Thoughts From The Frontline : Europe

The Hole in FDIC

John Mauldin — Sat, 19 Sep 2009 04:15:00 GMT

Elements of Deflation, Part 3
Outrageous! - Artificial Deflation!
If You Are in a Hole, Stop Digging!
The Hole in the FDIC
How Can Just Four Stocks Be 40% of the NYSE Volume?
New Orleans and a Mauldin Migration to Europe

This week we continue to look at what powers the forces of deflation. As I continue to stress, getting the fundamental question answered correctly is the most important issue we face going forward. And the problem is that we cannot use the usual historical comparisons. This week we look at one more factor: bank lending. I give you a sneak preview of what will be an explosive report from Institutional Risk Analytics about the problems in the banking sector. Are you ready for the FDIC to be down as much as $400 billion? This should be an interesting, if sobering, letter.

But first, Dennis Gartman and Greg Weldon will be joining me next week for another Conversation with John Mauldin. This is my subscription service where I sit down with my friends and let you eavesdrop on our conversations (we also transcribe them). Dennis and Greg are two of the premier traders and data mavens in the world, and we will be all over the world of commodities, currencies, and the markets. I can tell you, it will be one exciting conversation for me.

It won't be too long before it will be time to do another Geopolitical Conversation with George Friedman. George and I are doing a conversation quarterly, and right now it is a bonus if you subscribe to Conversations with John Mauldin, but the plan is to offer it separately for $59. Now, here is the important part: all current subscribers and anyone who subscribes now will receive these Geopolitical Conversations free, as a thank you. If you have not yet subscribed, you can do so and receive a discount by clicking the link and typing in the code JM47 to subscribe for $149. This is a large discount from our regular price of $199; plus, we are including the bonus Geopolitical Conversations that are worth $59. And now, to the regular letter.

Outrageous! - Artificial Deflation!

Speaking of deflation, let me mention something I find totally outrageous. Normally, I actually take up for the bureaucrats who are stuck with the task of trying to monitor inflation. It is a tough job, and like Monday-morning quarterbacks, everybody thinks you should have done it differently. I can understand the rationale for hedonic measurements, housing rent equivalents, etc., even if I don't agree with them. You have to set some rules and live with them. But the latest imbroglio is disgraceful.

It seems the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, in the CPI next week, will treat the subsidy received by those 800,000 car buyers who bought a car in the "Cash for Clunkers" program as if the price of a car fell by $4,500. Really? My tax dollars account for nothing?

This does several things. It will decrease the inflation used to adjust the GDP for this quarter. Not the end of the world, but annoying But what really matters is that the CPI is used to calculate Social Security increases and interest paid on TIPS.

If I tried to defraud one of my clients using such accounting legerdemain, I would be shut down, sued, and taken to court (at the minimum) by the host of regulators who look over my shoulder. And I should be! You don't make such changes in the rules to your own benefit. But that is what the BLS did. This policy should be overruled immediately. There are enough deflationary forces in the world without having to artificially create some more. OK, off the soapbox and onto the banking system.

If You Are in a Hole, Stop Digging!

Right outside my office window I am watching what is to me a visual parable for the banking crisis that has beset the world. I lease a rather large home in a nice, quiet neighborhood in Dallas, and moved my office here last year, as we can use the extra bedrooms and sitting areas. Besides saving a lot (!) of money (always a good thing), it gives me a ten-second commute as I walk down the hall to the back of the house. Tiffani and I each save over a month in driving time a year. That is huge.

My quiet neighborhood changed a few weeks ago. Trying to sleep in the morning after the Paul McCartney concert, I awoke to find with my bed literally vibrating. Earthquakes in Texas? No, it seems my neighbor decided he needed a bigger home, and the first thing to be done was to tear down the old one, which they did rather efficiently, if not quietly, over the next few days. We literally had glasses and other items vibrating in the house.

Then, after removing a large pecan tree, they proceeded to dig 25-foot-deep holes (26 of them!) and fill them with iron and concrete piers on my side of the lot. The plans called for a rather large basement, and the very experienced builders (exceptionally nice guys) wanted to make sure the earth did not move, causing my home to have problems. So for three days I had a very noisy drill literally ten feet away from my window (I wrote an e-letter during one of those days).

Now, since the other sides of the lot were on a street or backed up to an alley, they did not put in piers there. No homes to worry about. I did not think much of it, as these guys had built some of the biggest and nicest homes in the area. They then proceeded to dig a very large hole, as the basement was going to be quite expansive. It turns out you have to dig the hole bigger than the actual size of the basement, since you have to have room to put up forms to pour concrete, etc. And you have to excavate on an angle. At the end of the process, most of the lot was slanting downward toward the end of the hole near the alley.

Then the clouds darkened, and the builders realized we were in for a little rain. (You can start to guess!) They took precautions and put heavy plastic over the sides of the hole to keep the sides dry. And then the rains came. Texas rains. The plastic was pulled from its wall and the street side of the hole began to literally wash back into the hole as we watched, going all the way back to and under the sidewalk. The poor builders showed up and began the process of trying to mitigate the damage, but it had been done and only got worse as it continued to rain for three days. The next morning I was the temporary owner of lake-front property. Those piers on my side were starting to be exposed.

They brought in crews for emergency repairs to the sides of the hole, and they really went after it. What to do then? It seems that the only thing to do was to fill the hole back up and start all over, only this time putting piers around the whole property. Which is what they are doing now. But since they had taken all the original dirt away, they are now having to take dirt from the rest of the property to fill the hole they will redig later.

It seems to me the banking crisis was somewhat like that. We allowed our banks to dig a hole, but we only had regulations on one side of the hole, and a patchwork of systems to shore up the securitizations, credit default swaps, and the entire shadow banking system.

Then the rains came and the whole thing fell apart. What we are now engaged in is the process of filling in the hole and putting rules in place to keep the system intact when we start the next building project. And since we hauled off all the old dirt or, in the case of the banks, had to write off hundreds of billions of dollars, we now have to find new dirt to fill in the hole. A very expensive operation, to say the least. Remind me never to build a house.

The Hole in the FDIC

And speaking of holes, let's look at a huge one that is looming at the FDIC. Institutional Risk Analytics (IRA) is maybe the premier bank-analyst service in the country. They charge over six figures for their flagship service. Good friend and Maine fishing buddy Chris Whalen runs the show and was kind enough to send me some of his new data, which they have not yet released to the public. You get it here first. (www.institutionalriskanalytics.com)

IRA takes the data from the FDIC and crunches it with their own set of risk parameters. While the FDIC has a little over 400 banks on its current "watch" list, IRA gives 2,256 banks an "F." They project that over 1,000 banks will either fold or be taken over during the current cycle. To date in 2009, a total of 92 banks have failed across the country, compared with 25 for all of 2008, according to the FDIC. 900 more to go. Ouch.

How much money are we talking about? The banks rated F have total insured assets of $4.46 trillion. So far in this cycle banks that have been taken over by the FDIC are showing losses of 25%!

Turning to a note from IRA: "An important point in the analysis is that estimated losses for failed bank resolutions by the FDIC are running around a quarter of failed bank assets, a level much higher than between 1980 and 1995, when failures cost an average 11 percent. Our firm's long-held view of the likely loss rate peak for the US banks in this credit cycle is 2x 1990 loss rates or, as noted by the IMF, around 4 percent of total loans. Since total loans and leases held by all FDIC-insured banks was some $7.7 trillion as of Q2 2009, the IMF estimate implies a cumulative loss of over $300 billion.

"If you start with the internal assumptions used by our firm that roughly half of the banks currently rated "F" or some 1,000 banks will fail and/or be merged with another institution and that the loss to the FDIC bank insurance fund will be approximately 20-25% of total assets, then the cost of these resolutions to the FDIC through the full credit downturn could be in excess of $400-500 billion. Keep in mind that in making this alarming estimate we ignore other banks currently in ratings strata above "F" and that some of these institutions may indeed fail as well. Also, our overall "worst case" or maximum probable loss ("MPL") for large US banks above $10 billion in assets is $800 billion through the current credit cycle."

From almost $60 billion last fall, the FDIC's reserves have been drawn down to only about $10 billion today (after set-asides), a 16-year low. A quick look at the FDIC's own data shows us how inadequate those reserves are compared to the deposits they are now insuring. The FDIC only has about two-tenths of one cent for every dollar of assets it covers. Look at this chart from my friends at Casey Research.

The FDIC can borrow $100 billion in an emergency line of credit, and through 2010 it can get another $500 billion. But if and when that money is borrowed, it will have to be paid back. Remember the money that was lost in the savings and loan crisis 20 years ago? The FDIC had to borrow a mere $15 billion. We are still paying that 30-year loan back.

The FDIC has two options to replenish its insurance fund in the short run: it can charge banks higher fees or it can take the more radical step of borrowing from the US Treasury. It has already levied a "special fee" that garnered over $5 billion.

Now, let's hold that thought, as we will come back to it in a minute.

A growing economy requires a growing credit market. If credit is shrinking it signals a receding economy. But banks are having to raise capital, and that means many banks are having to curtail lending. First, let's look at a chart of total bank loans for the last five years. Notice that there was a big jump in late 2008 as commercial paper became hard to obtain and businesses hit their credit lines. Since then banks have been cutting back.

This next chart is again total bank loans but goes back to 1947. Notice that loan growth was relatively smooth with only a few sideways drifts during recessions and never dropping significantly, as it has in the last year. And the data suggests that banks intend to keep reducing their loan exposure as they try to increase their capital (at least the large number of banks that have problems).

Consumer credit-card lending is down. Banks have cut their outstanding and unused bank lines to corporations. I can go on and on, but you get the picture. Remember the money that the Fed used to purchase toxic assets so that banks could lend? They are increasingly using that money to buy Fannie and Freddie loans and banking the interest in an effort to improve their profitability.

Why are they raising capital? Because their loan losses are high and rising. Look at this chart from Northern Trust. What it shows is consumer loan losses rising, and so far there is no sign of those losses topping out. The lines are still going up. The same can be said for real estate loans at commercial banks, which are now running over 9% delinquent. These are loans the banks kept on their books.

Everyone knows that commercial real estate loans are the next shoe to drop, and write-offs may be as large as $400 billion. This will force some banks to go under, but other banks will simply have to absorb the losses.

Now, let's come back to the FDIC. Sheila Bair, who heads the agency, has emphatically said that the FDIC will not ask Congress for a capital infusion. That means, as noted above, that the FDIC will have to either use their credit lines or ask for more "one-time" special-fee contributions.

If the FDIC borrows the money, and it is highly likely they will, they are going to have to raise the rates they charge member banks for the government backing. And to pay back $3-400 billion? Rates will have to be raised quite high, on the very banks struggling to raise capital and make a profit.

This is going to be a huge drain on future profits of US banks for a very long time. It is going to make it even harder for them to increase their capital – and they need to. But it has to happen. Zombie banks, those that are bound to fail, need to be taken out and put into stronger hands so that credit growth can once again start to rise. But this will not happen overnight. It is going to take time.

While I am writing about US banks, this is a problem all over the developed world. Banks that have to raise capital and reduce loans are not growing credit and are a drag on growth. As credit shrinks it is a large deflationary force. And that is not even taking into account the implosion of the shadow banking system.

Yes, we are seeing statistical growth in the economy this quarter and probably the next. But unemployment is rising and wages and incomes are falling. We will go into that next week.

We are in for a very poor, jobless recovery, and the risk of falling into a double-dip recession is quite high. The stock market is pricing in a steep V-shaped recovery in both GDP and corporate profits. I am not convinced.

How Can Just Four Stocks Be 40% of the NYSE Volume?

Before I hit the send button, a brief comment on a very odd market happening. It appears that recently up to 40% of the volume in the NYSE is in just four low-priced financial stocks. "According to Reuters, four beaten-up financial companies - Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup (C), Fannie Mae (FNM), and Freddie Mac (FRE) - have accounted for upwards of 40 percent of the trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange to begin this week."

The stocks are basically churning in price. Why is this? There are a lot of theories, so let me offer one of my own. I think it has a lot to do with flash trading. As I wrote in a previous letter, with high-frequency program trading hedge funds and sophisticated brokers can make as much as 0.5 cents buying and selling a share of stock at breakeven. Supposedly, the exchanges pay these premiums for adding liquidity. But we are seeing liquidity in stocks where none is needed.

The SEC announced this week that they are going to look into halting these programs. Good. It can't come too soon. Allowing certain funds and brokers to basically front-run the average fund or individual because they have their servers on the actual trading floor is just wrong. This must stop. And if program trading is actually driving the volume in these four names, it needs to be stopped as soon as possible.

Candidly, I have no way of knowing what the true reason for the volume is. Maybe it is something simple and innocent. But I am deeply suspicious. I doubt it's people buying Bank of America, which has seen its volume as high as 238 million shares, or Citi at 973 million shares, in ONE day! This for stocks that are severely financially impaired? Someone needs to be on top of this. As in Monday.

New Orleans and a Mauldin Migration to Europe

Today Tiffani finished using 960,000 of my American Airline miles to buy tickets for my seven kids, three of their spouses, one toddler, and three babies (two of whom are not yet here) to Paris, where the entire clan will wander down through France to northern Italy and end up in Rome next June. I am giving those in the area fair warning. Actually, it sounds like a very fun adventure. I have been to part of that area, and I am really looking forward to showing the kids castles, beaches, and art. And pizza in Rome!

I celebrate my 60th birthday the first weekend of October, then fly to New Orleans to be at the annual New Orleans Conference, October 8-11. The speaker line-up is better than ever. I find this to be one of the best conferences I go to very year. I have been attending on and off for over 25 years. You should think about this one. http://www.neworleansconference.com/speaker-eblast-JohnMauldin/

Then I will spend the next weekend in Detroit, then probably go to New York, then Philadelphia for a CMG conference October 20, then down to Houston, over to Orlando, stop to change clothes and pack at home, and then fly off on a whirlwind trip to Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, speaking at a series of CFA conferences. Denver and Orlando in mid-November, and nothing else so far. Switzerland and London in January.

It's time to hit the send button. Have a great week, and take your banker to lunch – he needs a friend (and let him have the bill!).

Your never wanting to build a home analyst,

John Mauldin

Europe on the Brink

John Mauldin — Sat, 18 Jul 2009 03:30:00 GMT

Europe on the Brink
And Then There Was Leverage
Too Big To Save
Those Wild and Crazy Swiss
A Positive Third Quarter?
New York and Maine

We have avoided Armageddon, at least for now. The cost to the US taxpayer has been a few trillion. Some in the media are loudly announcing the end of the recession. But we are not out of the woods yet. There are a few more bumps in the road. Actually, some of them are quite steep hills. As big as the subprime problem? Maybe.

When asked a few weeks ago what was my biggest short-term concern, I quickly replied, "European banks have the potential to create significant risk for the entire worldwide system." This week we will glance "over the pond" to see what gives me cause for concern. Then we briefly look at a few of the bumps I mentioned, which are likely to stretch out any recovery, and maybe even dip us back into recession.

But first, a quick announcement. We are making dramatic changes to my free Accredited Investor E-Letter and service, and will have a new web site and much improved content in a month or so. But in the meantime, I have just finished a new letter; and if you sign up at the current site, you will of course get all the new services and benefits when we make the changes, as well as this new letter. Basically, this service is for accredited investors (net worth of $1.5 million or more) who are interested in learning more about and investing in alternative funds like hedge funds, commodity funds, and so on. You will get a call from one of my worldwide partners (Altegris Investments in the US, Absolute Return Partners in Europe, Nicola Asset Management in Canada, Plexus Asset Management in Africa, and Fynn Capital in Latin America) and gain access to a lot of information and an easy way to preview what I think is a great line-up of quality funds and managers. You can go to www.accreditedinvestor.ws and sign up today. Don't procrastinate! (In this regard, I am president and a registered representative of Millennium Wave Securities, LLC, member NASD.)

And for those of you in the US who are on your way to becoming accredited investors (but not there yet), my friends at CMG have a platform of alternative managers that can be tailored to your specific needs. You really owe it to yourself to see the managers on their platform. The link to their form is http://www.cmgfunds.net/public/mauldin_questionnaire.asp. And now, let's jump into the letter.

Europe on the Brink

Globalization is a two-edged sword. On balance, it has brought prosperity to those who have embraced it, with rising lifestyles, better health, longer lives, and more. The more we need each other, the less likely it is that we'll shoot each other. Shooting your customers is not a good business strategy. And while the growth has not been even or smooth, only a Luddite would want to return to the early 1800s or 1900s, or even 1975.

The other edge of that sword? We are connected in so very many ways, far more than most of the world suspected. Who thought that insane lending policies at US mortgage banks would bring the world financial system to its knees, increasing unemployment and leading to a global recession? World trade is down 20% or more. US railroad shipments are down more than 20% year-over-year. Chinese (and Asian) factories have seen their orders drop, as US consumers have gone on strike. The US trade deficit was just $25 billion last month; and while our exports are still dropping, our imports are dropping more. Oil is becoming a bigger and bigger share of imports, and that does not come from Asian exporters.

The US is far and away the country with the largest gross domestic product (GDP). California would be the 7^th largest country, but few think of California in such terms. For this letter, at least, I would like to think of Europe as a whole rather than as 27 countries. From that perspective, Europe is as economically important to the world as the US. What happens in Europe makes a difference in the US.

Last week we looked at the precarious position of Japan, the second largest economy (or third if you think of Europe as a whole). It was a sobering letter. When you realize the extent to which Japan has funded Asian expansion, what is happening there cannot be good for the world.

But Europe's banks have been much more aggressive in funding emerging-market expansion than US or Japanese banks. Western European banks have lent $4.5 trillion to various emerging-market countries, businesses, and consumers. Many Eastern European businesses borrowed in low-interest-rate euros. New homeowners in Hungary and the rest of Eastern Europe borrowed in Swiss francs and euros, and as their currencies have collapsed they now find they owe more on their homes than they're worth.

And here's the problem. Europe's banking system is in far worse shape than the US system. The losses may be bigger, and their capital to meet those losses is certainly less. Let's look at some charts. Remove sharp objects or pour another adult beverage.

As I noted last week, one of the real benefits of writing this letter is that I get to see a lot of really interesting information from readers and meet with very savvy investment professionals. I recently had the privilege of sitting with a team of analysts from Hayman Capital here in Dallas. Hayman runs a global macro hedge fund, so they spend a lot of time thinking about how all the different aspects of the global markets fit together. This week we again look at some of their analysis. There was a lot of work (as in months) done here; and Kyle Bass, the founder of the firm, graciously allowed me to share some of it with you (and kudos to Wes Swank, who pulled this together). The graphs are theirs, and my discussion about them is certainly informed by our meeting; but I am using the material as a launching point, so they are not responsible for my conclusions and interpretations.

And Then There Was Leverage

In the first few years of the G.W. Bush administration, the banking authorities decided it would be OK to allow five banks to increase their leverage from 12:1 up to 30:1. Which five banks, you ask? Bear Stearns, Lehman, Merrill Lynch, JPMorgan, and Goldman Sachs. How did that work out, just five years later? Three are gone and two survived with large dollops of taxpayer money.

(Sidebar: Is it really any surprise that Goldman and JPMorgan are making record profits on the underwriting and trading side of the business? Hell, if I could eliminate 50% of my competition, my profits would grow too! JPMorgan's consumer credit, credit card, and other business groups are losing money big-time.)

Thirty times leverage means that if you lose 3.3%, you wipe out all your capital. And we watched as banks too big to fail were bailed out with taxpayer dollars. Slowly, banks are buying time, writing down assets. Remember, this month is the second anniversary of the onset of the credit crisis. I wrote back then that the strategy would be to stretch this out as long as possible. Time heals a lot of bad debts, especially at a 0% Fed Funds rate.

Banks that are reporting so far this quarter seem to be saying that the write-offs will start to level off in about two quarters, although banking expert Chris Whalen says that the level may stay higher than we think for longer than we think. There are a lot of assets to write off, and they are just now getting to the commercial real estate problems. This is going to take time. (For an interesting interview on CNBC with Maine fishing buddy Chris Whalen, click here: http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/07/christopher-whalen-banking/.)

The point, before we get to Europe, is that here there was a central bank and a government that not only could step in but was willing to. I know former Treasury Secretary Paulson had his critics, but I am not one of them. Did he do some things that in hindsight he might like to take a "mulligan" on? Sure. But he dealt with the problems in the best manner he could. The time to have taken action was when we were making liar and no-doc loans and calling then AAA, or allowing banks to go to 30:1 leverage. Paulson had to deal with eggs that were already broken. That the system did not crater is to his credit. Securitizing what he and everyone else should have known would be garbage while he was head of Goldman Sachs is not to his credit. But I digress.

I am going to give you four charts showing the leverage of banks in the US, the United Kingdom, the Eurozone, and Switzerland. The bottom, blue portion is assets to common and preferred stock; the red is assets to common equity, which can include good will; and the purple is assets to tangible common equity.

Tangible common equity is all the rage, and that is what the recent "stress tests" measured, as opposed to tier 1 capital, which includes preferred stock (which would basically be the blue portion.) TCE only includes common shares. Now, let's start with the US. These graphs show leverage. The average leverage of tier 1 capital of the five largest banks is in the range of 12:1, and is actually down from ten years ago. (By the way, a very good and simple explanation of all this can be found at http://baselinescenario.com/2009/02/24/tangible-common-equity-for-beginners/.)

While the TCE has obviously been rising and taking total leverage to rather lofty levels in the mid-40s, banks are raising capital, and over time leverage will come back down. It helps if you can borrow money at almost nothing and lend it out at much higher rates. Now, let's turn to the United Kingdom. This is uglier.

Regulators in the UK allowed 20:1 leverage on a regular basis. It is now almost 40: and with TCE is around 55. The assets of UK banks are about five times as large as UK GDP. By comparison, for the US the ratio is barely 2:1.

Think about that for a second. The UK has banking assets which are five times as large as the annual domestic output of the country. They also had a housing bubble. They have their own bailouts to deal with, which are massive and will potentially get much larger. But at least they have a central bank and government that can try to fix the problems.

But as the commercial says, "But wait, there's more!" Let's look at the Eurozone.

Leverage is now 35:1 and with TCE is almost 55. How did 35:1 work out for the US? Given the massive credit problems that Eurozone banks have with emerging markets (plus Spain's housing bubble, which is every bit as bad as that of the US), will this not end up in wailing and weeping?

Too Big To Save

And here's the real issue. They have no Paulson and Bernanke. Now some of my Austrian-economist friends will say, "Good, they should all be allowed to die;" but that is a very cavalier attitude when you start talking about actually increasing the unemployment rate to something like 20%. I agree that management should be changed (as well as the regulators: 35:1 to 1 - really? What were they thinking?) and shareholders wiped out, but I do not want the system to collapse. And this is a global risk, not just localized to Ireland or Spain or Austria. Sure, the pain might be worse in the local region, but we will all feel it.

The European Central Bank, at least as of now, cannot step in and start saving individual banks. How do you save a Spanish bank and not an Austrian bank? Austria's banks have made large loans to Eastern Europe, in euros and Swiss francs, and are going to have large losses, far more than 3%, which would wipe out their capital. But bank assets in Austria are 4 times GDP. What we have are banks that are too big to save for relatively small Austria. And for Italy, Spain, Greece, et al. More on this below. For now, let's turn our eyes to Switzerland.

Those Wild and Crazy Swiss

We think of Switzerland as a stodgy, by-the-numbers, clockwork type of banking country. I have done business with Swiss private bankers, and they are conservative. But somewhere, somehow, UBS and Credit Suisse ran up a little leverage. Before the crisis, they were over 40:1. And now they're nearly at a nosebleed-high 70!

As an aside, I was in Switzerland about two years ago, meeting with some very well-known Swiss, let's call them dignitaries. In a very off-the-record conversation, they told me UBS was technically bankrupt. As it turns out, there were a lot of banks around the world that were technically bankrupt.

Now, the next graph underscores the problem of "too big to save." Let's say the US will eventually pump $1 trillion into the banking system (in taxpayer losses). That is about 7% of US GDP. We may not like it, but it doesn't stop the game. US bank assets are only twice US GDP. Switzerland and Ireland are over 7 times, the UK is over 5, and the Eurozone is at 4 times. And so it goes.

Eurozone banks are already reeling from losses from US subprime-related problems. They are now getting ready to deal with even deeper losses from their own lending portfolios. If the losses were just 5% of the portfolio (an optimistic assumption), it would be 20% of Eurozone GDP. But each country is responsible for its own banks. While it is thought Germany will be able to handle its problems, the prognostication for Austria and Italy is not so sanguine. Italy is already running a massive deficit, and has no central bank to monetize its debt. The same goes for Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Ireland. 5% loan losses in Ireland would be 40% of GDP, the equivalent for my fellow US citizens of about $5 trillion. Where does Europe find a few trillion dollars?

I was writing in late 2006 that the subprime lending market would end in tears. And I think the European banking crisis that is on the horizon has the potential to be every bit as big a problem as subprime loans. The world depended on Europeans banks for much of the lending that allowed for growth and development. Like their counterparts in the US, they are going to have to reduce their loan portfolios. Deleveraging is not fun.

It takes time to build up a banking infrastructure that can raise the capital necessary to make and process loans. A lot of time. Europe is a big customer of the US and Asia. Their businesses are going to be hit hard by the lack of capital, which is of course no good for employment, etc. We are all connected. What happens in Rome no longer stays in Rome.

Let me reprint a graph from last week. Burn it into your mind. The world is going to need to find $5 trillion to finance government debt issuance. And we need to fund private business and consumer debt. Where is all this money going to come from? "If you lend me $5 trillion today, I will gladly repay you Tuesday."

A Positive Third Quarter?

Those who are calling for the end of the recession are shouting that the third quarter may be positive in terms of GDP. And that is possible. But only for statistical and not for fundamental reasons. For instance, lower imports are a net positive for GDP. But lower imports mean a weaker economy. Government spending adds to GDP. Normally, if the government spends too much, then we get inflation, which is subtracted from nominal GDP to give us real (after-inflation) GDP. But inflation is low and getting lower, so there is not going to be much to subtract from nominal GDP. Are government spending and massive deficits a sign of fundamental strength?

It is quite usual for there to be a positive quarter in the middle of a recession. Watch the fundamentals: industrial production, unemployment, capacity utilization, tax receipts, etc. When those turn up, or at least level off, the recession is over. Then we get to the long recovery.

Quick point. As I have noted, unemployment is at 9.5% and going to 11% and hopefully no higher. Average hours worked per week is at an all-time low. The number of people working part-time but wanting full-time work is another 7%! And that part-time number is rising very rapidly.

When the recovery actually does begin to manifest itself, and it eventually will as we find the New Normal, what do you think employers are going to do? Hire new workers? Or give their current employees more hours? The latter, of course. This is going to be a long, slow, painful, jobless recovery. Unemployment is going to remain stubbornly high.

And this Congress wants to raise taxes on small business. 75% of the "rich" are small businesses. How do you expand your business in California or New York, where taxes will be over 60% by the time you add in local taxes? We will talk about this next week; but as a preview, from an economic viewpoint, massively raising taxes in the middle of a recession is about as dumb as you can get. But it looks like we are headed there. Green shoots, my foot.

New York and Maine

I'll head to Maine in early August with youngest son Trey to fish with my friends and talk economics. Meanwhile, # 2 daughter Melissa will soon have to have her gall bladder removed. Amanda gets married next month. Two more grandchildren (in addition to the one I had last month) in the next five months. Watching #2 son struggle with a budding family, and getting fewer hours as even the health-care business slows down. UPS is giving #1 son fewer hours than he needs. Life is always interesting with seven kids.

I can remember really struggling as a young entrepreneur in my 20s and 30s. There were many nights I couldn't sleep as I worried about payroll or a bill coming due. No one gave me a course in basic business. I had to learn it "on –the –job," as they say. It wasn't always pretty. It was a struggle starting out in the '70s, but you got up every morning and did your best. It was not easy. And now, I watch my kids do the same thing. It is a struggle for them, too. It is a reminder how just lucky I am. I truly feel I am one of the most blessed of men.

Have a great week, and remember that the world will not come to an end. It is important to find the good in life and enjoy it, even in the midst of the fight. Somehow, we will all figure out how to Muddle Through together.

Your ready to find some wine analyst,

John Mauldin

This Time its Different*

John Mauldin — Sat, 20 Jun 2009 02:53:00 GMT

This Time It's Different*
Peter Bernstein, R.I.P.
Welcome to the New Normal
The Three Amigos
Credit Spreads - Bullish or Bearish?
ISM - Is Less Bad That Good?
Contain Your Enthusiasm
London, The Baltics, and Rome

I have often written that the four most dangerous words in the investment world are "This Time It's Different." If memory serves me, I have written several e-letters disparaging various personages who have uttered those very words, and gone one to confirm later that it wasn't different. It almost never is. And yet - and yet! - I am going to make the case over the next few weeks that it really is different this time, with only a lonely asterisk as a caveat. What prompts my probable foolishness to tempt the investing gods is the rather large amount of bad analysis based on unreasonable (dare I say lazy or surface?) readings of statistics that is coming from the mainstream investment media and investment types with their built-in bias for bullish analysis. Normally, gentle reader, your humble analyst is a paragon of moderate sensibilities, but I have been pushed over a mental edge and need to restore balance. I anticipate that this topic will take several weeks, as trying to cover it all in one sitting would exhaust us both. It should be fun. But first...

Peter Bernstein, R.I.P.

Sadly, Peter Bernstein passed away at 90 years young on June 5. One of the great honors and privileges of my life has been getting to know Peter and his lovely wife, Barbara. Introduced at a small dinner five years ago, I have been privileged to share many dinners and meetings with him in the years since, soaking up his wisdom. Only a month ago, he made a presentation (by satellite) to Rob Arnott's annual conference and was at the top of his intellectual game. His writing of late has been some of his best. Peter cofounded the Journal of Portfolio Management and truly was the dean of investment analysts.

He wrote 10 books (five after the age of 75!). I am often asked what books I would recommend for insight into the economic world. At the very top of my list has always been Against the Gods: the Remarkable Story of Risk. If you have not read it, then get it and put it on top of your summer list. Capital Ideas is also brilliant. The Power of Gold is a must-read. You can get all three in a set at Amazon.

Jason Zweig wrote a very moving obituary in the Journal and reminded me of a few quotes I've heard from Peter. "'What we like to consider as our wealth has a far more evanescent and transitory character than most of us are ready to admit.' He urged investors to regard their gains as a kind of loan that the lender - the financial market - could yank back at any time without any notice.

"Asked in 2004 to name the most important lesson he had to unlearn, he said, 'That I knew what the future held, that you can figure this thing out. I've become increasingly humble about it over time and comfortable with that. You have to understand that being wrong is part of the investment process.'"

Peter and I chatted several times during the last year, and he continued to tell me that those who thought we were in for a typical recovery were probably going to be wrong. In private conversations he was very worried about the world, and added much wisdom to those of us privileged to sit at his feet.

Isaac Newton once said, "If I have seen further it is only by standing on the shoulders of giants." In the world of investment wisdom, there is no shoulder higher than that of Peter Bernstein. Rest in gentle peace, my friend. You will be greatly missed.

This Time It's Different*

Ben Bernanke's career will be analyzed and written about for many years. But the one thing that has caused me the most pain is his bringing of the term "green shoots" into the investment lexicon. These may be the two most overused and annoying words of my investment career. Every possible sign of a recovery is anointed with the phrase.

Of late, there has been a tendency for analysts to see numbers or statistics that are "less bad" and interpret them as signs that we are in recovery or at least almost there. They glance back at previous recoveries and say, "Doesn't this look like the last time? When such and such happens it means that recovery is on the way. We should therefore buy stocks" (or whatever).

That we are condemned to read such musings is part of the investment landscape. But that does not mean we shouldn't take the time to look at what the writer of those words is actually looking at. All too often of late, I find these people grasping at straws or failing to understand the data.

My premise for uttering the heresy "This Time It's Different*" is that the fundamental nature of the economic landscape has so changed that comparisons with post-WWII recoveries is at best problematical and at worst misleading.

As we will see next week, we are on a track that looks far more like the Great Depression than the recessions of our lifetimes. To expect a normal recovery cycle, whether it is corporate profits or lending or consumer spending or capital investment or (pick a category) is just not reasonable. This is a period that is fundamentally, in so many ways, different. And the recovery (and there will be one!) will also be of a different warp and woof throughout the entire world economy.

Let me see if I can summarize my thinking before we get into the reasoning behind it.

First, we are at the end of a huge cycle of increasing private debt that ended in an overleveraged society. The process of reducing debt and unwinding leverage is going to take a rather long time. It will not be the typical one or two years and then things get back to an ever-higher normal. We are, using a phrase coined by my friend Mohammed El Erian at PIMCO, on our way to a new normal. We are hitting a massive reset button on our economic world, taking us to some new and lower level of consumer spending, leverage, etc. No one knows what the new level will be, although admittedly we are closer to it than we were a year ago.

At this new normal, we will not need as many malls or factories or stores or new-car plants or car dealerships or any number of other things to satisfy the new normal of consumer desires. As an example, and jumping ahead to a statistic for one minute, capacity utilization is now approaching 65%. Anything under 80% is anemic. Does anyone really think that businesses (in general) are going to invest more money in expanding capacity, in the face of the lowest level of production relative to potential since the 1930s?

The savings rate has shot up from zero to 6% in just a very short time. It used to be 12%. It would not be all that unusual historically for savings to go to 9% or more in a few years. That means that consumer spending will drop by 9%. Since consumer spending was 70% of GDP, that new lower level will become our new normal. And of course, due to population growth and hopefully increasing incomes, consumer spending will once again grow from whatever that new normal will be. But it is going to take some time for spending to reach the level of our productive capacity of a few years ago. We are going to have to shutter a few factories and businesses.

David Rosenberg, now with Gluskin Sheff, offers us this insight:

"What really struck us in the employment report of a few weeks ago was the fact that the only segment of the population that is gaining jobs is the 55+ age category. This group gained 224,000 net new jobs in May while the rest of the population lost 661,000. In fact, over the last year, those folks 55 and up garnered 630,000 jobs whereas the other age categories collectively lost over six million positions. This is epic." [See chart below.]

"Moreover, the number of 55 year olds and up who have two jobs or more has risen 1.1% in the last year, the only age cohort to have managed to gain any multiple jobs at all. Remarkable. These folks have seen their wealth get destroyed by two bubble-busts less than seven years apart ... the Nasdaq nest egg back in 2001 and the 5,000 square foot McMansion in 2007. Both bubbles ended in tears ... and so close together."

As we will see, the housing market is going to take at least two more years to truly recover. Looking at one month's data that shows housing starts up a few thousand as a sign of recovery in the housing market is, well, silly. Housing starts are anemic and the inventory of unsold homes is still at all-time highs (a ten-month supply) with more and more homes coming onto the market through foreclosure.

The multiple causes of the recession are not subject to a quick fix. Offering to pay someone $4,500 to trade in an old car for a new one is a rather pathetic way to try and jump-start consumer spending and the auto industry. Is it not enough that we will "invest" $50 billion in GM, while shrinking the company to a size where it will be difficult for profits to ever pay back that investment? We have to add insult to injury and borrow more money to buy cars. Care to wager whether GM will need more money within five years? (And by the way, I love my GM (Cadillac) car, and will likely buy another one at some point, so I wish them well.)

The "stimulus plan" was ill-conceived and not very stimulative. But the combination of the Fed and Treasury and massive monetary infusions has pulled us back from the brink of Armageddon. But we are not out of the woods yet. There is much heavy lifting to be done on the way to the land of the new normal.

Welcome to the New Normal

Secondly, my premise is that the recovery is going to take longer and be much less robust than any recovery since WWII. With unemployment likely to go over 10%, and with our new normal world not needing as much production of so many things, unemployment is going to stay stubbornly higher for longer than in any previous recovery. We are going to look next week at a very sobering report from the San Francisco Fed that suggests we may be for a longer than usual jobless recovery.

Thirdly, all this is going to affect corporate profits, especially for companies that depend on consumer spending. Those investors who expect corporate profits to rebound in 2010 are likely to be disappointed. (For the record, if you go to the S&P web site, analysts are projecting anywhere from a 40% to a 60% rebound in earnings for 2010 for the S&P 500. I would willingly take the "under" on that bet if I could find any takers.) I think whatever profit recovery that is built into the market at today's prices is generous. It is going to be tough to get much of a return from traditional buy-and-hold equity index investing for some time.

Fourthly, this is a global problem and primarily one in the "developed" world. I think we will find that much of Europe will be in a worse state of affairs than the US. If there are bright spots in the developed world, I tend to think they will be Canada and Australia/New Zealand. The opportunities are more likely to be in emerging markets, after they adjust to the new normal.

What this all means is that we as investors, entrepreneurs, managers, employees, and consumers need to adjust our expectations. For those of us in the US, this is complicated significantly in that we really have no idea what new level of government spending and taxation we will be faced with in 2010 and beyond. For one of the few times in my life, what the government does is likely to have a huge impact on the economy, as there is the potential for a significant shift in the very fundamental nature of government involvement in the economy. It is difficult to see what the new normal will be.

In Continental Europe, your new normal is going to be further complicated by an eroding banking crisis that is likely to put a real crimp in any recovery. China and Asia must adjust to lower US consumer spending. They have built too many factories to supply what seemed like an inexhaustible US consumer. They have to find new internal markets or face their own new normal.

All that being said, at some point, perhaps as early as the third quarter, we could see a positive number for GDP, although I think it will be later. Part of the reason that we will see some positive numbers is that year-over-year comparisons are going to get easier to make. Last summer, when inflation was close to 5% and I was writing that deflation was the real danger, oil was rising from $40 to $160 and food prices were going through the roof. Now oil is back to $70 and so we get lower year-over-year inflation numbers. Over the last two years the price of oil/energy is up, but we measure inflation on a yearly basis.

Housing construction was once about 5% of GDP. Obviously, the collapse of housing construction has had a rather negative impact on recent GDP numbers. But housing is probably close to, if not at, a bottom. Even if it dropped by another 20%, it would have far less of an impact on GDP at the much-reduced level where it is now.

It is similar with inventories. They can only drop so much, and eventually they get to the new normal and stop being a drag on the statistical GDP. We are not in an unrelenting death spiral. There is a bottom. It is like a person jumping out of an airplane. They fall rather rapidly until the parachute opens, and as they get closer to the ground they manipulate the chute to further slow the descent. But until they reach the ground, they are still falling. That is the case today. The economy is still falling, but the parachute has opened. We are going to reach the bottom at some point. We will find that new normal. We just need to adjust our activities and plans around that new destination.

I truly believe we get back to 3% GDP growth and 4% unemployment at some point in the future, but it is going to be more than a few years, especially if taxes are raised as much as is talked about in some circles. But just as in the late '70s, when the outlook was not very bright, things will change for the better. When asked back then where the new jobs would come from, the correct answer was "I don't know, but they will come."

It is the same today. There are whole new technologies and industries that are going to be created in the next decade. Entrepreneurs will respond with new innovations and businesses. Jobs that are not now on the horizon will spring up.

As a society, we are having to work through the excesses of a lifestyle that was propped up by ever-increasing debt and an out-of-control consumerism. That will happen in the fullness of time. But it WILL take time, and we need to adjust our expectations to account for that.

Over the next few weeks, I am going to drill down into the data to show why recovery will take longer and to help you withstand what will be an onslaught of out-of-control bullishness over data that is simply less bad. Let's start with a few easy targets.

The Three Amigos

In 2001, I wrote about what I called the Three Amigos that I watched to give us an indication of the direction of the economy. They were capacity utilization, high-yield bonds, and the (now-renamed) ISM numbers. Watching the direction they go gives us a good idea where the economy is headed. I have not written about them for years (as a trio), so let's revisit our old friends. We saw above that capacity utilization is still in a cliff dive. For there to be an actual recovery, we need to see capacity utilization start to climb back up. That is not currently a very positive indicator.

Credit Spreads - Bullish or Bearish?

A number of commentators have been effusive about how credit spreads have "come back in." And indeed, junk-bond yields have fallen. That is a good thing. Look at the graph below (courtesy of Tony Boehk).

Note that yields have simply come down to levels associated with recessions, and not with actual recovery. What happened last year is that junk-bond yields priced in Armageddon. Now they simply price in a recession and slow recovery. Could they improve more? Certainly. But the easy lifting is done. The direction is right. Let's see how they do the next few months. If those yields keep falling, that would be a very positive sign.

ISM - Is Less Bad That Good?

The Institute for Supply Management released their data for May, and again, commentators were enthusiastic about the increase in the manufacturing index. Green shoots and other signs and wonders were all over the media.

The ISM is a survey of manufacturers about how their businesses are doing. They are surveyed on ten criteria, like new orders, employment, inventories, backlog of orders, etc. (for the full report, you can go to http://www.ism.ws/ISMReport/MfgROB.cfm?navItemNumber=12942).

From these responses the ISM creates an index. An index number above 50 means that the manufacturing sector is growing, and below 50 means it is shrinking. At the web site above, you can get quite a bit of detail. It is quite true that we have come back from what was the lowest overall index number in 30 years. But we are simply back to the level that was the low in the previous two recessions. The ISM number is "less bad" and that is a good thing, but it is still a bad number. Yes, it is headed in the right direction. Let's look at the actual chart.

Of course, as businesses adjust to the new normal, whatever that level is, year-over-year comparisons will start to be positive. Simplistically, if a business makes 500 widgets a month and sales fall to 300, they will likely report falling production and rising inventories. Over time, inventories will finally settle out as management adjusts, and at some point inventories and production will (hopefully) start to rise. This gets reported as positive. The actual numbers may be down from the peak, but the direction of the company is once again on a positive slope.

When you look at the actual numbers comprising the release, the manufacturing part of the US economy is still contracting. Is it less bad than a few quarters ago? Yes, but it is still bad. The recent number is only slightly higher than the average for the last 12 months. We need this number to be above 50 to talk about an actual recovery in the here and now, as opposed to the future.

Contain Your Enthusiasm

Shipping containers moving into US ports rose by 2% in April, from March. That was cause for celebration in some circles. Buried way down, if mentioned at all, was the fact that compared to a year ago shipping is down 22%. And year-over-year comparisons have been worse for 22 months in a row. At some point, you get to a bottom. We find the new normal. But if the new normal is down 20%, that is a different-looking economy.

This quote came from good friend Dennis Gartman:

"'Stuff' moves by air when it is needed swiftly, but we can compare year-on-year data to get an idea of the relative weakness or strength of the economy. At the moment, the data is still very, very weak. According to the data reported out by the International Air Transport Association, after having touched just barely under $60 billion in '07 and '08, this year the IATA 'guesstimates' that only $40-$42 billion will move into the US.

"We are effectively back to the levels of '00-'04 and we are well below anything since '05. Having reached its worst year-on-year comparison back in December of last year when there was 23% air-transported cargo moving into the US from abroad, these yearly comparisons have remained about 20% lower since. Inventories of 'goods' on the nation's shelves remain high, and so long as that is true then we are going to see horrid, recessionary year-on-year comparisons in this very timely data."

Dennis also looked at rail shipments: "Since the start of this year this year, when the year-on year comparison was a relatively tepid -8%, the trend has been steadily 'from the upper left to the lower right' on the charts. By March, the year-on-year comparisons were averaging -15%. By April, -22%; by May -25%; and now, after a week or two of June, they are -26%. This is not a trend to be tampered with; this is a trend of some very real severity, and for now we fear that it is a trend rather firmly intact. Thankfully, it looks back, not forward; but if the past is prologue to the future, the future still looks rather bleak.

"Finally, there is a glimmering of hope on the rail horizon, and that is that the June figures, as they are compiled, are showing some signs of life. According to the AAR, 'freight traffic on US railroads during the week ended June 13 continued to show signs of gradual improvement ... [as] rail car loadings and intermodal were up from the previous week with carloads at their highest level in 10 weeks.'"

Welcome to the new normal. It is a quite distinctively different world than that of 2006. Global trade is off 10% and there is outright deflation in many places. We will have lots of data to look at over the next few weeks as we explore the new normal, but that is enough for today.

Oh, I almost forgot. The asterisk on "This Time It's Different*"? Human nature hasn't changed. We are still driven by fear and greed. The business cycle has not been repealed. Free-market capitalism will get us back (with a few new rules of engagement). What's different will be the nature of this recovery. All the other eternal truths will remain.

London, The Baltics, and Rome

I leave for London in mid-July and will co-host CNBC Squawkbox from 7-9 AM on Friday, July 17. Then the plan was to go to Eastern Europe. Things have changed, and now I am thinking of doing a tour through the Baltics, starting with Finland, then going down through the three Baltic nations, maybe a side trip to St. Petersburg, and then end up in Rome for a few days. That should be a fun vacation. We will see how much I can really pack in! But I do love to go to new places and meet new friends.

It is Father's Day weekend and all seven kids are in. The house is full. Tomorrow night we all go to see the new grandchild. Brunch on Sunday. The US Open at the Black. This weekend just can't hardly get any better. I may do my part to help the economy and go get the new Apple iPhone. My youngest son's phone broke, and my excuse is that I can give him mine and the new one then only "really" costs me $100. Consumer spending is not dead yet, to judge from the lines. But technology is a necessity, I keep telling myself.

Have a great weekend. I hope you enjoy yours as much as I am going to enjoy mine.

Your still missing his own dad analyst,

John Mauldin

The Paradox of Deficits

John Mauldin — Sat, 23 May 2009 20:44:50 GMT

Things That Go Bump in the Night
A Trillion Dollars as Far as the Eye Can See
The Global Recession Gets Worse
Where Will the Money Come From?
The Paradox of Deficits
Naples, London, and Eastern Europe

From ghoulies and ghosties

And long-leggedy beasties

And things that go bump in the night,
Good Lord, deliver us!

--Old Scottish Prayer

There is something that is bumping around in my worry closet. The bond market is not behaving as if there is deflation in our future, and the dollar is getting weaker. Unemployment keeps rising, but most of all, the US government deficit looks to be spinning out of control. This week we look at all of this and take a tour around the world to see what is happening. There is a lot of interesting material to cover.

But first, I am proud to announce that thanks to your donations the net proceeds from the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner totaled $17,000! A donation was made in that amount to the Autism Society of America, San Diego County Chapter, in Richard Russell's name.

The evening was captured in both video and photographs, and we would like to share those with you. We have put together a DVD that captures all the wonderful moments, including tributes from Richard's longtime friends and family, an entertaining skit by Richard's daughter Daria, and another touching tribute by Richard's daughter Betsy. Perhaps the best speech, however, came from Richard himself -- which is of course included on the video. For those who could not attend in person, we have already made copies of the video and will mail it to you as soon as you order it. The cost is $29.95, and that includes shipping. You may order as many copies as you like.

To order the video, please visit: http://www.johnmauldin.com/russell-tribute-dvd.html

The photographs were placed on Shutterfly, an online gallery where you may view them and choose the ones you would like to order. We have created a web page specifically for these photos. To access that page, please use this link: http://richardrusselltributedinner.shutterfly.com or you can link from the page above. Now, let's jump right into the letter.

A Trillion Dollars as Far as the Eye Can See

As of this week, total US debt is $11.3 trillion and rising rapidly. The Obama Administration projects that to rise another $1.85 trillion in 2009 (13% of GDP) and yet another $1.4 trillion in 2010. The Congressional Budget Office projects almost $10 trillion in additional debt from 2010 through 2019. Just last January the 2009 deficit was estimated at "only" $1.2 trillion. Things have gone downhill fast.

But there is reason to be concerned about those estimates, too. The CBO assumes a rather robust recovery in 2010, with growth springing back to 3.8% and then up to 4.5% in 2011. Interestingly, they project unemployment of 8.8% for this year (we are already at 8.9% and rising every month) and that it will rise to 9% next year. It will be a strange recovery indeed where the economy is roaring along at 4% and unemployment isn't falling. (You can see their spreadsheets and all the details if you take your blood pressure medicine first, at www.cbo.gov.)

Just a few quick thoughts. This year the proposed administration plan is to borrow 50% of every dollar spent. The CBO projects than nominal GDP will grow by about 50% over the next 10 years (which is historically reasonable), but also that revenues will double, which suggests massive tax increases in relation to GDP. Interestingly, the International Monetary Fund says growth next year will be tepid at best (more below). The deficit in 2010 is almost 10% of GDP. The average proposed deficit is almost a $1 trillion average for the next ten years. Ten years from now, the deficit is projected to be $1.2 trillion. And that is if government costs do not go up and inflation only averages 1.1% for the next six years.

The Global Recession Gets Worse

Let's take a quick trip around the world. In the first quarter, the German economy fell by 14%, Japan by 15%, Mexico by 21%, and England was down almost 8%.

Global trade is simply collapsing. The chart below is the ugliest it has ever been. Chinese exports are down 41%, Japanese exports down 38%, Germany's down by 32%, and so on. (chart courtesy of www.variantperception.com )

Let me quote from the very interesting study the team at Variant Perception did.

"As we have repeatedly said, Spain is set for a long, painful deflation that will manifest itself via a spectacularly high unemployment level, a real estate collapse and general banking insolvencies. Consider this: the value of outstanding loans to Spanish developers has gone from just €33.5 billion in 2000 to €318 billion in 2008, a rise of 850% in 8 years. If you add in construction sector debts, the overall value of outstanding loans to developers and construction companies rises to €470 billion. That's almost 50% of Spanish GDP. Most of these loans will go bad.

"Spanish banks are now facing a very bleak outlook. Spain's unemployment rate reached over 17% last month; there are now four million unemployed Spaniards and over one million families with not a single person employed in the family. Spain and Ireland had the worst housing bubbles in the world and now Spain has as many unsold homes as the US, even though the US is about six times bigger.

"Why are Spanish banks not insolvent? Spanish banks are not marking their real estate loans to market. We've often wondered how it is that our thesis for Spanish real estate and industrial collapse has not created more victims. The answer is simple according to an article in Expansion, the Spanish equivalent of the Financial Times, from the 19th of April titled 'Spanish banks control half of all real estate appraisals.' You can't make this stuff up. We haven't even begun to see the worst in Spain yet."

European banks are in far worse shape than their US counterparts. That is because they utilize far more leverage, on an average about 30 times leverage. How can that be, in what is supposed to be a conservative industry?

"European banks were only restricted on the basis of risk-weighted assets, unlike the US where it is the total leverage ratio that matters, so most European banks bought assets that were rated by Moody's and S&P, who couldn't rate their way out of a paper bag, and for anything that wasn't highly rated, they bought credit default swaps or guarantees from AIG and MBIA. Because of that European banks were able to lever up a lot more than their US counterparties. Given the much higher leverage levels and general worsening of collateral values, we think that all the shoes in Europe have not dropped."

European banks have assets of about 330% of their GDP, compared to US banking assets, which are about 50%. They have over $700 billion in loans to Asian businesses (which are watching their exports collapse) and $1.3 trillion in loans to Eastern Europe, which is in a very serious recession, and so many of those loans are simply not going to be worth anything. Simply put, there is going to be a need for massive amounts of money to bail out European banks, or we'll watch their economies simply implode.

Where is the money for the bailouts going to come from? Germany? That will be a tough sell politically in a country that is in a much worse recession than the US. How do you tell your citizens you need to bail out banks in other countries with their tax dollars? Italian and Austrian banks are going to need a lot of capital, more than their governments can pay. It is going to be a very tough problem.

Governments around the world are responding to the global recession by running massive deficits. In addition to the US, the UK, Japan, Russia, Spain, and Ireland are all running deficits of over 10%.

And, as in the case of the US, these are not going to be one-time deficits. The IMF predicts that England will shrink again next year and the recovery in the US will be modest at best. The US economy is expected to grow by 0.2% (far from the optimistic projections of various US government agencies), the 16-nation eurozone will eke out a modest gain of 0.1%, and the Group of Seven (G7) leading industrial economies will, as a whole, only grow by 0.2 percent. They project that Japan's economy will stagnate next year.

Where Will the Money Come From?

And now let's look at what is bumping in my worry closet. The world is going to have to fund multiple trillions in debt over the next several years. Pick a number. I think $5 trillion sounds about right. $3 trillion is in the cards for the US alone, if current projections are right.

Just exactly where is that money going to come from? The US trade deficit is now down to under $350 billion a year. The Fed can monetize a trillion. Maybe. Look at the yield curve on US government debt below (Bloomberg). US savings are going to go up, but where is the incentive to buy ten-year debt at 3.5%? Four-year debt under 2% doesn't do much for your savings growth. Even with monetization and the Chinese buying our debt with the dollars we send them, that still leaves the bond market about $1.5 trillion short, give or take $100 billion.

The world is deleveraging. Debt is being drawn down. Securitization of various types of debt has seriously slowed. Banks are cutting back on lending. Home prices are dropping all over the world. Commercial real estate is rolling over, and banks all over the world are exposed. "Recession turns malls into ghost towns" is the headline in today's Wall Street Journal. Personal savings are rising and retail sales are flat to down. Unemployment is rising.

All this should be massively deflationary. Interest rates should be falling or at least not rising. But a funny thing is happening. In the past two months, the yield on the ten-year bond has risen by 1%. It has moved 0.38% or almost "4 big handles" in just two weeks. Look at the chart below. What is happening?

According to Merrill Lynch, the size of the world bond market is estimated to be approximately $67 trillion, with the shares of US, Euroland, and Japanese securities each representing less than 50 percent of this total. (PIMCO)

England has been put on negative watch for its debt rating. Bill Gross said yesterday that it is not unthinkable that the US could lose its AAA rating. I think the bond market is looking at the mountain of debt that will have to be somehow sold and wondering where such a colossal sum will come from. Where do you find $10 trillion in the next ten years for US debt?

And that is just for US government debt. $5 trillion for new global debt in the next two years? In a deleveraged world? How much will the other countries need? What about money needed for businesses and mortgages and credit cards and so on?

If you add $10 trillion to the current $11.3 trillion (including Social Security trust funds, etc.), that totals $21 trillion in 2019. Let's be generous and suggest that interest rates will only be an average of 5%. That would be an interest-rate expense of over $1 trillion. That is 25% of projected revenues and 20% of expected expenses. And that assumes you have nominal growth of over 4% for the next ten years. If growth is less, tax revenues will be less. It also assumes massive tax increases from carbon credits.

The Paradox of Deficits

I think the bond market is looking a few years down the road and saying that $1-trillion deficits are simply not capable of being financed. And if the debt is monetized, then inflation is going to become a very serious issue.

When you run deficits that are 4-6-8% or more than nominal GDP, at some point things simply back up. Can we ride along for a few years? Certainly. Japan is getting ready to see its debt-to-GDP ratio rise to almost 200%. But everybody can't do it all at once.

Call it the Paradox of Deficits. We have been running a large trade deficit in the US for years, because the people (China, Japan, and the Middle East) who wanted to sell us "stuff" were kind enough to turn around and invest the money in our bonds. This in turn created Greenspan's conundrum, as it helped keep down US (and global) interest rates. Combine that with a massive increase in leverage, a few bubbles, and we now arrive at a true crisis.

Deficits are not necessarily a bad thing if kept in check and restraint is shown. But everyone cannot run deficits at the same time. If we don't buy $700 billion in goods, then that money cannot be recycled back to our debt. It is that simple.

(Sidebar: And now, China and Brazil are moving to do their trades in their own currencies rather than dollars. Very smart on their part.)

Europe, Japan, and the US cannot try to borrow $5 trillion in the next two years without a serious distortion of the bond market, not to mention the entire economic landscape.

I have long thought that "crunch time," the end game, would show up around 2013-14. But I never in my wildest imaginings thought we could run an almost $2 trillion deficit. That crazy guy on the corner telling us "The end is nigh"? He may be right.

Long before we get to 2015, let alone 2019, I think the bond markets will have called a halt to $1 trillion deficits. There will be a real crisis. The deficits will not be funded at anywhere close to an interest rate that will not break the budget. Taxes will get raised beyond what they were in the Clinton years. And Obama's budget makes some very optimistic judgments about how much will be saved in medical costs, as if no one has tried to rein in medical costs before. The crisis may come much sooner if his universal health-care bill is passed as proposed without offsetting cuts somewhere else.

Watch the bond market. Rates should be going down, not up. The bond market is telling us the deficit simply can't be financed down the road. Now, maybe a few cool heads in the Democratic Party will prevail in the US Senate and the deficits will be brought under control. (The Republicans have so far seemed as clueless as they are impotent.) We could (theoretically) run $400 billion deficits for a very long time, as GDP would be growing somewhat faster.

It would be best to run budget surpluses, but the game does not end if there are reasonable deficits. It ends with deficits that cannot be funded except by monetization. And that will tank the dollar, except against all the other countries that are monetizing their debt.

I am increasingly inclined to think that as the world comes out of its current malaise – and it will – US investors should think more globally with their investment portfolios. That is something we will explore over the coming year. But that's enough for today.

Naples, London, and Eastern Europe

Next Friday I go to London to speak at a conference for my friends at Jyske Bank. International investing expert Gary Scott will be there, as well as my friend and business associate Steve Blumenthal. It should still be possible to attend, if you would like. You can see more at www.jgam.com. And then, in theory, I will be home all of June.

The plan now is for me to return to London on July 15^th. I will co-host CNBC London Squawk Box on July 17^th, see clients, and then be with London business partner Niels Jensen for his 50^th birthday party on the 18^th. (And here's wishing him a speedy recovery from his back surgery last week!)

And then I am actually going to take a vacation. I am slowly trying to expand the list of countries I have been to. This year I am thinking of venturing further into Eastern Europe. Romania and Bulgaria are on the top of the list, and perhaps Slovenia? I would love to hear from readers in those countries, or from others who have visited them. I will have about 12 days and want to be able to see the sights and relax as well.

Then I come back, go to Maine with young son Trey for our annual get together with all the guys at the Shadow Fed fishing trip run by David Kotok, and get back in time for daughter Amanda's wedding on the 22nd. It is going to be a full, fun summer.

And speaking of Trey, he turns 15 on Wednesday. He is the last of my seven in the house. The rest are all out and (more or less) on their own. But then I get three new grandkids between now and the end of the year, so the next generation is starting.

These are interesting and serious times we find ourselves in, but we should all try and remember to enjoy life as much as possible. I am grateful that I am so busy, and count it as a blessing when so many are not. Have a great Memorial Day, and take a few moments to remember those who have sacrificed so that we can be free.

Your looking forward to summer analyst,

John Mauldin

While Rome Burns

John Mauldin — Sat, 21 Feb 2009 03:56:20 GMT

While Rome Burns
The Risk in Europe
The Euro Back to Parity? Really?
Back to the Basics
Living in Paradise
The 20-Year Horizon
If I Had a Hammer
New York, Las Vegas, and La Jolla

When I sit down each week to write, I essentially do what I did nine years ago when I started writing this letter. I write to you, as an individual. I don't think of a large group of people, just a simple letter to a friend. It is only half a joke that this letter is written to my one million closest friends. That is the way I think of it.

This week's letter is likely to lose me a few friends, though. I am going to start a series on money management, portfolio construction, and money managers. It will be back to the basics for both new and long-time readers. I am not sure how long it will take (in terms of weeks), but it is likely to make a few people upset and provoke some strong disagreements. Let's just say this is not stocks for the long run.

And because many of you want some continuing analysis of the current crisis, each week I will throw in a few pages of commentary at the beginning of the letter.

But first, and quickly, I just wanted to take a moment and remind you to sign up for the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner, all set for Saturday, April 4 at the Manchester Grand Hyatt in San Diego -- if you haven't already. This is sure to be an extraordinary evening honoring a great friend and associate of mine, and yours as well. I do hope that you can join us for a night of memories, laughs, and good fun with fellow admirers and long-time readers of Richard's Dow Theory Letter.

A significant number of my fellow writers and publishers have committed to attend. It is going to be an investment-writer, Richard-reader, star-studded event. If you are a fellow writer, you should make plans to attend or send me a note that I can put in a tribute book we are preparing for Richard. And feel free to mention this event in your letter as well. We want to make this night a special event for Richard and his family of readers and friends. So, if you haven't, go ahead and log on to https://www.johnmauldin.com/russell-tribute.html and sign up today. I wouldn't want any of you to miss out on this tribute. I look forward to sharing this evening with all of you.

And now, let's turn our eyes to Europe.

The Risk in Europe

I mentioned last week that European banks are at significant risk. I want to follow up on that point, as it is very important. Eastern Europe has borrowed an estimated $1.7 trillion, primarily from Western European banks. And much of Eastern Europe is already in a deep recession bordering on depression. A great deal of that $1.7 trillion is at risk, especially the portion that is in Swiss francs. It is a story that could easily be as big as the US subprime problem.

In Poland, as an example, 60% of mortgages are in Swiss francs. When times are good and currencies are stable, it is nice to have a low-interest Swiss mortgage. And as a requirement for joining the euro currency union, Poland has been required to keep its currency stable against the euro. This gave borrowers comfort that they could borrow at low interest in francs or euros, rather than at much higher local rates.

But in an echo of teaser-rate subprimes here in the US, there is a problem. Along came the synchronized global recession and large Polish current-account trade deficits, which were three times those of the US in terms of GDP, just to give us some perspective. Of course, if you are not a reserve currency this is going to bring some pressure to bear. And it did. The Polish zloty has basically dropped in half compared to the Swiss franc. That means if you are a mortgage holder, your house payment just doubled. That same story is repeated all over the Baltics and Eastern Europe.

Austrian banks have lent $289 billion (230 billion euros) to Eastern Europe. That is 70% of Austrian GDP. Much of it is in Swiss francs they borrowed from Swiss banks. Even a 10% impairment (highly optimistic) would bankrupt the Austrian financial system, says the Austrian finance minister, Joseph Proll. In the US we speak of banks that are too big to be allowed to fail. But the reality is that we could nationalize them if we needed to do so. (And for the record, I favor nationalization and swift privatization. We cannot afford a repeat of Japan's zombie banks.)

The problem is that in Europe there are many banks that are simply too big to save. The size of the banks in terms of the GDP of the country in which they are domiciled is all out of proportion. For my American readers, it would be as if the bank bailout package were in excess of $14 trillion (give or take a few trillion). In essence, there are small countries which have very large banks (relatively speaking) that have gone outside their own borders to make loans and have done so at levels of leverage which are far in excess of the most leveraged US banks. The ability of the "host" countries to nationalize their banks is simply not there. They are going to have to have help from larger countries. But as we will see below, that help is problematical.

Western European banks have been very aggressive in lending to emerging market countries worldwide. Almost 75% of an estimated $4.9 trillion of loans outstanding are to countries that are in deep recessions. Plus, according to the IMF, they are 50% more leveraged than US banks.

Today the euro rallied back to $1.26 based upon statements from German authorities that were interpreted as a potential willingness to help out non-German (in particular, Austrian) banks.

However, this more sobering note from Strategic Energy was sent to me by a reader. It nicely sums up my concerns:

"It is East Europe that is blowing up right now. Erik Berglof, EBRD's chief economist, told me the region may need €400bn in help to cover loans and prop up the credit system. Europe's governments are making matters worse. Some are pressuring their banks to pull back, undercutting subsidiaries in East Europe. Athens has ordered Greek banks to pull out of the Balkans.

"The sums needed are beyond the limits of the IMF, which has already bailed out Hungary, Ukraine, Latvia, Belarus, Iceland, and Pakistan -- and Turkey next -- and is fast exhausting its own $200bn (€155bn) reserve. We are nearing the point where the IMF may have to print money for the world, using arcane powers to issue Special Drawing Rights. Its $16bn rescue of Ukraine has unravelled. The country -- facing a 12% contraction in GDP after the collapse of steel prices -- is hurtling towards default, leaving Unicredit, Raffeisen and ING in the lurch. Pakistan wants another $7.6bn. Latvia's central bank governor has declared his economy "clinically dead" after it shrank 10.5% in the fourth quarter. Protesters have smashed the treasury and stormed parliament.

"'This is much worse than the East Asia crisis in the 1990s,' said Lars Christensen, at Danske Bank. 'There are accidents waiting to happen across the region, but the EU institutions don't have any framework for dealing with this. The day they decide not to save one of these one countries will be the trigger for a massive crisis with contagion spreading into the EU.' Europe is already in deeper trouble than the ECB or EU leaders ever expected. Germany contracted at an annual rate of 8.4% in the fourth quarter. If Deutsche Bank is correct, the economy will have shrunk by nearly 9% before the end of this year. This is the sort of level that stokes popular revolt.

"The implications are obvious. Berlin is not going to rescue Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal as the collapse of their credit bubbles leads to rising defaults, or rescue Italy by accepting plans for EU "union bonds" should the debt markets take fright at the rocketing trajectory of Italy's public debt (hitting 112pc of GDP next year, just revised up from 101pc -- big change), or rescue Austria from its Habsburg adventurism. So we watch and wait as the lethal brush fires move closer. If one spark jumps across the eurozone line, we will have global systemic crisis within days. Are the firemen ready?"

While Rome Burns

I hope the writer is wrong. But the ECB is dithering while Rome burns. (Or at least their banking system is -- Italy's banks have large exposure to Eastern Europe through Austrian subsidiaries.) They need to bring rates down and figure out how to move into quantitative easing. Europe is at far greater risk than the US.

Great Britain and Europe as a whole are down about 6% in GDP on an annualized basis. The Bank Credit Analyst sent the next graph out to their public list, and I reproduce it here. (www.bcaresearch.com) In another longer report, they note that the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Switzerland have the greatest risk of widespread bank nationalization (outside of Iceland). The full report is quite sobering. The countries on the bottom of the list are also in danger of having their credit ratings downgraded.

This has the potential to be a real crisis, far worse than in the US. Without concerted action on the part of the ECB and the European countries that are relatively strong, much of Europe could fall further into what would feel like a depression. There is a problem, though. Imagine being a politician in Germany, for instance. Your GDP is down by 8% last quarter. Unemployment is rising. Budgets are under pressure, as tax collections are down. And you are going to be asked to vote in favor of bailing out (pick a small country)? What will the voters who put you into office think?

We are going to find out this year whether the European Union is like the Three Musketeers. Are they "all for one and one for all?" or is it every country for itself? My bet (or hope) is that it is the former. Dissolution at this point would be devastating for all concerned, and for the world economy at large. Many of us in the US don't think much about Europe or the rest of the world, but without a healthy Europe, much of our world trade would vanish.

However, getting all the parties to agree on what to do will take some serious leadership, which does not seem to be in evidence at this point. The US almost waited too long to respond to our crisis, but we had the "luxury" of only needing to get a few people to agree as to the nature of the problems (whether they were wrong or right is beside the point). And we have a central bank that could act decisively.

As I understand the European agreement, that situation does not exist in Europe. For the ECB to print money as the US and the UK (and much of the non-EU developed world) will do, takes agreement from all the member countries, and right now it appears the German and Dutch governments are resisting such an idea.

As I write this (on a plane on my way to Orlando) German finance minister Peer Steinbruck has said it would be intolerable to let fellow EMU members fall victim to the global financial crisis. "We have a number of countries in the eurozone that are clearly getting into trouble on their payments," he said. "Ireland is in a very difficult situation.

"The euro-region treaties don't foresee any help for insolvent states, but in reality the others would have to rescue those running into difficulty."

That is a hopeful sign. Ireland is indeed in dire straits, and is particularly vulnerable as it is going to have to spend a serious percentage of its GDP on bailing out its banks.

It is not clear how it will all play out. But there is real risk of Europe dragging the world into a longer, darker night. Their banks not only have exposure to our US foibles, much of which has already been written off, but now many banks will have to contend with massive losses from emerging-market loans, which could be even larger than the losses stemming from US problems. Plus, they are more leveraged. (This was definitely a topic of "Conversation" this morning when I chatted with Nouriel Roubini. See more below.)

The Euro Back to Parity? Really?

I wrote over six years ago, when the euro was below $1, that I thought the euro would rise to over $1.50 (it went even higher) and then back to parity in the middle of the next decade. I thought the decline would be due to large European government deficits brought about by pension and health care promises to retirees, and those problems do still loom.

It may be that the current problems will push the euro to parity much sooner, possibly this year. While that will be nice if you want to vacation in Europe, it will have serious side effects on international trade. It clearly makes European exporters more competitive with the rest of the world, and especially the US. It also means that goods coming from Asia will cost more in Europe, unless Asian countries decide to devalue their currencies to maintain an ability to sell into Europe, which of course will bring howls from the US about currency manipulation. It is going to put pressure on governments to enact some form of trade protectionism, which would be devastating to the world economy.

Large and swift currency swings are inherently disruptive. We are seeing volatility in the currency markets unlike anything I have witnessed. I hope we do not see a precipitous fall in value of the euro. It will be good for no one. It is a strange world indeed when the US is having such a deep series of problems, the Fed and Treasury are talking about printing a few trillion here and a few trillion there, and at the very same time we see the dollar AND gold rising in value. Which all serves as a good set-up to the next section.

Back to the Basics

"Stocks for the long run" has been weighed in the balance in Baby Boomers' retirement accounts all over the world and has been found wanting. The S&P 500 is now roughly where it was 12 years ago, although earnings in 1997 were higher than those projected for 2009. The Dow closed at 7466 on Thursday, a six-year low, giving all those who follow Dow Theory a clear bear market signal, suggesting there is more pain ahead.

In 1997 I was a young 49. For me to make the advertised 8% average annual returns in my equity portfolio, the Dow would have had to go on a tear for the next 8 years. 8% compound from 1997 would have the Dow well over 30,000 now. Remember those silly books which predicted such nonsense? (Seriously, what statistically flawed analysis, yet people bought it.) Now the market would have to do 18% a year for the next 8 years to get to 30,000. Anyone want to make that bet? Let's look at a few paragraphs I wrote in Bull's Eye Investing.

Living in Paradise

Would you like to live in paradise? There's a place where the average daily temperature is 66 degrees, rainy days only occur on average every five days, and the sun shines most of the time.

Welcome to Dallas, Texas. As most know, however, the weather in Dallas doesn't qualify as climate paradise. The summers begin their ascent almost before spring arrives. On some days the buds almost wilt before turning into blooms. During the lazy days of summer, the sun frequently stokes the thermometer into triple digits, often for days on end. There are numerous jokes about the Devil, hell, and Texas summers.

Once winter arrives, some days are mild -- perfect golf weather. Yet the next day might be frigid, with snow or the occasional ice storm. That's good for business at the local auto body shops, though it makes for sleepless nights for the insurance companies. Certainly the winters don't match the chilly winds of Chicago or the blizzards of Buffalo, but Dallas is far from paradise as its seasons ebb and flow.

For the year though, the average temperature is paradisical.

Contrary to the studies that show investors they can expect 7% or 9% or 10% by staying in the market for the long run, the stock market isn't paradise either. Like Texas summers, the stock market often seems like the anteroom to investment hell.

Historically, average investment returns over the very long term (we're talking 40-50-70 years) have been some of the best available, but the seasons of the stock market tend to cycle with as much variability as Texas weather. The extremes and the inconstancies are far greater than most realize. Let's examine the range of variability to truly appreciate the strength of the storms.

In the 103 years from 1900 through 2002, the annual change for the Dow Jones Industrial Average reflects a simple average gain of 7.2% per year. During that time, 63% of the years reflect positive returns, and 37% were negative. Only five of the years ended with changes between +5% and +10% -- that's less than 5% of the time. Most of the years were far from average -- many were sufficiently dramatic to drive an investor's pulse into lethal territory!

Almost 70% of the years were "double-digit years," when the stock market either rose or fell by more than 10%. To move out of "most" territory, the threshold increases to 16% -- half of the past 103 years end with the stock market index either up or down more than 16%!

Read those last two paragraphs again. The simple fact is that the stock market rarely gives you an average year. The wild ride makes for those emotional investment experiences which are a primary cause of investment pain.

The stock market can be a very risky place to invest. The returns are highly erratic; the gains and losses are often inconsistent and unpredictable. The emotional responses to stock market volatility mean that most investors do not achieve the average stock market gains, as numerous studies clearly illustrate.

Not understanding how to manage the risk of the stock market, or even what the risks actually are, investors too often buy high and sell low, based upon raw emotion. They read the words in the account-opening forms that say the stock market presents significant opportunities for losses, and that the magnitude of the losses can be quite significant. But they focus on the research that says, "Over the long run, history has overcome interim setbacks and has delivered an average return of 10% including dividends" (or whatever the number du jour is. and ignoring bad stuff like inflation, taxes, and transaction costs).

The 20-Year Horizon

But how long is the "long run"? Investors have been bombarded for years with the nostrum that one should invest for the "long run." This has indoctrinated investors into thinking they could ignore the realities of stock market investing because of the "certain" expectation of ultimate gains.

This faulty line of reasoning has spawned a number of pithy principles, including: "No pain, no gain," "You can't participate in the profits if you are not in the game," and my personal favorite, "It's not a loss until you take it."

These and other platitudes are often brought up as reasons to leave your money with the current management which has just incurred large losses. Cynically restated: why worry about the swings in your life savings from year to year if you're supposed to be rewarded in the "long run"? But what if history does not repeat itself, or if you don't live long enough for the long run to occur?

For many, the "long run" is about 20 years. We work hard to accumulate assets during the formative years of our careers, yet the accumulation for the large majority of us seems to become meaningful somewhere after midlife. We seek to have a confident and comfortable nest egg in time for retirement. For many, this will represent roughly a 20-year period.

We can divide the 20^th century into 88 twenty-year periods. Though most periods generated positive returns before dividends and transaction costs, half produced compounded returns of less than 4%. Less than 10% generated gains of more than 10%. The P/E ratio is the measure of valuation reflected in the relationship between the price paid per share and the earnings per share ("EPS"). The table below reflects that higher returns are associated with periods during which the P/E ratio increased, and lower or negative returns resulted from periods when the P/E declined.

Look at the table above. There were only nine periods from 1900-2002 when 20-year returns were above 9.6%, and this chart shows all nine. What you will notice is that eight out of the nine times were associated with the stock market bubble of the late 1990s, and during all eight periods there was a doubling, tripling, or even quadrupling of P/E ratios. Prior to the bubble, there was no 20-year period which delivered 10% annual returns.

Why is that important? If the P/E ratio doubles, then you are paying twice as much for the same level of earnings. The difference in price is simply the perception that a given level of earnings is more valuable today than it was 10 years ago. The main driver of the last stock market bubble, and every bull market, is an increase in the P/E ratio. Not earnings growth. Not anything fundamental. Just a willingness on the part of investors to pay more for a given level of earnings.

Every period of above-9.6% market returns started with low P/E ratios. EVERY ONE. And while not a consistent line, you will note that as 20-year returns increase, there is a general decline in the initial P/E ratios. If we wanted to do some in-depth analysis, we could begin to explain the variation from this trend quite readily. For instance, the period beginning in 1983 had the lowest initial P/E, but was also associated with a two-year-old secular bear, which was beginning to lower 20-year return levels.

Look at the following table from my friend Ed Easterling's web site at www.crestmontresearch.com (which is a wealth of statistical data like this!). You can find many 20-year periods where returns were less than 2-3%. And if you take into account inflation, you can find many 20-year periods where returns were negative!

Look at the 20-year average returns in the table above. The higher the P/E ratio, the lower (in general) the subsequent 20-year average return. Where are we today? As I have made clear in my last two letters, we are well above 20. Today we are over 30, on our way to 45. In a nod to bulls, I agree you should look back over a number of years to average earnings and take out the highs and lows of a cycle. However, even "normalizing" earnings to an average over multiple years, we are still well above the long-term P/E average. Further, earnings as a percentage of GDP went to highs well above what one would expect from growth, which is usually GDP plus inflation. Earnings, as I have documented in earlier letters, revert to the mean. Next week, I will expand on that thought.

And given my thesis that we are in for a deep recession and a multi-year Muddle Through Recovery, it is unlikely that corporate earnings are going to rebound robustly. This would suggest that earnings over the next 20 years could be constrained (to say the least).

In all cases, throughout the years, the level of returns correlates very highly to the trend in the market's price/earnings (P/E) ratio.

This may be the single most important investment insight you can have from today's letter. When P/E ratios were rising, the saying that "a rising tide lifts all boats" has been historically true. When they were dropping, stock market investing was tricky. Index investing is an experiment in futility.

You can see the returns for any given period of time by going to http://www.crestmontresearch.com/content/Matrix%20Options.htm .

Now let's visit a very basic concept that I discussed at length in Bull's Eye Investing. Very simply, stock markets go from periods of high valuations to low valuations and back to high. As we will see from the graphs below, these periods have lasted an average of 17 years. And we have not witnessed a period where the stock market started at high valuations, went halfway down, and then went back up. So far, there has always been a bottom with low valuations.

My contention is that we should not look at price, but at valuations. That is the true measure of the probability of success if we are talking long-term investing.

Now, let me make a few people upset. When someone comes to you and starts showing you charts that tell you to invest for the long run, look at their assumptions. Usually they are simplistic. And misleading. I agree that if the long run for you is 70 years, you can afford to ride out the ups and downs. But for those of us in the Baby Boomer world, the long term may be buying green bananas.

If you start in a period of high valuations, you are NOT going to get 8-9-10% a year for the next 30 years; I don't care what their "scientific studies" say. And yet there are salespeople (I will not grace them with the title of investment advisors) who suggest that if you buy their product and hold for the long term you will get your 10%, regardless of valuations. Again, go to the Crestmont web site, mentioned above. Spend some time really studying it. And then decide what your long-term horizon is.

If I Had a Hammer

Let me be very candid. As the saying goes, if you only have a hammer, the whole world looks like a nail. Many investment professionals only have one tool. They live in a long-only world. If the markets don't go up, they don't make a profit. So, for them the markets are always ready to enter a new bull phase, or stocks are always a good value. That is what they sell, and that's how they make their money. What mutual fund manager would keep his job if he said you should sell his fund? Frankly, it is a tough world.

About half the time they are right. The wind is at their backs and they look very, very good. Genius is a riding market. And then there are those times when it is just no fun to be them OR their clients. Driving to the airport today, I had CNBC on. They had a mutual fund manager on who was talking about why you should ignore the down periods and invest today. He used every hackneyed bromide I have heard and a few new ones. "You have to do it for the long run." "If you aren't invested, you miss the bull when it comes." (Which is SO statistically misleading! Maybe next week I will go at that one!) "Long-term valuations are very good." "The economy looks to turn around in the latter half of the year, so now is the time to buy, as the market anticipates the rebound by six months." Etc. He was selling his book.

Again, back to basics. In terms of valuations, markets cycle up and down over long periods of time. These are called secular cycles. You have bull and bear secular cycles. In a period of a secular bull, the best style of investing is relative value. You are trying to beat the market. These periods start with low valuations, and you can ride the ups and downs with little real worry. Think of 1982 though 1999.

But in secular bear cycles, the best style of investing is absolute returns. Your benchmark is zero. You want positive numbers. It is much harder, and the longer-term returns are probably not going to be as good. But you are growing your capital against the day the secular bull returns. And, as bleak as it looks right now, I can assure you that bull will be back. Some time in the middle of the next decade, maybe a little sooner, we will see the launch of a new secular bull.

Why? Because low valuations act just like a coiled spring. The tighter it gets wound, the more explosive the result. You just have to have patience.

Now let's look at two charts from Vitaliy Katsenelson. They illustrate my basic point: markets go from high valuations to low valuations and then back. The first uses one-year trailing earnings and the second uses a smoothed 10-year trailing earnings stream. But however you look at them, you see a very clear cycle. By the way, the one-year chart is a few months old, so the numbers would look even worse after the horrific earnings from the 4^th quarter of last year.

It is time to hit the send button. Next week, we will look at a very simple method for timing the markets within the cycles, which can help you avoid the real downturns. While it may seem obvious that avoiding bear markets will do wonders for your portfolio, a lot of investment professionals say you can't do it. To that I politely say, garbage.

The tables above clearly lay out how you can time the markets in broad patterns. You can't pick the absolute highs and lows, but you don't need to. You just need to know the direction of the wind and where you want to sail.

New York, Las Vegas, and La Jolla

I will be in New York in mid-March. Details are firming up. Then it's Doug Casey's "Crisis & Opportunity Summit," March 20-22 in Las Vegas, where I get to be the resident bull! Click to learn more about the Summit.

I will then go to La Jolla for my own Strategic Investment Conference, April 2-4. It is sold out, but as I mentioned at the top of the letter, you can still get tickets to the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner.

And allow me a quick commercial. Not all money managers and funds have had losses last year, though it may seem like it. My partners around the world can introduce you to some alternative funds, commodity funds, and managers that you may find of interest as you rebalance your portfolio this year. You owe it to yourself to check them out.

If you are an accredited investor (net worth roughly $1.5 million), you should check out my partners in the US, Altegris Investments (based in La Jolla) and my London partners (covering Europe), Absolute Return Partners. If you are in South Africa, my partner there is Plexus Asset Management. You can go to www.accreditedinvestor.ws and fill out the form, and someone from their firms will be in touch. All three shops specialize in alternative investments like hedge funds and commodity funds, on a very selective basis. We will soon be announcing new partners in other parts of the world. And if you are an advisor or broker, you should call them (or fill out the form) and find out how you can plug your clients into their network of managers.

If your net worth is less than $1.5 million, I work with Steve Blumenthal and his team at CMG. I suggest you go to his website, register, and then let them show you what the blend of active managers on his platform would have done over the past few months and years. These are primarily managers who will trade a managed account (using various proprietary styles) in your name, and they are quite liquid. Again, if you are an advisor or broker and would like to see the managers on the CMG platform and how you can access them for your clients, sign up and let Steve and his team know you are in the business. The link is http://www.cmgfunds.net/public/mauldin_questionnaire.asp.

If you are still here, I assume that you are still one of my one million closest friends. Have a great week, and take some time to enjoy life.

Your worried about Europe analyst,

John Mauldin

Time for a Reality Check

John Mauldin — Sat, 14 Feb 2009 20:04:49 GMT

Time for a Reality Check
World Trade Is Falling Off a Cliff
European Bank Losses Dwarf Those in the US
Geithner: "You Can't Handle the Truth"
Earnings Will Get Even Worse
Orlando, Colorado Springs, New York, and Las Vegas

It is not just the US that is in recession. The world is slowing down, and rapidly. This week we quickly survey the rest of the world, and then come back to the US. We follow up with the implications for corporate earnings worldwide, and specifically address my speculations about earnings forecasts for 2009.

World Trade Is Falling Off a Cliff

Let's start with some charts from my friend Simon Hunt, out of London. The following chart shows World Merchandise Export Values and World Industrial Production falling off a cliff. This is the worst such period since the end of World War II. And as the data we will examine next indicates, it is likely to get worse. Simon notes that consumer spending is about 60% of world GDP, and it is not just in the US that spending is slowing down. Consumers all over the developed world are in shock, as assets such as stocks and houses, real estate, and commodities fall in value. Unemployment is rising.

We think that almost 2,000,000 lost jobs in the last three months in the US is a catastrophe. China lost a reported 20,000,000 jobs in the last quarter, and migrant workers came back to the cities after Chinese New Year to find factories and jobs simply gone. Unemployment is rising rapidly in Europe, as the demand for goods has clearly been falling since last October.

This means that inventories are too high, not just in the US but in factories all over the world, and that production is slowing down. Look at the recent US trade deficit. Many market analysts rejoiced that it dropped to a six-year low, just below $40 billion. But the internal numbers were not as positive. Exports are dropping faster than imports, as seen below. "After growing in every quarter during the last three years, real goods exports fell 34.9% at an annual rate, the worst performance in more than three decades." (www.dismal.com) And a falling deficit means that US consumers have to save more to balance out less foreign buying of US debt. There is no free lunch.

Let's look at a little bit of insider economics trivia. The US government first estimated that GDP last quarter was a negative 3.8%. I wrote when that number first came out that it would be revised downward.

When the government makes its initial forecast of GDP one month following the end of a quarter, it has to estimate what exports and imports were for the last month of the quarter. There is simply no data. For the 4^th quarter of 2008, they estimated that the trade deficit would be about $34.5 billion, in line with what most economists thought. As it turns out, each $1 billion represents about 0.1% of GDP. So being off about $5 billion from the actual total of $40 billion subtracts another 0.5% of GDP from the previous estimate of -3.8%, taking it to a -4.3%.

Further, the government makes estimates about inventories which also affect GDP. When final numbers on real inventories come in, it will also add to the negative GDP estimate. Expect GDP to be in the range of a negative 5% for the 4^th quarter, and the current quarter is likely to be almost as weak.

In the US, the leading economic indicators (LEI) continued to decline, but the leading indicators in the rest of the world were often much worse. (The chart below is again from Simon Hunt.) These are results from the OECD's analysis of the leading economic indicators for a variety of countries. Notice in particular how poorly Russia and China are doing! Also remember that the LEI is about how the economy is expected to be doing in six months, not what is going on right now. This argues that there is no real global turnaround in the picture before the end of the third quarter, at the earliest.

China has seen its year-over-year exports drop by 17.5% and imports by 43%. These are not signs of a healthy economy. That being said, China is massively increasing bank loans and other stimulus-type spending to try and offset the effects of the global downturn. But putting 20 million people back to work in a short time is a daunting task.

Japanese GDP was down by 9% (!) last quarter. Many of the largest corporations are seeing exports drop by 20-30% and are engaged in massive layoffs, larger proportionally than in the US. The euro area economy dropped by 6% in the 4^th quarter, led by an 8.2% contraction in Germany (JP Morgan). I could go on and on, but the news is the same. The global economy is in a deep and worsening recession.

European Bank Losses Dwarf Those in the US

In a few paragraphs I am going to put up a chart from Nouriel Roubini's RGE Monitor on the size of US bank losses, and in a few pages I'll comment on the Geithner "plan" for rescuing US banks. We have indeed dug ourselves a very deep hole here in the US.

But European banks may be in far worse shape. Bruno Waterfield of the London Daily Telegraph reports to have seen an eyes-only document prepared by the European Commission for the finance ministers of the various EU member countries. The problem revealed in the report is an estimated write-down by European banks in the range of 16 trillion pounds, or about $25 trillion dollars! The concern is that bailing out the various national banks for such an unbelievable amount would push the cost of government borrowing to much higher levels than we see today.

As my kids would say, "Really, Dad, you think so?" Europe is somewhat larger than the US, so think what my gold-bug friends would say if the US decided to borrow $25 trillion to bail out US banks. The dollar would be crucified! The euro is going to get a lot weaker if bank problems are even half of what the report says they are. The British pound sterling is already off almost 30% and, depending on what the real damage is to their banking system, it could get worse.

Waterfield reports, "National leaders and EU officials share fears that a second bank bail-out in Europe will raise government borrowing at a time when investors -- particularly those who lend money to European governments -- have growing doubts over the ability of countries such as Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Britain to pay it back.

"The Commission figure is significant because of the role EU officials will play in devising rules to evaluate 'toxic' bank assets later this month. New moves to bail out banks will be discussed at an emergency EU summit at the end of February. The EU is deeply worried at widening spreads on bonds sold by different European countries."

Part of the problem is that European banks were far more highly leveraged than US banks. Some banks were reportedly leveraged 50:1. And they lent money to Eastern European projects and businesses which are now facing severe financial strain and plummeting local currencies.

Let that number rattle around in your head for a moment: $25 trillion. Even $5 trillion would be daunting. But the problem is that Europe does not have a central bank that can step in and selectively save banks from one country without taking on all euro zone member-country banks. Yet, as noted above, some countries may not have the wherewithal to save their own banks. It is reported that some Austrian banks are hoping that Germany will step in and help them. Given Germany's problems, they may have a long wait.

Now, let's look at what Nouriel Roubini (www.RGEmonitor.com and professor at NYU) estimates for US banks losses. He puts the figure at some $1.7-1.8 trillion out of a total of about $3 trillion (I think) in total financial system losses. And Nouriel's base assumptions are not all that bearish, given what we know: a 5% GDP contraction and 9% unemployment, with housing prices down another 20%. All those estimates are quite plausible.

And a quick promotional plug: my next recorded "Conversation" will be with Nouriel and his staff in a few weeks. See the link at the end of the letter to make sure you get your copy.

Geithner: "You Can't Handle the Truth"

The critics were quick to pan Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner's bank bailout plan as being weak on details. Which was true. There wasn't much substance in his speech. But let me offer a contrarian view. Geithner and the team around him may not be entirely tone deaf. They are very smart people and are surely in contact with major Wall Street figures, and would know that the lack of detail would disappoint.

Pretty much everyone knows the scene from A Few Good Men, where Jack Nicholson tells Tom Cruise, "You can't handle the truth!" (www.youtube.com/watch?v=8hGvQtumNAY)

What if the number that the Treasury and the Fed are looking at is a lot more than the remaining $350 billion in the TARP program? As in another $1 trillion more, or even the $1.5 trillion that Roubini says may be out there (and other independent analysts, like David Rosenberg of Merrill, say there may be another $2 trillion in losses). Can you imagine what the market reaction would have been if they had announced that this week? The Dow down 400 points would have seemed like a Sunday walk in the park. Congress would be screaming, and the chances for the stimulus package to pass would have materially diminished.

I don't think we know the real extent of what it is going to cost to shore up the banking system. But the consensus among the financial leadership is that we have to fix the credit system no matter what the costs, or risk a repeat of the Great Depression. That is the essence of what Irving Fisher taught us some 75 years ago, when faced with a deflationary debt crisis.

Time for a Reality Check

Reality check: The "stimulus" that President Obama will sign Monday is a band-aid. If Irving Fisher, who by some accounts was our finest American economist, was right, such a stimulus is useful in that it helps those who are unemployed and replaces some lost consumer spending; but the real work that must be done is to get the credit system flowing again. I don't have the space to go into that economic debate tonight, but it is at the core of the problem. It is Keynes vs. Fisher, von Mises vs. Friedman. It is, as Lacy Hunt says, "The Grand Experiment." After 70 years, we are going to see who is right. My money is on Fisher. It is not an experiment that is going to be fun to live through; but when we have the next debt deflation in 70 years or so, our grandchildren may know what to do.

We will see another stimulus package, probably by the end of the year. This time it will hopefully provide real stimulus. Much of the current version is simply an increase in federal spending that will be hard to rein in. And please, I am not being partisan. That is the analysis of many of Obama's advisors. And it goes back to the debate I mentioned. Keynes would argue that it is in fact stimulus. The other three economists would have differing views. And like I said, in a few years we are going to know who was right.

But the heavy lifting is going to be done by the Fed. Watch their balance sheet expand. And watch Treasury and the FDIC come back and ask for massive amounts of money to take over very large insolvent banks. Stay tuned.

Earnings Will Get Even Worse

Last week I said that 2009 as-reported earnings estimates for the S&P 500 would be dropping. 2008 earnings had dropped to $29.57 as I wrote the letter. They are now down to $28.60. One of my favorite analysts is David Rosenberg of Merrill Lynch. His forecast for reported earnings for 2009 is now down to $28. That puts the P/E for the S&P 500 at 30.

He also projects "operating" earnings to be $55 for 2010. And, as he writes today:

"For those looking for a silver lining, at least we are going to have a deeper bottom to bounce off. Applying a classic recession-trough multiple of 12x against a forward EPS estimate of $55 would imply an ultimate low of 666 on the S&P 500, likely by October if our estimate of the timing for the end of the official downturn is accurate."

That is a 20% drop from today's close of 829. That is not what you will hear from "sell-side" managers who want you to invest in their mutual funds and long-only management programs.

I noted the problem with the rest of the world earlier. 40% of the earnings for the S&P 500 are from outside the US. It is hard to see how those earnings are not going to be deeply affected. Let me reiterate my continued warning: this is not a market you want to buy and hold from today's level. This is just far too precarious an economic and earnings environment.

Given the probable ongoing bad news from financial and consumer stocks, plus the depressing news on bank losses coming down the road, why take the risk?

Orlando, Colorado Springs, New York, and Las Vegas

This Monday I fly out to Colorado Springs to look at a very intriguing high-tech start-up. As gloomy as this letter was, there are so many cool opportunities to get involved with new companies with truly world-changing technologies. Maybe it is just serendipitous, but I am seeing more exciting possibilities than I ever have.

On Friday I am off to Florida for a conference sponsored by Cain, Watters & Associates, and then back home for a few weeks (maybe) before I head to New York in mid-March and then to Las Vegas to be with Doug Casey and friends at his "Crisis & Opportunity Summit," March 20-22. Doug and his associate David Galland have really put together a great line-up. If you are interested in gold and natural resources, this may be a conference you want to attend. I always enjoy being with Doug and David, as they are old friends. And it is interesting to be at a conference where I am the "bull." Click to learn more about the Summit.

I mentioned the edition of "Conversations with John Mauldin" I will be doing with Nouriel Roubini. And the one I did with Lacy Hunt and Ed Easterling, where we talked about the economics "Great Experiment," is up! We recorded it two weeks ago, and I thought it went very well for an inaugural talk. The complete audio and transcript are already in the Membership Library. We are getting very favorable reviews. Multiple readers have let us know that the first Conversation was worth their entire year's membership. I am quite pleased with the first transcript and the response to it. After the release of banking data in early March, I will do a Conversation with good buddy Chris Whalen and a few real banking experts, on where the US banking system really is. I will offer it as a bonus to those who have already subscribed, as it will be more me asking questions than a real Conversation. I expect it to be very informative.

The regular price for a yearly subscription is $199, but you can subscribe now for $109 and still get access to the timely Conversation with Ed and Lacy. Don't wait, as I am sure my staff will only keep raising the price. To find out more, just click on the link and put in code JM75, which will give you the discounted price. https://www.johnmauldin.com/newsletters2.html

And for organizations that would like to purchase a discounted multiple subscription for all their brokers or partners, just drop Tiffani a note at conversations@2000wave.com and she will get back to you.

It is late and time to hit the send button. Have a great week, and enjoy the holiday weekend in the US!

Your on the lookout for more opportunities analyst,

John Mauldin

The Curve in the Road

John Mauldin — Sat, 04 Oct 2008 03:23:33 GMT

The Curve in the Road
Necessary but Not Sufficient
Why the Government Had to Step In
All the King's Horses
How Can I Be 59?

The "Bailout Plan" was passed. Will it work? The answer depends on what your definition of "work" is. If by work you mean no more government intervention and no further costly programs and a functioning market, then the answer is no. But there are things it will do. This week I try to help you see what might lie ahead around the Curve in the Road. We look at how the rescue plan will function, see what is happening in the economy, and finally muse as to whether Muddle Through is really in our future. It will make for an interesting, if not very upbeat, letter, so strap in. I would like your promise to not shoot the messenger. I am just trying to give you some of my thoughts as to what may lie in our future. And remember, as you read this, we will get through it. There are better days "a'coming."

But first, a few housekeeping items. Let me welcome some 200,000 new readers from EQUITIES Magazine. I have recently joined EQUITIES Magazine as a regular contributing editor. My column, Back to the Frontline, is featured in both their print publication and at equitiesmagazine.com. I am excited to be associated with this esteemed magazine with a rich history covering the global markets for over 57 years.

They've once again agreed to offer any reader of mine a free subscription to EQUITIES Magazine. For those who did not take advantage of the free subscription the first time, here is your chance. You can go to http://www.equitiesmagazine.com/mwi and simply register to get the magazine sent to your home or office. There is also a link to an interview I did in April with them. They have a lot of content and free resources like "live" real-time stock quotes and "live" real-time portfolio managers. Check it out!

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(In this regard I am president and a registered representative of Millennium Wave Securities, LLC, member FINRA. And please read all the risk disclosures.) And now, let's jump in to the letter.

The Curve in the Road

When you are out driving on a strange new road, you can't see around the curve ahead. But you can read the warning signs to get an idea of what might be coming. And while we can't really know how the developments in the economic world will actually unfold, there are some signs we can point to that might give us a few ideas.

First, let's look at the "rescue plan" as passed by Congress. As I pointed out last week, this is a bad bill. But it was necessary to pass something, and soon. Earlier this week I sent out a report that reviewed a study of 42 major baking crises. The conclusion: navigating them successfully depended upon quick action.

As everyone should know, the credit markets are almost completely frozen. LIBOR is bid only, no offers. Commercial paper markets are imploding. And what is trading is often at rates that are much higher than they were a few months ago. Corporations are being strangled on high rates. Corporations have little or no access to normal credit markets, and they will face massive problems when it comes time for them to roll over short-term debt.

LIBOR has gone crazy. This is not an orderly market.

Look at the following chart from friend Greg Weldon. For most readers, the commercial paper market is something you don't think about. But it is the lifeblood of business. We have seen this market drop by almost 30% in a year and by 10% in just the last three weeks! I simply cannot overstate how serious this is. Left unchecked, business activity in the US would soon slow enough to bring thoughts of the Great Depression. It will not be left unchecked.

The credit crisis is not simply a Wall Street issue. It has fast become a Main Street issue. And Main Street is where jobs are created and maintained.

As I have said repeatedly for months, the problem is that financial institutions are having to deleverage. They have massive losses and simply have to raise capital in order to survive. If you can't raise equity capital (and most can't), one of the ways you do that is to make fewer loans and to take less risk. You also charge more for the loans you do make.

Larger institutions cannot raise capital on competitive terms. GE is an AAA-rated company. Yet they had to pay Warren Buffett 10% to get $5 billion, plus in-the-money warrants worth at least another 10%. Buffett is likely to double his money on this deal over 4-5 years. A short while ago, GE could get short-term commercial paper for a few percentage points. That difference is going to significantly impact GE's bottom line. But they had no real choice. They took the money.

As did Goldman Sachs. Yet another Buffett $5 billion preferred-share purchase (with more warrants) at a rate that even Goldman will find it hard to make money on. But they had to raise capital quickly, and they had little choice.

I had lunch with Michael Lewitt and Joe Harch yesterday. They were in town to meet with a client, and we took the opportunity to get together and share notes. They run (among other things) a collateralized loan obligation fund. They buy bank and corporate debt. They now have the opportunity buy well-collateralized loans from rated companies at prices well below par. They related story after story of debt from quality, highly rated companies selling below $.90 on the dollar, and some much lower.

If GE and Goldman are paying 10%, what do you think it costs a firm with "only" a B rating? 15%? More? Junk bond yields have simply gone ballistic. Firms which used the credit market to access capital now are simply shut out. If they are a small public company, they can go to what are known as PIPE hedge funds (Private Investment in Public Equity) and sell equity at usurious rates (which is what Buffett does but on a larger scale). But a small or medium-sized private company? It is a hard time to go looking for money.

Left alone for the markets to work out, the economy of the US and the world would be in a depression within two quarters and would need years to recover. Think Japan.

Necessary but Not Sufficient

Now for the bad news. The Rescue Plan was necessary but not sufficient to fix the crisis. There is going to have to be more heavy lifting, I am afraid. Let me offer a few ideas about what possible actions might be taken in the future. I am not advocating these actions, I am simply telling you what might happen. These are possible, because authorities will do whatever they deem necessary to avoid a systemic economic meltdown and a potential depression.

If you are a large investor or sovereign wealth fund which put money into banks last year, you are down anywhere from 35-50% (unless you invested in Washington Mutual, and then you are down 100%). You are unlikely to invest more in any financial institution without some very real understanding of what is on the balance sheet of the bank that is asking for your money. What the Paulson plan potentially does do is remove the questionable debt. The bank may have to write down assets in order to sell the debt to the government, but they end up with a transparent balance sheet with hopefully known risks. Then they can go to the market and try and raise capital. Shareholders will get diluted. Such is the way of the world.

Sidebar: taxpayers really must demand that someone like Bill Gross of PIMCO and/or other savvy market specialists run this new government operation. He offered to do it, and I think we should take him up on his offer. Taxpayer losses should be kept to a minimum, and I believe someone like Gross would do his best to see that would be the case. The point of this exercise is to restart the frozen credit markets, NOT to bail out banks. Some banks may get bailed out in the process, but it should be at a cost to their shareholders and management, not to the taxpayer.

I am asked, why can't private money solve the problem? Because there is simply not enough private money. Buffett offered to take 1% of the new government pool. If that is all the largest pile of free money in the world can take, why does anyone think there is enough private capital to take the other 99%? Insuring the mortgage bonds is not sufficient, because there is not enough money to buy them in this market. When things have sorted themselves out in a few years, I think the bonds can be insured and sold, and likely at a profit if bought correctly. But we do not have the luxury of waiting a few years.

Between the relaxation of the mark-to-market rules and removing ambiguously priced loans from financial institutions at prices which allow the government pool to make a small profit, if held for five years, that part (the lack of a known price) of the problem can be solved. Banks can hopefully buy themselves time in which to work their way out of the problems they created.

It is much like 1982, when every major US bank thought it was a good idea to loan lots of money to Latin American countries. It was a most profitable business, right up until the countries decided to default. Then every US bank was more than just technically bankrupt. In a mark-to-market world, every large US bank would have collapsed. It would have been the end of the world as we knew it.

What did they do? The Fed let the banks keep the loans on their books at face value. Over time, they worked their way through the debt, making enough money to be able to write down the loans. That was done simply to give the banks the ability to buy time.

We are in a very similar situation. We have to buy some time in order for financial institutions to heal.

Why the Government Had to Step In

I had a lot of readers write me very nice letters this week, starting out with how much they like my letter, my insights, etc. Then they (mostly - but not all – and politely) launched on me for backing the rescue plan. Many of you had much better ideas than what was passed by Congress, which is not surprising.

I really do hate the idea of having to support a rescue plan. It goes against my every instinct. But I also know that doing nothing would result in an economy which would blow right through 10% unemployment within a few quarters, and take years to recover. The stock markets and the savings of millions of retirees would be wiped out. Home values would really go into a tailspin. Being right in theory is not worth seeing that kind of devastation.

Herbert Hoover sat by and decided to let the market solve the problems of 1929. He decided to run budget surpluses and ignore collapsing institutions. Combined with disastrous Federal Reserve policy (raising rates in a recession) and Smoot Hawley (which caused major trade wars and a slowdown in global trade), what should have been a serious recession turned into the Great Depression and resulted in the conditions for World War II.

The rescue plan does not address the need for the increased levels of capital needed by banks. As noted above, it simply creates the conditions under which capital might be raised. Banks have already raised $440 billion. They have written down $590 billion. Losses are estimated from a mere $1 trillion to as much as $2 trillion. About half of those losses would be in banking institutions worldwide. That means anywhere from $200 to $400 billion more must be raised in order for banks to get back to capital adequacy. It is probably closer to the latter number.

Until banks are adequately capitalized, they are not going to be able to do normal business lending. Further, large deposits are fleeing banks. Even with the new level of $250,000 of FDIC insurance, there is $1.9 trillion in uninsured deposits. These are mostly deposits of small to large businesses and financial institutions, which can leave a bank at the push of a button.

Nouriel Roubini tells us that there are 800 billion dollars deposited in US banks by foreign counterparties. Up until this week, if you were a foreign operation, would you rather be in large money-center US banks or European banks? Tough choice, but on balance you would pick the US. Then this week Ireland decided to simply insure every deposit in Irish banks, no matter the size. Predictably, money started flowing from all over Europe into Ireland. National banks and finance ministers are furious with Ireland.

However, Ireland may have no choice but to backstop its own depository institutions to keep them from losing deposits and becoming insolvent from a bank run by corporations acting in their own best interests. Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg each took 49% of their respective parts of Fortis Bank in return for a massive injection of capital, declaring the bank too big to fail – also wiping out a lot of already diminished shareholder equity. Europe has its own quite serious problems.

But what if the various countries, one by one, decide to guarantee deposits in order to protect their own banks? If you are an international corporation, especially if you are outside the US, do you want your $10 million in Europe or the US if Europe guarantees your deposits with no limit? Could we see silent runs on US banks?

I think it is about an even chance that the government will have to guarantee for a period of time (say 6 months to a year) every bank deposit, regardless of size, in the US.

That is a staggering thought. The potential will be large for almost-insolvent banks to pursue risky behavior to try and work their way through problems. If such a policy is pursued, tight controls must be administered so risky banks do not offer high CD rates in order to garner assets. The FDIC must closely monitor such activity. Perhaps such guarantees should be for existing depositors and not new customers. Insolvent banks and those on the edge must be shut down quickly in such an event, to prevent risky behavior.

Unthinkable? I bet you there is a working committee of government and Fed officials thinking about just that very thing and how to do it. It would be even more scary if there is not one. We are in completely uncharted waters, and every contingency needs to be thought through well in advance. We simply don't need more last-minute Paulson plans.

In the next few weeks and months, I think you can count on more extraordinary actions by the Fed and Treasury to try and jump-start the credit markets. Actions which were highly improbable a few months ago will be on the table. Will the Fed open its balance sheet to non-banks? Possibly. If they can guarantee money markets, will there be a scheme to insure commercial paper at some price? Not out of the question. Will European governments take more equity in large European banks? Very likely. Will the Fed and/or the Treasury invest even more capital in larger financial institutions? Given that We the People now own 80% of AIG and 100% of Fannie and Freddie, it is certainly within the realm of possibility that we will be the proud owners of even more private institutions.

Again, this is not just a US issue. We will likely see similar actions in Europe and some of the developing world. This is a worldwide crisis, and the response will be from central banks all over the world.

Understand, I am not advocating these actions. I am simply trying to help you understand what actions might be put into place by the various government of the world in an effort to avoid systemic economic collapse.

All The King's Horses

The reality is that the rescue plan does not fundamentally alter the US economic landscape. There can be no doubt we are in a recession. I think it will be dated from the beginning of the year, notwithstanding the odd 2^nd quarter growth. The manufacturing ISM was a dismal 43.5 (under 50 means a contracting US manufacturing industry). Such a level is typically associated with recessions, as the chart below shows. Given the financial crisis and the freefall in auto sales, this index is likely to fall further.

The "good news" is that the service portion of the economy is right at 50, which means that at least that important area is not contracting.

Unemployment rose by 159,000, with nearly every sector affected. Almost 1,000,000 jobs have disappeared over the last 12 months, and it is likely that we will lose another 1,000,000 jobs in the coming year. Since December, the ranks of the unemployed have grown by 1.8 million, and those not in the labor force but wanting a job by 370,000. Almost 3/4 of the increase in the unemployed have been job losers, with half the increase from permanent job losers (not temporary layoffs). (The Liscio Report)

Next week we will explore the economic landscape in detail, but let me provide a few thoughts. As I have said for a long time, we will be talking about deflation this time next year. Recessions are by definition deflationary events. Given that we have had two bubbles burst (housing and credit), there is even more potential for deflationary pressures. Add into the mix the deleveraging process, which will take years to finally abate, and the recent bout of price inflation caused by energy and food will pass, as demand destruction for oil will hold oil prices in check.

As I have said for a long time, the next move of the Fed is likely to be a cut. We are now close to such an action. A 1% Fed funds rate is again a real possibility. I am not sure it will help as much as some market participants think, but I think it likely the Fed will move before the end of the year, if not much sooner.

Europe and Japan are also probably in recession, and it is likely we are going to see a worldwide global slowdown. It would be nice if the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Fed could coordinate a joint rate cut to signal that they are working together on the problems. I would not want to be short the markets that day.

At the beginning of the year, I was predicting a small recession with a lengthy and slow recovery period. I now think that the recession could be deeper than a 1% contraction. I think we could see a rather lengthy recession. Quite simply, the credit crisis has been allowed to spin out of control. That Congress almost failed to act is beyond belief. Given the above circumstances, it is not out of the realm of possibility that a recession lasts through the middle of 2009. As recessions go, that is a long time. But trust me on this, it will pass. The recovery will be a slow Muddle Through affair, though. It will be a few years before we are growing at a sustained 3%. Over the next few weeks, we will look at what that means for earnings and the stock markets. Investors who utilize a traditional 60% stocks, 40% bonds portfolio are not going to be pleased. We will look at alternatives.

Stay tuned.

How Can I Be 59?

This has been a particularly hard letter to write, as I know it is rather gloomy, and I wish had more encouraging news. I have been writing this letter for over eight years. Every letter since the beginning of 2001 is in the archives, so my record is open for inspection. I have no particular axe to grind. Since I basically help investors (in conjunction with my partners) find investment managers and funds, we can adjust the choice of funds and management ideas to suit the times, and frequently do make changes in the mix. My goal in this letter is to help us all think about the economy and our investments and to be as "right" as I possibly can. Sometimes, like today, that means not being very upbeat. But it also means looking for ways to go with the tide rather than against it. I actually hope I am wrong and the bulls are right. But that is not the way I see it tonight.

Tomorrow is my birthday. The years seem to roll by at an ever accelerating pace. (I had the reason this happens explained to me once. When you are 10, a year is 10% of your life. When you are (sigh) 59, it is 1.6% of your life. It makes some sense.) It is hard to believe I am 59. Maybe it is because I am around my kids so much, but I don't feel that old. Seven kids from 31 to 14 (plus assorted spouses and their friends) can do that. And they are all coming to town to celebrate next weekend, so tomorrow will be a quiet day. And Tiffani is already planning for a serious 60^th birthday weekend next year.

Life has been good to me, for all its ups and downs. And I firmly believe that my best years are ahead of me. I am simply having more fun than at any time in my life, with more opportunities than I know what to do with. I am blessed with great business partners. I have the best readers of any analyst anywhere. One million closest friends. I am truly one of the world's wealthiest men when it comes to friends and family, and at the end of the day that is what counts.

Thanks for being part of my life. I plan on writing for a long time, so take care of yourself so you can keep reading. And have a great week!

Your actually optimistic analyst,

John Mauldin

The Problem with the Euro

John Mauldin — Fri, 30 May 2008 20:34:42 GMT

The Problem with the Euro
Swapping out Commodities
The Euro at Par with the Dollar
Laguna Beach, Montreal and Las Vegas

By John Mauldin

Last week I wrote that we could see a drop in the price of oil as speculators seemed to be storing oil in very large tankers and "slow steaming" them to port in a bet that prices would rise. When everyone is on the same side of the trade, the time is right for a reversal. This is especially true when there is a large potential supply sitting on the sidelines.

This week we briefly look at this prediction, and perhaps even more ominous problems for commodities in general, at least in the short run. The new turn our attention to the euro. It will make for an interesting letter.

First off, oil dropped about 4% yesterday and is down almost $10 from its high only a week ago. Yet supplies of crude oil surprisingly dropped by 8.8 million barrels yesterday. Oil shot up on the news as both those who were short covered their bets and even more people piled into the long side of the trade.

But then the EIA report gave the rest of the story. It seems the shortfall "was due to temporary delays in crude oil tanker off-loadings on the Gulf Coast." And as Dennis Gartman noted this morning, "officials at the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) said

that some crude oil tankers cancelled scheduled deliveries last week." The owners of the oil in those tankers are now down about 6-7%, whether it is speculators in the pits or the actual trading companies.

I talked with George Friedman of Stratfor this morning, and he says that the supply of tankers is even tighter, which suggests there is even more oil on the seas looking for a home. Crude oil prices could be under pressure in the next few weeks and months as whoever holds that oil is going to want to get it onshore somewhere and out of very expensive tankers.

Swapping out Commodities

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission announced yesterday that they are looking very hard at possibly closing a regulatory loophole that allowed some extremely large commodity index funds to get around position limits. For those not familiar with the concept of limits, it basically works like this. No trader or fund is allowed to own more than a specific amount of a commodity traded on the futures exchange. This limit varies from commodity to commodity and exchange to exchange. The point is to keep one group from manipulating the price of a commodity, as the Hunts did with silver in the early 80s.

The loophole is one where large investment banks can sell a "swap" for a specific commodity like corn and then hedge their position in the futures markets. There is no limit on the amount of the commodity that can be hedged. So, a fund can accumulate sizeable positions far in excess of what they could do directly by working with an investment bank. In essence, the swap is a derivative issued by a bank which acts just like a futures trade, but it is with the bank as guarantor and not an exchange. Swaps are not regulated as such. And up until now, the banks were seen as legitimate hedgers so there were no limits on what they could buy in the futures markets.

This works for very large commodity index funds which try to mirror a particular commodity index and need to be able to buy very large positions in excess of the normal limits (and there are scores of them), and for the banks that make the commissions and profits on the swaps. Remember, the fund gets a management fee, so growing the size of the fund grows their fees.

These indexes typically have about 26 commodities, with the largest allocation to oil, but almost anything that is traded has some small portion of the allocation. As I noted last week, there are some who believe this is working to drive up the price of commodities beyond the simply supply and demand principles. Whether or not you believe this to be the case, the CFTC is looking at the loophole.

The key word in the announcement yesterday was the word "classification." Right now the banks are classified as hedgers and as such have no limits. But they are not really hedging the actual physical commodity as a farmer or General Mills might do, but the hedge is their financial position.

If the CFTC decides to look through them to the funds, and they did use the word transparency in their announcement, they could decide to change the classification of the banks from hedgers to speculators. While I do no think that might make a difference in the long run, in the short run it could make commodities volatile in the extreme, and exert downward pressure up and down the price curve, depending on how they would decide to unwind the commodity index funds.

For what its worth, I advised my daughter to get out of the commodity fund she was in for the time being. When the regulators are in the room, anything could happen. And they are getting intense pressure from Congress to change the rules. My bet is that the train has left the station and it is but a matter of time until position limits are put in place for commodity funds, including commodity ETFs. Is that a good thing? I think not, but that matters not one whit. The hand writing is on he wall.

Does this mean I am not a long term commodity bull? No, I remain bullish on a host of commodities over the long term from a supply and demand perspective. It is just that you might want to consider whether to stand aside for a time while the congressional elephant is stampeding around the room. Maybe it is a non-event and someone figures out a way to unwind the positions slowly and over time. Maybe the grandfather the current funds at the size they are today. Who knows? As I said, when the regulators are under pressure to do something, I want to know what the new rules will be before I play in the game.

The Euro at Par with the Dollar

About five years ago, I said that the euro, which was trading at about $.88 at the time would rise to $1.50 and then fall back to $1 over the course of a decade or more. It would be one huge round trip. By the way, giving credit where credit is due, that opinion was crystallized over a long dinner with bond expert Lord Alex Bridport and several companions in Geneva. The logic was compelling then and it still is now. We are halfway through that decade long trip and it remains to be seen if we get back to parity. I think we will.

Why would the euro fall? Because the currency is still an experiment in cooperation. At some point, one or more of the weaker European countries is going to need more monetary stimulation than the majority of the countries in the union, for a variety of reasons. Will they pull out to be able to issue their own fiat currency? Will the EU as a whole slow down as the US recovers?

About 4 times a year, I give myself permission to not write a letter, taking a little mental vacation. This week, Louis Gave is graciously allowing me to use a chapter from his latest book, "A Roadmap for Troubled Times" which highlights some of the problems the euro is going to face, as well as analysis on a host of topics.

Gentle reader, this is an important topic and Louis says it better than I can. I highly recommend you get the book and read it. It is only about 200 pages and is a very easy read. The chapters on China are worth the price of admission, as well as his suggested investment themes. You can order the book at Amazon.com.

So, without further ado, let's jump into the problem with the Euro.

The Change In Policy

The Divergence in European Spreads - Why Now?

Back in May 2007, we wrote a piece entitled "Part 2-So What Should We Worry About". In that ad hoc comment, we wrote: "The crux of the thesis of our latest book, The End is Not Nigh, is simple and goes something like this: a) Asian central banks continue to manipulate their currencies and prevent them from finding a fair value against either the US$ or the Euro; b) this manipulation triggers an accumulation in central bank reserves which, in turn, leads to low real rates around the world; c) the combination of low global real rates and low Asian exchange rates amounts to a subsidy for Asian production and Western consumption; d) in the US, the subsidy has by and large been captured by individual consumers; e) meanwhile, in Europe, the subsidy has been cashed in by governments whose debt has skyrocketed; f) we see little reason why, in the near future, the subsidy should be removed; but g) if it were removed, the US would most likely encounter a consumer recession (not the end of the world); while h) Europe could go through a debt crisis (far more problematic)."

We went on and wrote: "Last week, and against most observers' expectations, the Indian central bank did not raise rates at its meeting. Instead, it seems that the authorities are allowing the currency to rise and hopefully thereby absorb some of the country's inflationary pressures (linked to energy and higher food prices). In recent weeks, the rupee has shot higher and now stands at a post-Asian crisis high. And interestingly, the local market is loving it. While Indian stocks had been sucking wind year to date, the central bank's apparent policy shift (from higher interest rates to higher exchange rates) has triggered a very sharp rally.

This of course is an interesting turn of events and we would not be surprised if Asian central banks were to study developments in India carefully over the coming quarters. After all, India is blazing a path that a number of Asian countries may yet decide to follow.

One could argue that a change in monetary policy in Asia could end up being a "triple whammy" for Western economies. It would mean that:

Asian central banks would export less capital into our bond markets and this would likely lead to a drift higher in real rates around the world.
Asian exchange rates would move sharply higher, which in turn would likely mean higher import prices in the US and Europe.
As Asian exchange rates start to move higher, Asia's private savers would likely start repatriating capital, further amplifying exchange rate and interest rate movements. This would also likely lead to collapses in monetary aggregates in the Europe and the US.

Finally, we concluded the paper by saying: As we highlighted in Part 1: Why We Remain Bullish, we are not worried about valuations. And we are also not worried about "excess leverage" in the system, or the threat of a "private equity bubble". We also do not fear an "economic meltdown" or a brutal end to the "Yen carry-trade" (which we did fear in the Spring of 2006). Instead, if we had to have one concern, it would have to be a possible change of monetary policy across Asia and the impact that this would have on real rates around the world. As we view things, the only reason Asian central banks would change their policies is if food prices continued to increase (in that respect, owning some soft commodities—a hedge against rising real rates—makes sense to us; as does owning Asian currencies). Interestingly, such a turn of events seems to be unfolding in India, yet no one seems to care. Monitoring changes in Asian inflation, monetary policies and exchange rates could prove more important than ever.

Nine months after that paper, we have indeed just gone through a period of a) rapidly rising food prices which have led to b) faster inflation rates across Asia, which have triggered c) a change in Asian monetary policy, notably a willingness to let the currencies appreciate faster than they have in the past. And if Asian central banks are now finally allowing their currencies to rise, then one thing is sure: Asian central banks will no longer need to print large amounts of their own currencies and accumulate US$ and Euros. They will thus also no longer need to buy US Treasuries and European bonds to the extent that they have.

Is it a co-incidence that, as Asia starts to allow its currencies to rise, US mortgages have been hitting the wall and spreads amongst European sovereigns have started to widen? The subsidy that Asian central banks have been giving to consumption in the US and governments in Europe (see The End is Not Nigh) is now disappearing.

Indeed, for the past five years, spreads of Italian ten-year government bonds to German bonds have hovered between 15bp and 25bp. But recently, spreads have started to break out on the upside.

And, of course, Italy is not alone. All across Europe, we have seen a widening of spreads between the "stronger" signatures (Germany, Holland, Austria, Finland, Ireland) and the "weaker" signatures (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain, Belgium, France) including those of Eastern Europe (Latvia, Romania, Hungary, Poland...).

Now as our more seasoned GaveKal reader will undeniably remember (see Divorce, Italian Style, or The End is Not Nigh), we have argued that spreads between Europe's sovereigns were set to widen for the past few years. And yet, nothing happened. Until, that is, we started to see Asian central banks allowing their currencies to start appreciating faster.

But what happens if Asian central banks now stop buying up European government debt to the tune of recent years? For a start, European money supply growth should decelerate rapidly and with it, economic activity. A bigger problem will then be the ability of European governments to raise further financing. Indeed, as economic activity tanks in Europe, and the Euro starts to fall, it is likely that investors will all of a sudden realize that governments only go bust when they issue debt in a currency that they cannot print.

In the past fifteen years, France government debt to GDP has moved from 35% in French Franc (i.e.: a currency the government could print at will) to 70% in Euros (i.e.: a currency that only the ECB can print). No wonder that Francois Fillon, the current French Prime Minister recently declared: "I run a state which now stands in a situation of financial bankruptcy, which has known deteriorating deficits for fifteen straight years and which has not voted a balanced budget for twenty-five years. This cannot last."

More importantly, the tightening-up of Europe's financial situation, and the widening of spreads between the "good borrowers" such as Austria, Finland or Germany and the "poorer borrowers" such as Italy, Greece, or Portugal, could have a devastating impact on Europe's commercial banks. Consider this piece of news from January 2008: "Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg, Germany's biggest state-owned bank, said 2007 profit will be about 300 million euros ($438.9 million) because of a drop in prices of banking and government securities. LBBW said it doesn't expect any defaults since the securities concerned have good ratings."

Less profits because of a drop in government securities? The careful reader may be somewhat surprised by this statement; after all, everywhere one cares to look across the OECD, government bond yields are close to their 2003 lows. So how did Germany's biggest state-owned bank manage to lose money on government securities? The answer, we believe finds its source in the funky regulations of Basel II. According to Basel II, an OECD country bank can sell a credit default swap on an OECD sovereign and this CDS:

Does not have to be marked to market (since it is assumed that an OECD country will not default on its debt).
Does not require the selling bank to put aside any capital on its balance sheet (since, once again, it is assumed that the country on which the CDS is written will not default).

In other words, for the past few years, clerks all over Europe's banks and insurance companies have boosted the bottom line with the "free money" that the sale of CDS provided. Every now and then, a clerk at the Treasury department of ABC Landesbanken would call up Goldman Sachs or Deutsche Bank and say: "I want to sell US$ 1bn of protection on Italy at 15bp for five years". And for five years, ABC Landesbanken would receive US$1.5 million without having to set aside capital on its balance sheet or take a "mark to market" risk on its income statement. Or so it thought...

Indeed, as the spreads between Italy and Germany start to widen something unexpected happens (a CDS will tend to reflect the spread between the issuer's debt and risk free debt of the same maturity. Otherwise an arbitrage could be made. If Italy's debt traded at 100bp over Germany and a CDS on Italy only cost 20bp, one could buy the Italian bond and buy the CDS and capture a "free" 80bp): ABC Landesbanken receives a margin call from Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank and, all of a sudden, what was a "risk and capital free" trade turns out to impact liquidity. Needless to say, this is the situation we are now in and this probably contributes further to the widening of spreads. All of a sudden, Europe's commercial banks are no longer keen to sell the spread as they have been for the past decade... in fact, they are most likely trying to buy back some of the contracts they wrote before they move too far against them.

In other words, a widening of spreads represents the worst of both worlds for European banks. For a start, it puts their balance sheets under pressure. For seconds, it cuts down their income as the writing of CDS on Europe's weaker sovereigns slows to a crawl.

For Europe's policy-makers, the widening of spreads poses a serious challenge which, if left unchecked, could cut to the very credibility of the Euro and the European construction exercise. It could also trigger a negative spiral such as the one we saw in the US whereby as the cost of borrowing increases on the weakest signatures, rolling over debt becomes more problematic, hereby inviting higher spreads etc... So how will Europe's politicians respond to this new challenge?

The widening of credit spreads across Europe reflects an economic reality. It makes no sense that say, Belgium and Ireland should borrow at the same rate.

The Euro 100bn question for investors should thus now be whether a) the recent widening is a one-off event and spreads are set to soon tighten again or b) the recent widening is the beginning of a more fundamentally-based re-pricing of risk across Euroland. The quandary now is whether politics can get us out!

In the mid 1990s, Europe's leaders got together and, in essence, said: "wouldn't it be great if we all got to borrow at the same rate as Germany?" And everyone around the table agreed that this would be a good thing. The decision was thus taken to a) create a currency which would resemble the DM, b) that this currency would be managed by a central bank with a mandate very similar to the Bundesbank's and c) that countries around the Euroland would strive to harmonize their fiscal policies (Maastricht Treaty rules and Stability and Growth Pact) to ensure the long term survival of the Euro. At the time it was also envisaged that the collapse in interest rates in certain countries (Italy, Belgium, Spain...) would give a tailwind to growth which would allow governments around the more indebted EMU countries to tighten their belts and clean up their fiscal houses.

The collapse in interest rates happened, as yields converged to the German rate... but unfortunately, the clean-up in fiscal houses did not. In fact some countries like France cashed in the "growth dividend" and voted themselves greater benefits such as the 35-hour work week.

Which brings us to today and the recent widening of spreads across Europe. This widening is a sign that the market is starting to acknowledge that the promises have not been kept. Thus, the best thing for Europe's governments would be to start keeping the promises that were made ten years ago. But of course, the main problem with that solution is that it implies that Europe's governments will have to tighten their belts over the coming quarters, i.e.: at the worst possible time in the cycle. After all, it is always hard for a government to pull back and shrink its size of the GDP cake... but in an economic slowdown, it is close to impossible.

It is all the harder to do when there is little political will for far-reaching reforms. As a former German central banker once told us: "I use to think that France needed a Margaret Thatcher, I now realize she needs an Arthur Scargill" (Scargill was the Trotskyite leader of the Miner's Strike). In other words, to get a government to shrink its size, you first need a serious crisis (or a scarecrow a la Scargill); only then do people accept real sacrifices.

And we should make no mistake about it: reforming Europe's welfare states will take real sacrifices. Take pensions as an example: for years, most European countries have run a pay-as-you-go system whereby people of my generation will pay directly for the retirement benefits of my dad's generation (actually, this sounds like what I do at GaveKal every day). In other words, Europe's pension systems are usually massive pyramid schemes; they work as long as the base grows and ever more people contribute to the bottom of the pyramid. The problem, of course, is that in a growing number of European countries, the base is no longer growing.

As such, the off-balance sheet liabilities assumed by the government in matters of pensions which, until recently, had always been self-funding, are now set to come back on the governments' balance sheets. Now the last time Europe ran a comprehensive survey of pension liabilities was in 2003... and the data back then was scary. We guess the situation does not look any better today.

Europe's deteriorating demographic and pension situation alone means that Europe's governments do need to contemplate serious pension reform. Or, failing that, to open their borders to workers from all horizons in order to keep expanding the tax-paying, pension- contributing workforce. Needless to say, neither of these options is very enticing politically. As such, rather than convince millions of pensioners to cut their benefits, or work longer, Europe's politicians may be tempted to try and convince a small minority of central bankers sitting in Frankfurt to massively ease monetary policy and print a bunch of money to help the governments meet their liabilities.

In essence, the scenario we are painting is a simple one: the credit crunch which has thus far mostly only engulfed the US is starting to make its way into Europe. And soon enough, Europe's banks will likely be reporting losses and write-downs, and investors will flee to the safety of the highest government bond paper. Unfortunately for Italy, Greece, Belgium or Portugal, their paper does not qualify as "high quality".

Now as we highlighted earlier in this book, a credit crunch typically invites a "three-step" plan policy response. First, one collapses the currency (to make one's assets and goods more attractive to foreign capital and invite inward capital flows). Secondly, one needs to see the banks recapitalized (if the market can not do it, then the banks need to be nationalized). Thirdly, one puts in place a very steep yield curve in order to force the banks to start lending again and the private sector to take risk.

It is obvious today that this course of action is very much the preferred path of, for example, President Sarkozy. Hardly a day goes by without the French President taking the ECB to task for doing so little to help Europe's liquidity crunch. But each time he does, his comments are increasingly met by responses from Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, for whom the independence of the ECB is sacrosanct.

The possibility of a massive easing from the ECB is nonetheless an interesting one and raises the question of how the market will respond to a more activist ECB. Would an ECB that did the bidding of politicians be seen as less of a Bundesbank and more of a Bank of Italy/Banque de France? And if so, would long bond yields across Europe be below 4% and the Euro at 1.55/US$? Would the foreign central banks that have been piling into European government paper remain keen to finance Europe's welfare states?

Another question, of course, is what would happen in the event of a bank bankruptcy in Europe? Would the ECB bail out the failing bank? Would the government of a failing bank be allowed to bend the EU's competition rules and nationalize the troubled financial institution? These are all questions with answers that remain unclear.

Of course, there is another way to go about dealing with a credit crunch: bitter infighting. This is what Japan did throughout the 1990s when the MoF would tell the BoJ that massive monetary easing was needed, only for the BoJ to turn around and say that the MoF needed to stop financing the construction of bridges that went from nowhere to nowhere. And as the infighting ensued, the Japanese banking system wrote off its entire capital base not once, but twice, over the course of the decade. Meanwhile investors shied away from all asset classes save the highest quality government bonds.

Could the same thing unfold in Europe? In Japan, there were only three sets of players (the BoJ, the MoF and the LDP) and over fifteen years, they could not seem to get the three-step plan (currency devaluation, bank recap, steep yield curve) right. In that regards, when considering the numbers of players involved in Europe, one may fear that the same policy paralysis could easily grip Europe. And, in this case, the recent break-out in the spreads that has now started will prove to have marked the start of a revolutionary trend for our financial markets: the end of the convergence trades and the start of the divergence trades.

A few years before his death, Professor Milton Friedman declared: "It seems to me that Europe, especially with the addition of more countries, is becoming ever-more susceptible to any asymmetric shock. Sooner or later, when the global economy hits a real bump, Europe's internal contradictions will tear it apart." Today, one should question whether the "real bump" is being hit and whether Milton Friedman will end up being proven right. But regardless of where one falls on the answers to these questions, one thing is sure: selling the bonds of Europe's weakest signatures and buying protection on Europe's weaker banks continues to make sense. It is some of the cheapest protection available against what remains a massive "fat- tail" risk to our financial systems. That's why we love this trade so much: the potential rewards are huge and the upfront costs still marginal. More importantly, it is a very good hedge against what would be a nightmare scenario for many financial institutions.

A Final Thought

In the next chapter of A Roadmap for Troubled Times, Louis goes into detail into how Italy might be the country to push the European Central Bank to take steps it might not otherwise want to take. Again, I strongly suggest you get the book. It is very thought-provoking and one of the better reads that I have had this year.

Laguna Beach, Montreal and Las Vegas

I leave with my daughter and partner Tiffani to fly to Laguna Beach in about an hour to be with Rob Arnott at his annual Research Affiliates Symposium and party. Rob arranges for some of the brighter economic minds in the country to give presentations. Harry Markowitz, Burton Malkiel, Peter Bernstein, Paul McCulley and Jack Treynor, among others. On Saturday evening, my good friends Vernor Vinge and David Brin, who have both won every award you can win in Science Fiction several times over, as well as being in the science Fiction Hall of Fame, will regale us with their views of what the future will look like. I get to moderate that event, and I am looking forward to it.

I fly to Montreal in a few weeks to speak for a conference put on by Canaccord and will get to have dinner with Martin Barnes and Pierre Casgrain. And then I will fly to Las Vegas July 10-12 for the annual Freedom Fest Conference where I will speak several times, but the line-up of speakers is as strong as any conference I have been to. Denish D'Souza will debate Christopher Hitchens, Steve Forbes, Ron Paul, Stephen Moore (Wall Street Journal) Charles Murray, George Gilder, John Goodman and about 100 other speakers, each impressive in their own right, will be there as will 1,000 freedom loving attendees. You can go to www.freedomfest.com and click on the list of speakers and register. Mark Skousen is the driving force behind the conference, and he does it right. I hope to see you there.

This will be a good weekend, as the food is always great and the intellectual stimulation is better. But the best part is being with friends and enjoying it together. Have a great week.

Your having more fun than ever analyst,

John Mauldin

The Idea of Europe

John Mauldin — Sat, 25 Jun 2005 01:22:00 GMT

Introduction This week we return to Europe, as what is happening there is one of the most important questions of the day. It is every bit as critical to our long-term world economic future as the valuation of the Chinese currency or US trade deficits...(read more)

Whither Europe and the Euro?

John Mauldin — Sat, 11 Jun 2005 01:18:00 GMT

Introduction What if the Malthusian doom and gloom crowd is wrong? What if the trend of lower population growth clearly evident in the developed world is echoed in the rest of the world? This week we look at a remarkable book by Ben Wattenberg called...(read more)

Forecast: The Next Ten Years

John Mauldin — Sun, 17 Apr 2005 02:12:00 GMT

Introduction This week we look at how politics and geopolitical events can affect our investments. We look at a decade-long forecast from one of my favorite information services: Stratfor.com. I change my view on the euro, talk about a possible Chinese...(read more)