's frozen credit market, that won't ever get the horse up on his feet, let alone to the water and drinking. The distrust of banks for even loans to other banks is shown by the still wide spread between LIBOR and the Treasury bills they covet.

"The M2 money supply is 60 times bank reserves, so normally when the Fed gives the bank another dollar in reserves, M2 rises by $60. But between August and November of last year, the $577 billion rise in reserves resulted in a mere $264 billion growth in M2, less than one half!"

See the chart below (the red, smooth line is M2, the dotted line is the adjusted reserves).

The Fed is aggressively expanding its balance sheet. They have made clear that they intend to purchase mortgage securities, consumer loans, and credit card securities. Corporate loans are on the table, as well as other forms of debt. (Finland is getting ready to purchase corporate debt. The list of countries that do so will rise very quickly.) This will be direct infusion of money into the system. As Bernanke said in 2002, he knows where the keys are to the room that has the printing press. And they are going to use it.

Obama and his advisors have signaled they intend to run a deficit of at least a trillion dollars. Right now, as I add it up, it is more like $1.3 trillion (the stimulus number keeps moving), and given that tax receipts are going to drop and unemployment benefits will rise (care to bet that unemployment benefits won't be extended to 52 weeks instead of the current 26?), it could be closer to $1.7-2 trillion. That would be almost 15% of GDP!

Let's get this straight. The only difference between the Treasury and the Fed under an Obama administration and the Bush administration is that Obama will be even more willing to spend (although Bush certainly showed little restraint). Incoming Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner has worked at Treasury and is now president of the New York Fed. There will be little difference between his policies (and those of Larry Summers, Obama's economic advisor) and those of Bernanke and Paulson. And like Paulson, he is going to have to make up the play book as he goes.

The Fed and the new administration are "all in," as they say in Texas hold 'em poker, in the fight to defeat deflation and get the economy growing. And eventually England and Europe will get it and join the fight (both the European Central Bank [especially!] and the Bank of England are behind the curve).

But there is a problem.

Lowering rates isn't enough to get consumers to spend when they have seen their wealth erode from losses in the value of their houses and investment portfolios and retirement accounts. The stimulus last summer was largely saved or used to pay down debt. What was an annualized stimulus of 3% of GDP in the second quarter, which is quite large, only kept GDP growth positive for one quarter.

Obama talks about creating 3 million jobs. If he can do it, that would only partially offset the job losses that will happen in his first year in office. But it will take a long time for much of the stimulus he is talking about to make its way into the economy. You can't turn on infrastructure projects in one quarter. It takes a lot of time to plan. New green power plants? Wonderful. I'm all for it. But they take years to authorize and build. Tax cuts? Again, much of it will be saved or used for debt.

The reality is that the US and much of the world are going to see their economies shrink for at least another year. And when that new, lower level is reached, the economy will slowly start to grow again. Remember those 71,000 retail stores closing? That means that those left standing will get more business and will be able to expand and grow and hire people. That is how recessions work. Excess capacity is worked through. Businesses cut back until they can get positive cash flow.

In 1978, in the midst of high inflation, bear markets, and malaise about all our jobs going overseas, the correct answer to the question "Where will all the needed new jobs come from?" was "I don't know, but they will." That is the correct answer today. That is what free markets and capitalism do. They find a way to make new paths and new businesses where none existed before. And it will happen again. Just with a little lag this time.

In the meantime, there is a lot of pain. An Obama administration is going to do what it can to help relieve that pain, even at the cost of trillion-dollar deficits for several years.

This you can take to the bank: If the Fed buys $500 billion in assets of various kinds and if the US government spends an extra trillion dollars and deflation is still a concern, they are going to double down and do it again. And yet again if they think it is necessary. They are not going to stop until the nominal economy is growing and inflation is above at least 1%.

How much will that number finally be? No one really knows. This has never been attempted. Maybe the initial stimulus package and Fed debt purchases will be enough. My bet is that it won't be, but that is just a guess. We are in uncharted waters. But the captains of the boats are all Keynesians. They are going to fight a recession and deflation with old-fashioned stimulus. And that means we had better adjust our portfolios and businesses for that reality.

Just to give you a picture of what economists think about the effect of the stimulus, let's turn to the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, which is one of my favorite sources for original economic insight (http://www.levy.org/). They are a rather conservative lot. The graph below shows what two different levels of government stimulus will mean to the economy. They graph unemployment at no stimulus (top black line) and at two levels of "shock" or stimulus. Shock 1 is about $380 billion and shock 2 is about $760 billion. The dotted lines are what is known as "output gap," or the measure of the difference between the actual output (actual GDP) of an economy and what it could produce at its most efficient (potential GDP).

"The implication of these projections is that, even with the application of almost unbelievably large fiscal stimuli, output will not increase enough to prevent unemployment from continuing to rise through the next two years.

"It seems to us unlikely that U.S. budget deficits on the order of 8--10 percent through the next two years could be tolerated for purely political reasons, given the strong and widespread belief that the budget should normally be balanced. But looking at the matter more rationally, we are bound to accept that nothing like the configuration of balances and other variables displayed in Figures 3 and 4 could possibly be sustained over any long period of time. The budget deficits imply that the public debt relative to GDP would rise permanently to about 80 percent, while GDP would remain below trend, with unemployment above 6 percent.

"Fiscal policy alone cannot, therefore, resolve the current crisis. A large enough stimulus will help counter the drop in private expenditure, reducing unemployment, but it will bring back a large and growing external imbalance, which will keep world growth on an unsustainable path.

"É At the moment, the recovery plans under consideration by the United States and many other countries seem to be concentrated on the possibility of using expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.

"But, however well coordinated, this approach will not be sufficient.

"What must come to pass, perhaps obviously, is a worldwide recovery of output, combined with sustainable balances in international trade."

Let me wrap up with a quick note about housing. The economy is going to have a rough time getting back to trend growth with the housing market in the tank. New home sales fell 2.9% in November, while the median price declined 11.5%. Unsold inventories stood at a rate of 11.5-month supply. Housing starts fell nearly 19% in November, while the number of building permits was down 15.6%. Sales of existing homes in November fell more than 8%. The S&P/Case-Shiller 20-city housing index showed an 18% drop in prices in October from a year earlier, while the 10-city index declined 19.1%. Prices in the 20-city index have fallen more than 23% since their July 2006 peak, while the 10-city index is down 25% since its top in June 2006.

It will be 2011 before we work through the excess supply of homes, especially as we are seeing more and more come onto the market because of foreclosures. Prices are likely to drop another 10%. There will be more wealth destruction and more pressure on consumers. 10% of all mortgages are either delinquent or in foreclosure.

Predictions 2009

Let's close with some predictions. Ten out of ten analysts in the recent Barron's forecast saw stock prices rising 10-20% this year. For reasons I outlined last week, I think we could see a tradable rally in the next few months, but at the very least test the lows this summer, if not set new lows. Earnings are going to be far worse than any analyst's projections I have seen. And earnings drive stock prices.

Further, this recession is going to be the longest in anyone's memory. It is going to seem like it is never going to end (it will, I promise), and more and more investors are just going to give up on stocks. The buy and hold for the long run mantra is wearing thin. In inflation-adjusted terms, the stock market is about where it was in 1973! If you reinvested dividends, that gets you to 1991 (again, inflation-adjusted). It takes a lot of buying to make a bull market. It only takes an absence of buying to make a bear market.

Could we get a rally after the summer or fall lows? Sure. And it could be a good one. A lot depends on how fast the stimulus kicks in and whether it really has an effect. Will the Fed really buy large-cap corporate debt? I hope we can see something like a 1974 bottom in stocks develop.

I think the correlation between the US stock market, other developed markets, and emerging markets is close to one. I prefer to stand aside until the US economy has a clear direction and we can see whether the stimulus actually works. And then we can look at the world economy. I won't embarrass them by naming names, but those who argued for "decoupling" between the US and the rest of the world are not looking good. Someday, but not this decade.

I would be a buyer of quality bonds, both corporate and municipal. The key is to have a bond analyst who knows what they are doing and not just looking at ratings. There are some real values in the bond market today.

I would not be a buyer of US government debt. Treasuries, if not in a mini-bubble, have little upside potential and just don't yield enough. Why would I hold a ten-year treasury for 2.39%? I like TIPS at these prices. TIPS are pricing in deflation for ten years and, as I outlined above, I don't think the Fed will allow deflation to take hold.

With all the massive printing of money, you would think I expect the dollar to crash. I don't. The question is, what will it fall against? The euro? Really? The pound is better valued, but England and Europe are going to have to cut rates and apply massive stimulus as well. Every developed country will have problems. I can see holding Canadian, Australian, and other commodity-country currencies, but the leverage needed to make it a reasonable investment potential is too risky for individuals.

I can't see the Japanese letting the yen get too much stronger. China seems to want to halt the rise of the yuan, and the rest of Asia will devalue their currencies to maintain whatever they think of as a competitive advantage. Longer term, I like Asian currencies.

After a year of bouncing around, gold may be poised to rise against all major currencies. We could easily see new highs in the next year.

I think oil is going lower (and maybe much lower -- can you say $1-a-gallon gas?) in the near term. As I have written about before, oil is now in the steepest contango on record. That means oil is cheap today and more expensive in a few months. That is not normal. Oil is bidding for storage. You can make 20-25% on your money in a few months if you can buy oil and find somewhere to store it. At least 25 supertankers have been leased to store oil, and sources say another ten are being bid for. It remains to be seen if OPEC can really cut enough to make a difference in the near term.

As for the other metals, I think it is quite likely copper and its industrial allies will fall in price at least for the near term, until production can be cut and demand in Asia begin to rise again. I would not be a buyer of long-only commodity funds for the near term. Someday the bull market in commodities will return, but not until Asian demand picks up.

The risks to my forecasts are quite clear. The stimulus could happen quicker and be more effective than I think, and the economy and the markets could surprise to the upside. On the other hand, and more scarily, the Fed could be pushing on a string in a liquidity trap and the economy and markets could get hit harder, along with most assets.

Briefly, if you would like to look at a range of money managers I think have the potential to navigate the current market successfully, let me suggest you contact some of my partners around the world. If you are an accredited investor (net worth $1.5 million) and would like to look at a group of hedge funds and especially commodity funds in the US, go to www.accreditedinvestor.ws and fill out the form, and my partners at Altegris Investments will get in touch with you. If you are in Europe, use the same link and I will get you in touch with Absolute Return Partners in London. In South Africa, my partner is Plexus Asset Management. We will soon be announcing new partners in Canada and in Latin America.

If your net worth is less than $1.5 million, my US partners at CMG have a platform of managers and traders that take direct-managed accounts with minimums of $100,000. These are liquid and fully transparent accounts with managers with long-term track records. You really should check it out. The link is http://www.cmgfunds.net/public/mauldin_questionnaire.asp.

And if you are an advisor or broker and would like to see the managers on the Altegris or CMG platforms and how you can access them for your clients, sign up and note on the form you are in the business. It might actually be fun to make a client call with a recommendation for a fund or manager that was up in 2008.

La Jolla, Bermuda, and Europe

Tiffani and I head out to La Jolla Monday to meet with Jon Sundt and his partners at Altegris Investments. There have been a lot of positive developments of late, including new managers, and of course we will be talking about the upcoming conference. And I will get to have a quick happy hour with Richard Russell and his son. The Tribute dinner is going to be so much fun.

On Wednesday, I am hosting a dinner at my new home for a small group of family office heads, hedge fund managers, and local businessmen. We are calling it an "Idea Dinner" and will throw out thoughts on how to invest in the coming year. I will report anything interesting.

I will be in Bermuda January 28-31 for a speech and some time away from the office to write on the book Tiffani and I are doing on millionaires. It is a fun project. And I have to have it finished by the end of February so I can get to London and Europe and New York in March.

I am always optimistic at the beginning of the year. Even though I see a serious recession, I am working, like every businessman in the world, on making my business grow in spite of problems in the economy. Free markets with motivated entrepreneurs will be what really creates a growing economy.

It is time to hit the send button. There is a fire in the family room, and it is time to relax. Enjoy your week. I know I will.

Your more optimistic than this letter implies analyst,

John Mauldin

The Velocity Factor

John Mauldin — Sat, 06 Dec 2008 03:05:16 GMT

The Velocity Factor
Richard Russell Tribute

"A severe global recession will lead to deflationary pressures. Falling demand will lead to lower inflation as companies cut prices to reduce excess inventory. Slack in labour markets from rising unemployment will control labor costs and wage growth. Further slack in commodity markets as prices fall will lead to sharply lower inflation. Thus inflation in advanced economies will fall towards the 1 per cent level that leads to concerns about deflation.

"Deflation is dangerous as it leads to a liquidity trap, a deflation trap and a debt deflation trap: nominal policy rates cannot fall below zero and thus monetary policy becomes ineffective. We are already in this liquidity trap since the Fed funds target rate is still 1 per cent but the effective one is close to zero as the Federal Reserve has flooded the financial system with liquidity; and by early 2009 the target Fed funds rate will formally hit 0 per cent. Also, in deflation the fall in prices means the real cost of capital is high - despite policy rates close to zero - leading to further falls in consumption and investment. This fall in demand and prices leads to a vicious circle: incomes and jobs are cut, leading to further falls in demand and prices (a deflation trap); and the real value of nominal debts rises (a debt deflation trap) making debtors' problems more severe and leading to a rising risk of corporate and household defaults that will exacerbate credit losses of financial institutions."

- Professor Nouriel Roubini of New York University

I had breakfast with Nouriel this morning down in Soho (I am in New York today). I thought the above quote was an excellent way to lead off this week's letter. Some of the more important questions of the moment are whether we face a serious bout of deflation, and if so, what can be done about it. There are market observers who are looking at the graphs which show the meteoric rise in the monetary base (see below) and predict that we will soon see much higher and rising inflation and a seriously falling dollar (accompanied with a large rise in gold). Is inflation everywhere and always a monetary phenomenon, as Friedman taught us? Can we see a large rise in the monetary base that is not accompanied by inflation? As Frederic Bastiat said (roughly), "In economics there is what you see and then there is what you don't see." The more important of the two items is what you don't see. In this week's letter we talk about what most market observers are not seeing, and why you should be paying attention.

We are going to revisit portions of an important e-letter I wrote earlier this year about the velocity of money. I am updating the charts and adding a lot of new commentary. I cannot overly stress how important this is. If you want to understand the markets, the dollar, gold, and more, you have to have this information down. You will need to put on your thinking cap, as much of what I am writing is counterintuitive and certainly not considered as received wisdom in much of the financial-commentator media. (Note: this letter will print longer than usual as there are a lot of graphs.)

Also, I am going to make an important announcement at the end of the letter about a new information service, and I need feedback from some of you.

Richard Russell Tribute

But first, I and some of my fellow newsletter writers (Bill Bonner and Dennis Gartman, among others, are slated to be there) are going to be hosting a special tribute dinner to honor Richard Russell for his outstanding contribution of over 50 years to not only the craft of investment writing but to the lives and investment portfolios of his readers. He is one of my personal heroes as well as a good friend. At 84, his writing today is better than ever, and now he writes every day, not just once a month! Richard is an institution in the investment writing world, and after talking with his wife Faye he has said he would let us plan the dinner.

Richard has some of the most loyal readers anywhere. I have personally talked to readers who have been reading Dow Theory Letters almost since the beginning (1956), and their enthusiasm for all things Richard has not waned.

We really hope we can get a roomful of Richard's friends, writing colleagues, and fans who have benefited from his wisdom over the years, to honor him for a life well lived and a true servant's spirit, as well as being a guide not just in the markets but in life. The dinner will be Saturday evening, April 4, 2009 in San Diego. In order to know how many people we should plan for, please send an email to russelltribute@2000wave.com indicating how many tickets you would like. Plan on the tickets being around $200, with any money left over going to Richard's favorite charity. I actually expect tickets to go rather fast, so let us know as soon as possible. We will get back into contact with you as to the exact time and place. Thanks.

The Velocity Factor

When most of us think of the velocity of money, we think of how fast it goes through our hands. I know at the Mauldin household, with seven kids, it seems like something is always coming up. And with Christmas looming, the velocity, at least in terms of how fast money seems to go out the door, seems faster than normal. And what about my business? Travel costs are way, way up; and as aggressive as we are on the budget, expenses always seem to rise. Compliance, legal, and accounting costs are through the roof. I wonder how those costs are accounted for in the Consumer Price Index? About the only way to deal with it is, as my old partner from the 1970s Don Moore used to say, is to make up the rise in costs with "excess profits," whatever those are.

Is the Money Supply Growing or Not?

But we are not talking about our personal budgetary woes, gentle reader. Today we tackle an economic concept called the velocity of money and how it affects the growth of the economy. Let's start with a few charts showing the recent high growth in the money supply that many are alarmed about. The money supply is growing very slowly, alarmingly fast, or just about right, depending upon which monetary measure you use.

First, let's look at the adjusted monetary base, or plain old cash plus bank reserves (remember that fact) held at the Federal Reserve. That is the only part of the money supply the Fed has any real direct control of. Until very recently, there was very little year-over-year growth. The monetary base grew along a rather predictable long-term trend line, with some variance from time to time, but always coming back to the mean.

But in the last few months the monetary base has grown by a staggering amount - by over 1400% on an annual basis, as shown in the next chart from my friend Dr. Lacy Hunt at Hoisington Asset Management. And when you see the "J-curve" in the monetary base (which is likely to rise even more!) it does demand an explanation. There are those who suggest this is an indication of a Federal Reserve gone wild and that 2,000-dollar gold and a plummeting dollar are just around the corner. They are looking at that graph and leaping to conclusions. But it is what you don't see that is important.

Now, the same graph but in percentage terms:

Several of my readers have sent me questions related to the chart below, which compares the above graph to the value of the US dollar, as measured in the trade-weighted dollar index. If the Fed is flooding the market with dollars, does that not mean a crash in the dollar is imminent? What foreign government or investor would want to hold dollars when the Fed is debasing the currency so rapidly?

Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Illiquid

The answer is that the Fed is not creating money in the sense of, say, monetizing the national debt (that comes later in the letter). Remember that the adjusted monetary base is cash plus bank reserves on deposit at the Fed. Banks have to hold a certain portion of their assets as liquid assets in order to meet potential demand from depositors for their money. If they go below that required number, the regulators come in and demand they increase their liquid assets immediately.

Various assets have been getting a "haircut" as to their ability to count as liquid reserves. With more and more assets becoming illiquid, the amount of money held in the liquid asset portion of many US banks assets has been dwindling. What to do? The Fed decided to take these assets and trade them (temporarily) for US treasuries, which are quite liquid. It's a kind of "Give me your tired, your poor, your humble illiquid assets yearning to be free" program to allow banks to stay in regulatory compliance.

But notice something. While the Fed did create the T-bills, they did not inject new capital into the overall system. If a bank had one billion in assets and gave the Fed $100 million to get liquid T-bills, it still just has $1 billion in assets. Yes, it could sell them to someone else to get cash, but that someone else would use already existing dollars. The Fed has provided liquidity but did not inject (yet) new cash into the overall system through this program. At some point in the future, when banks are once again doing business with each other and the system is more liquid, banks will take those T-bills back to the Fed and receive back whatever collateral they used to get them in the first place.

To illustrate what I am saying, let's look at MZM, or Money of Zero Maturity. Stated another way, you can think of it as cash, whether in a bank, a money market fund, or in your hands. We will look at the growth of MZM in the next two charts, one of which shows the actual growth and the other the growth in annual percentage terms.

Now remember, Friedman taught us that inflation is a monetary phenomenon. If you increase the money supply too fast, you risk an unwanted rise in inflation. If the money supply shrinks or grows too slowly, you could see deflation develop.

Note that MZM was growing at close to an 18% rate year over year earlier in the year but that growth is now down to 10%. Also note that less than three years ago MZM was growing close to zero. Since that time inflation has increased. Therefore, one could make the case that the Fed is causing inflation by allowing the money supply to increase too rapidly. Case closed?

Maybe not. Correlation is NOT causation. More cash sometimes means that people and businesses are taking less risk. The Fed cannot control what we do with our money, only how much bank reserves it allows and how much cash it puts into the system.

Forecasting inflation from a money-supply graph is very difficult. It used to be a lot simpler, but in recent decades has been very unreliable, for reasons we will look at in a moment. But it is much too simplistic to draw a direct comparison between inflation and an arbitrary money-supply measure.

If we look at a graph of M2, which includes time deposits, small certificates of deposit, etc., we again see a rise in recent growth. M2 is the measure of money supply that most economists use when they are thinking about inflation. And we see that M2 is growing at a sprightly 7% year over year. This is not all that high historically, but again it is up significantly from the past few years. See the graph below. Note that there have been several times (as recently as 2000) when annual M2 growth was over 10%.

But there is more to the inflation/deflation debate than just money supply. Money supply is what you see. And now we look at what most of us don't see.

The Velocity of Money

Now, let's introduce the concept of the velocity of money. Basically, this is the average frequency with which a unit of money is spent. Let's assume a very small economy of just you and me, which has a money supply of $100. I have the $100 and spend it to buy $100 worth of flowers from you. You in turn spend the $100 to buy books from me. We have created $200 of our "gross domestic product" from a money supply of just $100. If we do that transaction every month, in a year we would have $2400 of "GDP" from our $100 monetary base.

So, what that means is that gross domestic product is a function not just of the money supply but how fast the money supply moves through the economy. Stated as an equation, it is Y=MV, where Y is the nominal gross domestic product (not inflation-adjusted here), M is the money supply, and V is the velocity of money. You can solve for V by dividing Y by M. (In last April's discussion of the velocity of money I used "P" instead of "Y". Lacy Hunt tells me the more correct statement of the equation is Y=MV, and I defer to the expert. Sorry for any confusion.)

Now, let's complicate our illustration just a bit, but not too much at first. This is very basic, and for those of you who will complain that I am being too simple, wait a few pages, please. Let's assume an island economy with 10 businesses and a money supply of $1,000,000. If each business does approximately $100,000 of business a quarter, then the gross domestic product for the island would be $4,000,000 (4 times the $1,000,000 quarterly production). The velocity of money in that economy is 4.

But what if our businesses got more productive? We introduce all sorts of interesting financial instruments, banking, new production capacity, computers, etc.; and now everyone is doing $100,000 per month. Now our GDP is $12,000,000 and the velocity of money is 12. But we have not increased the money supply. Again, we assume that all businesses are static. They buy and sell the same amount every month. There are no winners and losers as of yet.

Now let's complicate matters. Two of the kids of the owners of the businesses decide to go into business for themselves. Having learned from their parents, they immediately become successful and start doing $100,000 a month themselves. GDP potentially goes to $14,000,000. But, in order for everyone to stay at the same level of gross income, the velocity of money must increase to 14.

Now, this is important. If the velocity of money does NOT increase, that means (in our simple island world) that on average each business is now going to buy and sell less each month. Remember, nominal GDP is money supply times velocity. If velocity does not increase and money supply stays the same, GDP must stay the same, and the average business (there are now 12) goes from doing $1,200,000 a year down to $1,000,000.

Each business now is doing around $80,000 per month. Overall production on our island is the same, but is divided up among more businesses. For each of the businesses, it feels like a recession. They have fewer dollars, so they buy less and prices fall. They fall into actual deflation (very simplistically speaking). So, in that world, the local central bank recognizes that the money supply needs to grow at some rate in order to make the demand for money "neutral."

It is basic supply and demand. If the demand for corn increases, the price will go up. If Congress decides to remove the ethanol subsidy, the demand for corn will go down, as will the price.

If the central bank increased the money supply too much, you would have too much money chasing too few goods, and inflation would rear its ugly head. (Remember, this is a very simplistic example. We assume static production from each business, running at full capacity.)

Let's say the central bank doubles the money supply to $2,000,000. If the velocity of money is still 12, then the GDP would grow to $24,000,000. That would be a good thing, wouldn't it?

No, because only 20% more goods is produced from the two new businesses. There is a relationship between production and price. Each business would now sell $200,000 per month or double their previous sales, which they would spend on goods and services, which only grew by 20%. They would start to bid up the price of the goods they want, and inflation sets in. Think of the 1970s.

So, our mythical bank decides to boost the money supply by only 20%, which allows the economy to grow and prices to stay the same. Smart. And if only it were that simple.

Let's assume 10 million businesses, from the size of Exxon down to the local dry cleaners, and a population which grows by 1% a year. Hundreds of thousands of new businesses are being started every month, and another hundred thousand fail. Productivity over time increases, so that we are producing more "stuff" with fewer costly resources.

Now, there is no exact way to determine the right size of the money supply. It definitely needs to grow each year by at least the growth in the size of the economy, plus some more for new population, and you have to factor in productivity. If you don't then deflation will appear. But if money supply grows too much, then you've got inflation.

And what about the velocity of money? Friedman assumed the velocity of money was constant. And it was from about 1950 until 1978 when he was doing his seminal work. But then things changed. Let's look at two charts sent to me by Lacy. First, let's look at the velocity of money for the last 108 years.

Notice that the velocity of money fell during the Great Depression. And from 1953 to 1980 the velocity of money was almost exactly the average for the last 100 years. Also, Lacy pointed out, in a conversation which helped me immensely in writing this letter, that the velocity of money is mean reverting over long periods of time. That means one would expect the velocity of money to fall over time back to the mean or average. Some would make the argument that we should use the mean from more modern times since World War II, but even then mean reversion would mean a slowing of the velocity of money (V), and mean reversion implies that V would go below (overcorrect) the mean. However you look at it, the clear implication is that V is going to drop. In a few paragraphs, we will see why that is the case from a practical standpoint. But let's look at the first chart.

Now, let's look at the same chart since 1959, but with shaded gray areas which show us the times the economy was in recession. Note that (with one exception in the 1970s) velocity drops during a recession. What is the Fed response? An offsetting increase in the money supply to try and overcome the effects of the business cycle and the recession. Y=MV. If velocity falls then the money supply must rise for nominal GDP to grow. The Fed attempts to jump-start the economy back into growth by increasing the money supply.

In this chart, Lacy assumes we are already in recession (gray bar at far right). The black line is his projection of velocity in the near future. If you can't read the print at the bottom of the chart, he assumes that GDP is $14.17 trillion, M2 is $7.6 trillion and therefore velocity is 1.85, down from almost 1.95 just a few years ago. If velocity reverts to or below the mean, it could easily drop 10% from here. We will explore why this could happen in a minute.

Y=MV

But let's go back to our equation, Y=MV. If velocity slows by 10% (which it well should) then money supply (M) would have to rise by 10% just to maintain a static economy. But that assumes you do not have 1% population growth, 2% (or thereabouts) productivity growth, and a target inflation of 2%, which means M (money supply) would need to grow about 5% a year, even if V is constant. And that is not particularly stimulative, given that we are in recession. And notice above that M2 is growing just about in line with that.

Bottom line? Expect money-supply growth well north of 7% annually for the next few years. Is that enough? Too much? About right? We won't know for a long time. This will allow armchair economists (and that is most of us) to sit back and Monday morning quarterback for many years.

My friends at GaveKal have their own measure of world velocity, and as you might expect it is slowing too. This slowing is a global problem and is one of the reasons we are in a global recession.

A Slowdown in Velocity

Now, why is the velocity of money slowing down? Notice the significant real rise in V from 1990 through about 1997. Growth in M2 (see the above chart) was falling during most of that period, yet the economy was growing. That means that velocity had to have been rising faster than normal. Why? It is financial innovation that spurs above-trend growth in velocity. Primarily because of the financial innovations introduced in the early '90s, like securitizations, CDOs, etc., we saw a significant rise in V.

And now we are watching the Great Unwind of financial innovations, as they went to excess and caused a credit crisis. In principle, a CDO or subprime asset-backed security should be a good thing. And in the beginning they were. But then standards got loose, greed kicked in, and Wall Street began to game the system. End of game.

What drove velocity to new highs is no longer part of the equation. The absence of new innovation and the removal of old innovations (even if they were bad innovations, they did help speed things up) are slowing things down. If the money supply did not rise significantly to offset that slowdown in velocity, the economy would already be in a much deeper recession.

While the Fed does not have control over M2, when they lower interest rates it is supposed to make us want to take on more risk, borrow money, and boost the economy. So, they have an indirect influence.

I expect the Fed to cut at least another 50 basis points next week, and to give us a statement with a nod toward difficult economic conditions. The latest Beige Book from the Fed was simply dreadful, so you can bet the governors will have a deteriorating economy in mind. Given the 25-plus-year low in consumer confidence, they have little choice.

I agree with Nouriel that the Fed will soon move rates close to zero. For all intents and purposes, the markets have already moved there. But is it having an effect on the willingness of banks to lend? Not hardly. Standards for lending are tightening every week. Look at the graphs below. The willingness of banks to make consumer loans is dropping to a 28-year low. And they are tightening standards on all sorts of business loans.

Now, I argued above that the Fed is not really expanding the money supply, so far. But within a few quarters, we will be facing outright deflation. The Fed is going to monetize at least a portion of what will be a $1+ trillion dollar US deficit. They have announced they are going to purchase $800 billion in mortgage-backed and other types of consumer loan assets. That will be a direct infusion of dollars into the economy. That is serious monetization. But they may feel they have no choice if they want to keep the US economy from going Japanese.

When someone becomes a Fed governor, they take them into a back room and perform a DNA transplant on them. They come out of that room viscerally, almost genetically, focused on preventing deflation from happening on their watch.

How much monetization will be enough to halt deflation and overcome the slowdown in the velocity of money and the rise in personal savings? No one knows. There is no fancy equation or model which can encompass all the factors, or at least not one I know of.

We will also soon see which of the additional deflation-fighting policies that Bernanke outlined in his 2002 "helicopter" speech the Fed will adopt. It is highly likely that we will see more than a few of them. It is quite possible that we will see the Fed start to set rates on longer-term bills and even bonds in an effort to pull down longer-term rates for corporations and individuals.

We will explore all the deflation-fighting options and what the results might be in future letters, but remember that there will come a time when the Fed will have to "take back" some of the liquidity they are going to provide. That means we could be in for a multi-year period of slow growth after we pull out of this recession. And this recession could easily last through 2009.

A Conversation with John and Friends

Next week, I will announce a brand new subscription service that we will be offering to you. I travel and speak all over the world, and during this time I get to have private dinners and personal telephone conversations with some of the best minds in this business. Tiffani has often remarked what an education she gets just sitting at the table with us, and wishes she could have recorded the conversations for everyone to listen to.

And that is what we have decided to do. We are going to invite you to regularly "meet me" at the table for conversations with my friends and colleagues. This will be the only place you will be able to listen to detailed conversations with my colleagues who are leading experts in their fields. These encounters will be designed so that out of the mountain of information available, you get a concise view of the current landscape and can be motivated to make better decisions in your personal and business economic life.

This week, would you please let me know what you think? Here are two additional ideas in the works:

1. George Friedman of Stratfor and I spent a day together last week, brainstorming. We decided we are going to have quarterly conference calls to analyze the geopolitical landscape and discuss the immediate economic implications. You will get to listen.

2. I get hundreds of intelligent questions each week that, if answered, could benefit all of my readers. We will be giving you a place to drop your questions into a "Virtual Hat," and I will then answer them on a protected website.

While the basic format and level of service in Thoughts from the Frontline is not going to change, in the first half of 2009 we will be launching these new, unique subscription services.

Which of these services would benefit your life? Do you have any compelling ideas that I haven't mentioned that you would like our firm to pursue? What do you enjoy about Frontline Thoughts? What changes if any would you like to see? Please let Tiffani and me have your feedback (good or constructive) and your ideas - send them to eu@2000wave.com. As an incentive, she will randomly pick 5 emails to receive a free annual subscription to one of the new services. Thanks very much.

The letter is already long, so I will refrain from personal remarks this week. Enjoy your week.

Your knowing that we will all get through this analyst,

John Mauldin