Musing on the Markets : Credit Derivatives

We (Still) Don't Know What We Don't Know

Vinny Catalano, CFA — Thu, 19 Nov 2009 02:08:00 GMT

So, here we are. More than two years into what started out as a credit crisis, one plus year after the Lehman collapse and a question that pertains to the one of the central workings of the equities market cannot be answered.

At last evening's Market Technicians Association Educational Foundation seminar, the question your trusty moderator (that's me) posed to the esteemed panel with its decades of experience was in regards to volume. Specifically, the equity markets' volume as recorded each day for every stock traded. That is, the volume that accompanies the price action that results in the market capitalization of the stock market that results in the market value of every investor's portfolio.

Many market analysts have noted the low volume that has accompanied this bull rally. Some have used this fact as a reason to be more cautious, even bearish. Others have cited that low volume bull rallies have occurred in the past and this one is no different. However, in the past, the volume recorded for equity trades completed were quite accurate and reliable, being recorded on exchanges and reported accordingly. Today, the picture is not quite so clear.

With so much trading occurring in the off the exchanges hidden recesses of dark pools and structured products, I asked my very knowledgeable panel, can any investor rely on the volume figures being generated in this current market to measure the strength of the price action of a stock? The answer received was, "We don't know". Well, if this well connected, highly informed group of individuals doesn't know, you can easily assume that just about no one knows. Do you?

The importance of understanding this issue goes beyond its impact on basic market analysis tools (such as technical analysis) and cuts to the heart of a financial system that is still shrouded in opaqueness.

Transparency remains elusive. Yet, transparency (knowing what investors need to know) is vital to the restoration of a sustained confidence in a system that can be measured. When trades occur in the dark corners of dark pools and other off-exchange structured products, clarity as to what exactly is transpiring becomes the victim and investors seeking to measure the market become the equivalent of a bystander to a drive-by financial shooting.

Investment Strategy Implications

Nothing increases the risk factor of any investment more than the dangers posed by ignorance. Yet, here we are. More than two years into what started out as a credit crisis, one plus year after the Lehman collapse and we still don't have a clear idea of what exactly is transpiring in a central part of the capital markets - equities.

For those who might be tempted to dismiss such concerns I simply point to the two key impacts of changing equity prices: the wealth effect and the cost of capital. Both directly impact the real economy, in the current case in a positive way. Were it not for rising market values, the current government policies designed to rescue the US (and global) economy would be brought into doubt. And doubt, a close cousin of uncertainty, is a bad thing for a fragile economic environment.

Price without volume is an incomplete measure of the strength (or weakness) of a market move. Yet, in the current environment, price is the only metric that can be tracked with clarity. Volume, its indicator of power, cannot.

Two years and running and we still don't know what we don't know.

To further the exploration of what we don't know tomorrow I will describe how hedge fund replication products pose a potential threat to the equity markets.

Vinny Catalano, CFA, Global Investment Strategist with Blue Marble Research publishes the "Sectors and Styles Strategy Report" newsletter, which contains the market beating Model Growth Portfolio. To learn about subscribing as well as other benefits, click here.

Beyond the Sound Bite: An Interview with Susanne Trimbath, Ph. D.

Vinny Catalano, CFA — Wed, 09 Sep 2009 15:26:00 GMT

My interview with the CEO and Chief Economist of STP Advisory Services includes her libertarian perspectives on the virtuous circle, the risks in the Fed's exit strategy, key consequences of financial innovation, and the next global financial crisis: public debt. Dr. Trimbath is also the author of "Beyond Junk Bonds: Expanding High Yield Markets".

The length of the interview is 18 minutes 28 seconds.

(Please visit the site to view this media)

Beyond the Sound Bite: An Interview with Gillian Tett

Vinny Catalano, CFA — Wed, 05 Aug 2009 19:33:00 GMT

My interview with the assistant editor of the Financial Times and author of "Fool's Gold" includes key aspects of financial innovation, the consequences of a reluctance to lend by financial institutions, the utility qualities of the financial services industry, and the transitional nature of both the financial services industry and the global economy.

The length of the interview is 16 minutes 24 seconds.

(Please visit the site to view this media)

In Defense of Financial Innovation

Vinny Catalano, CFA — Tue, 07 Apr 2009 13:55:00 GMT

There is considerable talk (much of it rather regressive) about the future of the financial system. In one camp are the advocates of a return to basic banking. Think George Bailey and “It’s a Wonderful Life”. Paul Krugman, John Bogle, and Meredith Whitney appear to belong to this group. Then there are those who believe that the system should evolve from where it was, only with better oversight and far greater transparency. By all accounts, Secretary Geithner and Mohammed El-Erian belong to this group.

As unpopular as it currently may be, I’m on the side of the Treasury Secretary and PIMCO CEO for the following reasons:

I believe financial innovation must be allowed to grow and even flourish as the benefits of risk management and opportunistic investing through derivatives, structured finance, and other heretofore unknown instruments is vital to the complex world of globalization. Financial innovation allows for the more efficient use of capital in new and innovative ways thereby enabling greater growth potential across most markets and economies. Perhaps most importantly, as providers of global capital, financial innovation is important to the dominant players in the markets - major institutional investors (pension fund, endowments, hedge funds, etc) - and their ability to manage large sums of money in the vast and growing global markets and economy. They want it. Even need it.

The George Bailey model is simplification for its own sake. A Luddite-like natural recoil action to the pain and suffering caused by the failure of proper oversight and transparency. Moreover, the Bailey model would relegate the US financial institutions to a dumbed-down version of finance completely at odds with a globalized world and economic system (not to mention the unintended consequences of assets flowing to other, more forward-thinking markets). I believe Secretary Geithner sees and understands this and that is why, much to the consternation of many old school thinkers, he is intent on keeping the current financial infrastructure in place, just fix that which went out of control via limited oversight and inadequate transparency.

With better oversight and greater transparency, the benefits of financial innovation to the global economic system far outweigh the damage wrought by the inept supervision of a complex world of finance.

Think of it this way, did FDR blow up the stock market after the 1929 to 32 crash? What he did was create the SEC, which served the system well until the free market ideologues got control of it over the past several decades and, with the aid of financial innovation, allowed the animal spirits to run roughshod over common sense. Another example would be the Internet and the tech bubble blow up. Did technology innovation stop because of Enron and WorldCom and the multitudes of dotcom implosions? Of course not.

Financial innovation is a tool. And like any tool, it can be used for good or ill. You don't ban knives because someone gets stabbed. You don't ban guns because someone gets shot. And you don't ban cars because someone gets run over. Innovation is essential for forward progress. And, in the case of finance, an enabler of better asset and risk management.

Financial innovation is the baby. Don't throw him out with the bath water of poor oversight and limited transparency.

Why Paul Krugman is Wrong

Vinny Catalano, CFA — Tue, 24 Mar 2009 16:01:00 GMT

Let me start by saying that on many levels, I agree with Paul Krugman. I read his blog regularly and find his work to be of significant value. I also share many of his political views and leanings. But when he makes the market efficiency argument, he has entered a space where he is wholly unqualified to roam. For in several of his recent postings that is, in effect, what he has done. Like other economists that I know, he is attempting to apply his social science skills in economics to the social science skills in investing. In this regard, Krugman is wrong on three levels.

First, to argue against the Geithner plan (accurately portrayed as seeing the problem as one of liquidity and not solvency) is argue that the markets AT ALL TIMES, IN ALL CONDITIONS know what the fair value of any asset is at any and all times. Yet, everyone acknowledges that the market for the so-called “toxic assets” is dysfunctional. And central to its dysfunctionality is their illiquidity. So, if certain markets for certain instruments are dysfunctional (which includes valuation) due in large part to illiquidity then why isn’t the conclusion that liquidity and not solvency the core of the problem?*

Second, if making the dogmatic argument for market efficiency weren’t enough, Krugman then moves into the math space and applies bizarro logic to the actions professional investors will likely take as they participate in the Geithner PPIP plan: “Let me offer a numerical example. Suppose that there’s an asset with an uncertain value: there’s an equal chance that it will be worth either 150 or 50. So the expected value is 100. But suppose that I can buy this asset with a nonrecourse loan equal to 85 percent of the purchase price. How much would I be willing to pay for the asset? The answer is, slightly over 130. Why? All I have to put up is 15 percent of the price — 19.5, if the asset costs 130. That’s the most I can lose. On the other hand, if the asset turns out to be worth 150, I gain 20. So it’s a good deal for me.”

The logic of this example falls on its face on three levels. First, no professional investor is going to invest in a 50/50 bet (20 points I win, 19.5 points I lose). That ½ point return advantage is all of 38 basis points of upside potential! Does anyone reading this believe that PIMCO, for example, will make such a bet? I don’t. Moreover, since the US government is involved in the process, it is equally hard to imagine that Geithner and Bernanke would allow the US equity stake to engage in boneheaded bid up purchases. Lastly, and most importantly, just what valuation methodology will the PPIP parties engage in? How about one that is rooted in sound economic principles, say, the discounted cash flow method. In the Krugman math example, no such sane and prudent approach will occur.

The third part of Krugman’s argument that is problematic goes right to the heart of his economic skills and the illogic of his thinking when it comes to asset values. Specifically, how will the economic stimuli (monetary and fiscal) that he so strongly advocates in favor of have a positive effect on the economy yet somehow have little to no effect on asset values? Specifically, how do trillions of dollars move the US economy yet asset values for the length of the “toxic assets” remain depressed, if not plunge further? Why wouldn't such assets at least maintain their discounted cash flow values?

You Know You’re In Trouble When Gingrich Agrees With You

Advocate views like Krugman’s make strange bedfellows. So, it is no surprise to see none other than Newt Gingrich sing the praises of Paul’s folly. At least, however, Gingrich’s argument is rooted in the political sphere as he tries to attribute motive to the Obama administration with statements such as “We are currently being run by a left wing machine that want the United States as we have known it to cease to exist”.** Whereas Krugman’s argument is rooted in the dogma of market efficiency.

Liquidity Not Solvency

The central part of the so-called “toxic assets” argument has been liquidity versus solvency. Those with an understanding of how markets work (like Geithner and his predecessor, Hank Paulson) see it principally as a liquidity problem. Those with Nobel prizes living in ivory towers see it otherwise.

I love you, Paul. But on this one, you win the booby prize.

*Of course, other factors such as the economic outlook play a key role in the depressed pricing. However, just as the case with the price of oil last summer, non economic factors play an exacerbating role.

**Setting the standard Republican fear mongering playbook aside, Gingrich’s arguments do offer an alternative methodology, which interestingly contain several very workable elements such as creating an online auction, let the participants decide the value, and cover the losses.

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Street Scan

Vinny Catalano, CFA — Tue, 10 Mar 2009 16:17:00 GMT

Billionaires are now Slumdog Millionaires because:

A. The credit markets remain frozen
B. The US economy is falling off the cliff
C. Corporate earnings are headed substantially lower (<$50 S&P 500 operating earnings)
D. The socialist programs of the Obama administration threaten capitalism as we know it
E. All of the above, and then some
***
from International Monetary Fund “Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) Market Update”
January 28, 2009

“Until now banks have managed to obtain sufficient capital to offset existing writedowns, but that is mainly due to the massive public sector injections of capital in the fourth quarter. The worsening credit conditions affecting a broader range of markets have raised our estimate of the potential deterioration in U.S.-originated credit assets held by banks and others from $1.4 trillion in the October 2008 GFSR to $2.2 trillion. Much of this deterioration has occurred in the mark-to-market portion of our estimates (mostly securities)*, especially in corporate and commercial real estate securities, but degradation is also occurring in the loan books of banks, reflecting the weakening outlook for the economy.”
***
Aggregate assets in money market funds (institutional and retail): $4 trillion (approx.)
Total market capitalization of the S&P 500 as of March 9, 2009: $5.9 trillion
***
from Dave Rosenberg, North American Economist, Merrill Lynch
March 9, 2009

"Beige Book mentions nine positive areas
Even if we still do not see a bottom in sight just yet for the economy or the equity market, there are sectors that at least from a macro standpoint have a relatively firm underpinning even in the midst of this unbelievably severe recession and bear market phase. We have said it once and we will say it again, the Fed's Beige Book offers up the most timely and detailed information on sectors. The most recent report that was issued last week contained positive mentions on these nine areas of the economy:
􀂄 Food production
􀂄 Pharmaceuticals
􀂄 Apparel retailing
􀂄 IT services
􀂄 Biotech
􀂄 Aircraft manufacturing
􀂄 Fast food restaurants
􀂄 Discount stores
􀂄 Environmental services

Positives outperformed the market by 800 basis points
While these sectors, on average, were down 8% between the most recent Beige Book and the one that preceded it in early January, they collectively outperformed the market by 800 basis points.

21 negative sectors mentioned
At the same time, there were 21 sectors that received negative mentions in last week's Beige Book. They are listed below:
􀂄 Travel/tourism
􀂄 Education services
􀂄 Luxury goods (jewelry)
􀂄 Agri-business
􀂄 Banks
􀂄 Homebuilding
􀂄 Electronic equipment
􀂄 Computers
􀂄 Motor vehicles
􀂄 Staffing services
􀂄 Commercial real estate
􀂄 Rails/Trucking
􀂄 Furniture/Appliances
􀂄 Health care services (elective)
􀂄 Oil drilling
􀂄 Metals and mining
􀂄 Wood products
􀂄 Media services
􀂄 Petrochemicals
􀂄 Construction equipment
􀂄 Semiconductors

So, for every positive mention, there were more than two negatives. The S&P 500 sector equivalents, on average, declined 26% between the last two Beige Books, and underperformed as a group by 1,000 basis points."
***
email sent last night to "Kudlow Report" producer Donna Vislocky in response to Larry’s plea for bullish commentators:

“On tonight's program, Larry said his producers were having a hard time booking those who were bullish. Well, here I am.

As someone who is now 100% invested, I am at the opposite end of when I last appeared on your program in early 2007 when I was highly cautious. Today, however, the picture is swung completely to the other side of the pendulum.

Here are a few bullish reasons that I am more than willing to debate a bear:

1 - Investor psychology is so thick you could cut it with a knife. Too bearish now, just like they were too bullish two years ago.
2 - A mountain of cash sits in money market funds - nearly $4 trillion. The stock market value for the S&P 500 stands today at $5.9 trillion.
3 - Valuation levels in many areas are very attractive and any upside earnings surprise would drive stocks higher.
4 - Technical analysis has recently begun to generate some positive divergences - downward momentum pressures have diminished, divergences (emerging markets, for example) have, uh, emerged.

Moreover, as someone who has criticized mark-to-market since March of last year, I am in complete alignment with one of tonight's guests, Steve Forbes.”

*emphasis added

Patience, The Lost Virtue

Vinny Catalano, CFA — Tue, 02 Dec 2008 18:09:00 GMT

As the alternate universe of derivatives continues their great detoxification unwind, financial assets struggle to comprehend a world in transition to a new financial and economic order. In the process, fixed income markets remain frozen while equity markets lurch from one end of the prospective economic spectrum to the other in near 1.0 correlation.

Investment Strategy Implications

The derivatives tail continues to wag the cash market dog. For traditional investors (those who still believe in things like earnings, P/E ratios, and Discounted Cash Flow models), the only path through this chaotic, cold-turkey transition from an economically juiced, over leveraged, structurally imbalanced world to a less leveraged, more balanced one (e.g., global growth being less dependent on the US consumer) is patience. The alternative is to sell everything and hope that one is smart and quick enough to time their re-entry point.

Investors (in the true sense of the word) will follow the former while traders will choose the latter.

Just How Bad Are Corporate Profits?

Vinny Catalano, CFA — Tue, 18 Nov 2008 16:02:00 GMT

Today's earnings report from Hewlett-Packard raises the question posed in this blog postings' title. To help shed some light on the subject, consider the corporate results produced thus far re 3Q08.

Compiled each week from data published in the Wall Street Journal (and produced for subscribers in each weekly report along with more than a dozen other charts and tables), the accompanying table* shows that when you exclude Financials & Energy, the earnings results are less than great but nowhere near as dire as the headlines and sound bites would led investors to believe. Moreover, the quarter over quarter results ex Financials show a net gain.

That said, several items warrant comment:

* Autos (Consumer Goods) had the largest swing from horrendous (-$42.6B) to just plain bad (-$2.5B)
* Broadcasting and Airlines hit the Consumer Services sector with negative swings of $17.5B and $3.5B, respectively
* Conventional Electricity (Utilities) were hit hard due to higher energy costs to the tune of $-5.3B

Going Forward

Needless to say, investing is a forward looking game. Guidance has ranged from cautious to the ever dangerous "challenging". Despite this fact, however, most bottom up analyst projections remain in what could only be classified as the enthusiastic category, as evidenced by 2009 S&P 500 operating earnings estimated in $90 range.

While obviously overly optimistic, the bottom up boys and girls' forecast may not be too terribly off the mark as lower energy costs and a more robust global growth scenario turn out to be two of the surprise events of the new year. Then there is the very serious prospect of write-ups in Financials as assets held get mark to market upward should any return to normalcy in debt and credit related assets pricing occur.

Investment Strategy Implications

Doomsday scenarios abound. The headlines are awful. And while the credit markets show some progress, the TED spread remains elevated as the improvement in LIBOR is offset by the deflation/depression fear driven levels in the 3 month US Treasury rate.

Thankfully, the equity markets are now past the November 15th notification date for hedge fund redemptions, which should alleviate some of the forced liquidations that have roiled stocks over the past six weeks. However, unmet hedge fund redemptions linger as something of an overhang remains (gradual liquidations replaced hurried forced liquidations) as does tax related selling by individual investors.

Lots of conflicting factors at play. Then again, what would you expect during the bottoming process of one of the worst financial and economic episodes in history?

Lehman Credit Default Swaps Announcements Today

Vinny Catalano, CFA — Fri, 10 Oct 2008 08:35:00 GMT

If you are looking for a reason why stocks are plunging, here's one major reason.

Today, at 10:30 AM and then again at 2 PM (both eastern time) announcements re settlement of the massive Lehman Bros. credit default swaps will occur. According to one trading desk source of mine, the equity markets are far more concerned on this point than are the debt markets. Earlier this week, the settlement of Fannie and Freddie CDS' were announced.

While the settlement of the Fannie and Freddie loans was enormous, the CDS settlement prices were more than 90 cents on the dollar making the CDS losses far more manageable (less than 10 cents on the dollar). However, as the Financial Times noted last week, "In the Lehman case, numerous banks and investors have already made losses due to exposure to Lehman as a counterparty on numerous derivatives trades. The auctions next week are for credit derivatives which have Lehman as a reference entity. There are likely to be fewer contracts outstanding than for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because Lehman was not included in many of the benchmark credit derivatives. However, exposure remains unclear,..."

Expectations for Lehman CDS' settlements are in the 10 to 20 cents on the dollar range.

Investment Strategy Implications

The equity markets are pressured on multiple levels. One of them is the forced liquidations due to client redemptions, including mutual funds and hedge funds. In the case of hedge funds, it is unknowable at the moment but can be reasonably assumed that despite having an estimated 1/3 of their assets ($600B) in cash, many have exposure to credit default swaps and may incur huge losses as a result. Hence, forced equity liquidations.

By the end of day investors should have a far better idea just how extensive the counterparty damage is. Additionally, knowledge of the credit crisis process and the methods by which it will work its way toward resolution along with the interconnected dynamics of and impact to the real economy will advance. However, the psychological damage to confused equity investors may be far more long lasting.

Fear is feeding upon itself. And the greatest aspect of this fear is ignorance. Tragically, a leadership vacuum is evident with the failure to explain to the American public (and the world audience) what is happening and why. And in the process, panic in all its ugly forms is running rampant and time will show that many equity values being posted today do not reflect their true intrinsic value. In other words, we are clearly at the point where, just as with many credit instruments, mark-to-market in many equities do not reflect their fundamental realities.

To view the Lehman auction results, click here

To learn more about the credit default swaps settlement process, click here

Cutting Off Your Nose to Spite Your Face

Vinny Catalano, CFA — Mon, 29 Sep 2008 20:16:00 GMT

Today, the House of Representatives has dealt a huge blow toward stabilizing the financial markets and avoiding a world economic crisis. The less than perfect Paulson bill would have accomplished that goal in numerous ways. One of them, which has been least understood and grossly underappreciated by most other than those who read this blog, is the method by which the Treasury and the Fed would have finessed the rules and stopped the gasoline that turned a house fire into an inferno – FAS 157.

The Paulson plan’s tourniquet that would have stopped the writedown bleeding is mark-to-maturity, the plan’s component that would have enabled Treasury and the Fed to finesse the insanity of FAS 157’s mark-to-market and ceased the graveyard spiral of lower values, more capital, forced sales, lower value, etc.

What Now?

There is still time for the House to come to its senses and immediately pass a bill that would be far better than the alternative of no bill. On the assumption that such an action did not occur, however, then financial assets and therefrom the world economy will suffer the consequences the likes of which are extreme in the best case.

Yet, there is an alternative, an action that could help alleviate the carnage, one that comes from the source of the carnage – FASB. A repeal or more likely a suspension of FAS 157 would go miles toward accomplishing what the Paulson plan would have achieved – stopping the graveyard spiral in asset values.

As for the odds of that happening, the answer is simply “who knows?” However, the consequences of no action by either the House or FASB are frankly unthinkable. Let’s pray for less principled outrage and more adult, common sense decision-making.

Unacceptable

Vinny Catalano, CFA — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 12:01:00 GMT

As the world listens to Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke argue for support of their three-page $700 billion manifesto, I wish to focus your attention on a central aspect of the credit crisis – the scale and scope of the credit derivatives octopus.

To illustrate, consider this: If scientists can “identify all the approximately 20,000-25,000 genes in human DNA”, and “determine the sequences of the 3 billion chemical base pairs that make up human DNA,” then why can’t the financial scientists identify the extent of the credit derivatives market?

This is a national, if not global, emergency. In such an emergency, is it acceptable to say, “We don’t know what we don’t know?” Or, “It’s too hard to figure out.” Nonsense. If this emergency were a war, would it be acceptable to say, “We can’t build that tank or missile because we don’t know where the steel is”? Of course not. So, why is it acceptable to say we don’t know the extent of the credit derivatives octopus?

Perhaps certain US government officials do know but they are just not saying so. Perhaps those certain US government officials reside in the US Treasury and Federal Reserve Bank. If so, then their actions these past anxiety-riddled months are about as inept as could be possible as a more comprehensive plan of action should have been constructed (from such knowledge) rather than the firemen Hank and Ben put out the latest financial wildfire this weekend, right now routine we have been treated to.

Investment Strategy Implications Along with the insane decisions to implement FAS 157 and eliminate the uptick rule, the outrageous neglect on the part of those charged with oversight of the entire financial services industry, and the fundamental rationale supporting each (efficient markets and laissez-faire), you can add the unacceptable argument that it’s just too hard to figure out the credit derivatives octopus.

In the process, the world’s markets and economies are now forced to experience a disorderly unwinding of the credit bubble – a disorderly unwinding that could have been mitigated had certain action steps, and the rationales supporting them, been avoided.

Sadly, today’s testimony will almost certainly contain a lot of shoulder shrugging “we don’t know what we don’t know, it’s too hard to figure out” statements. Unacceptable.

From Chaos to Sanity: The Imperative of Logic

Vinny Catalano, CFA — Wed, 17 Sep 2008 15:41:00 GMT

Rules Matter.

If the NFL changes its rules of play, does that not have an effect on the game? So, why would a rule change by the FASB or the SEC or a law by Congress not have the same game changing effect?

When the FASB said that illiquid and opaque assets should be valued at their last sale (or whatever could be approximated as such), were they cognizant of the impact it would have on financial institutions with their capital requirements.

When the SEC eliminated the uptick rule and looked the other way on naked short selling, were they cognizant of the impact it would have in facilitating the bear raids from short sellers? And were they aware that such bear raids would virtually take off the table any capital raising option via an equity sale?

When Congress let the financial innovation genie out of the bottle via various laws (mostly in the area of deregulation) and lax oversight, were they cognizant of the impact it would have financial engineers on Wall Street?

The answer to all of the above is apparently not.

Let me clear – the problems of excess amounts of leverage, animal spirits, and bad business decision-making are at the core of the credit crisis. There is no doubt that this is where the blame must lie. Be it no-doc, no-income mortgages, or homes purchased with the intent of flipping them in six months, or credit cards to teenagers in high school, the list is very, very long. However, the circumstances produced by such bad behavior are not the only culprits. For when coupled with virtually no oversight and the above noted rule, legislative, and regulatory changes, the bubbles that were blown are what the financial system is now struggling to unwind. Which brings us right to the single most important aspect of the crisis – will the unwinding of the excess amounts of leverage (the deleveraging process) be an orderly or disorderly one?

If left unchanged, the answer is what you see on your screens everyday. Firemen Hank and Ben rushing about to put out one financial wildfire after another.

But it need not be this way.

No doubt, there are many ways to achieve the same end result – a more orderly transition of the deleveraging process – but we’ve got to get beyond the reactive mode and become more proactive to begin to move from chaos to sanity. So, let me humbly offer a few immediate solutions to the credit crisis:

1 - Modify FAS 157

Change the rule from the insanely destructive and academically illogical mark-to-market to mark-to-moving average. By shifting the “fair value” reading from the last sale to the average of the past six months, you will get the closest thing to a reasonable compromise between the market fundamentalist ideologues (with their quaint notion that markets are always efficient) and the realists who know that in the short term investors can be anything but rational, especially when it involves illiquid, opaque assets.

2 – Require more transparency in illiquid assets

The FASB’s recent rule change for FAS 133 appears to be one such solid step in the right direction. More needs to be done.

3 – Begin the process of creating standards for derivatives

Financial innovation is not going away. And when conducting properly, financial innovation can be a very positive force for the real economy. However, when so much is constructed in the dark, in times of stress it becomes impossible to determine where the bodies are buried.

4 – Restore the uptick rule

Since the SEC has finally woken up and instituted sanity into the naked short selling arena, they now need to revisit their laissez-faire, market fundamentalist ideology and restore the uptick rule. By doing so, it will significantly the incentive for the pre-Depression era bear raids that are wrecking such havoc.

5 – Move with a sense of urgency

I began this commentary with a reference to football, so let me return to that metaphor.

In a football game, there often comes a point where time is of the essence. And those teams that are prepared for such times act with clarity and a strong sense of urgency. They may not always succeed but the process is the correct one. The current crisis requires such a sense of urgency. If left unchecked, however, the bear forces at work will continue their bear raids (on equity and debt) until the threat to the system becomes more than it can withstand. Frankly, financial Armageddon is not too strong of a phrase.

Investment Strategy Implications

The impact on the economy has now become so significant that lives are being impacted, most dramatically within the companies that are being driven out of business or into the arms of the US Government and for why? Because rule changes have altered the game.

The laissez-faire, market fundamentalism Reagan doctrine is dead. Over. Finished. Kaput. In its place will be (not is) a return to regulatory and oversight environment that preceded it. The danger is this is if the pendulum swings too far the other way and restrictions are imposed that severely limits the US’s ability to compete. Given the populist rant of the two presidential candidates, such a move to overregulation is not out of the question.

As I noted yesterday and Mr. El-Erian stated in his interview, transitions can be very messy. Let’s hope that some degree of clear thinking will produce the kind of results needed.

There They Go Again

Vinny Catalano, CFA — Tue, 26 Aug 2008 10:45:00 GMT

commentary from this week's "Sector and Styles Strategy Report*: Back on February 11th I wrote a report titled “What are the Sell Side Analysts Smoking?” The commentary and report focused on the excessively optimistic outlook earnings forecasts for 2008 by bottom up analysts. Excessively optimistic in that top down forecasts were substantially below the bottom up numbers.

At the time, the operating earnings projected for the S&P 500 for 2008 was an astounding +24% over 2007’s numbers. Whereas, the top down forecasts had operating earnings for 2008 in mid $80s on down to the mid $70s.

Since then, particularly over the past two months, the bottom up forecasts have gradually ground down to reality so much so that now they have now reached the slightly negative territory of -2.4% (see Earnings Outlook on page 3 of report*).

One might conclude that for 2009 the bottom up boys and girls would factor in more of the data and analysis from the top down crowd but that is just not the case. For 2009, the numbers are equally, if not more, astounding.

According to the recent consensus forecasts, bottom up earnings growth expectations for 2009 is a whopping +26%! Even after you exclude Financials you still end up with a +13.3% number. Excluding Financials and Energy gets you to 13.8%.

And, lest you think that this dream state is restricted to the US, think again. The global numbers are a cool +18.7%, up from 2.8% currently projected for 2008. Where does this thinking come from? How do you get such optimistic numbers when most top down forecasts (from economists and investment strategists, often in the very same firms!) are much like this year – closer to 0%.

I believe a major part of the problem lies in the process by which bottom up analysts go about making their forecasts. Specifically, when it comes to making earnings forecasts, many if not most bottom up analysts have a “silo” mentality, often acting as though there were no interconnections between their defined industries and companies and the broader macro climate. To be more specific on this point, I am not talking about your basic, tradition GDP starting point but rather the thematic and trend issues that are often hard to quantify such as the credit crisis and the risk of contagion therefrom.

Investment Strategy Implications There is no news in stating that there are many risks facing investors as the last leg of 2008 unfolds and 2009 comes closer into view. Yet, what seems to be news to many bottom up analysts is the interconnectedness and impacts from thematic and global macro trend issues.

Therefore, for the benefit of those who insist on using bottom up forecasts exclusively, let me offer that the great risk for 2009 is the one I have written about time and again – credit related losses that move UP and OUT: UP the quality spectrum (within an asset group) and OUT to other asset groups, such as credit cards, student loans, auto loans, and corporate debt.

This danger is tied to the economic pain that results from deleveraging, with deleveraging not restricted to the banking industry but to the US consumer as he/she comes to terms with the consequences of a negative wealth effect and the need to repair their seriously overleveraged balance sheet. The result would be more savings, less spending, an extended period of subpar growth, and a transformation of the US and world economy away from its high dependency on US consumption.

Reliance on the traditional and the standard methodologies during times of economic transformation and change can and almost certainly will lead to faulty projections that can be very expensive.

*Published Aug. 25, 2008. Subscription required. To learn about "Sectors and Styles Strategy Report" newsletter and other subscriber benefits, click here.

One Year and Counting

Vinny Catalano, CFA — Tue, 12 Aug 2008 08:01:00 GMT

commentary from this week's "Sectors and Styles Strategy Report:

“Of all the newfangled financial creations that have caused problems this past year, arguably the most nerve-wracking are derivatives traded over-the-counter…” Economist August 8, 2008

And the beat goes on.

On several occasions over the past year, hopes rose that the credit crisis was about to abate only to be dashed by yet another set of surprisingly large bank write-downs. Surprising to some but not on these pages. The risks from the credit crisis are far broader than originally thought and only now becoming grudgingly clear. And there is truly no end in sight.

Up and out is my way of characterizing what Nouriel Roubini has accurately described as the full scope of the financial Frankensteins created over the past decade. UP in the form of write-downs moving up the quality spectrum within an asset group. And OUT to other financial instruments created by the wizards of Wall Street.

Exacerbating the situation is the accounting rule change instituted last November, FAS 157, in which assets impacted by diminished demand produce lower values requiring mark-to-market write-downs thereby requiring new capital to meet banking related capital requirements leading to further pressure across the entire banking system. A vicious circle.

The equity markets are beset with multiple layers of issues – some, such as inflation, likely to not be an issue for much longer. However, fears of a global economic slowdown are now more real than ever, particularly when we get to 2009 and corporate default rates begin to rise as noted in the following chart* from last week’s NYSSA Market Forecast event (courtesy high yield expert Marty Fridson):

Moreover, according to Marty, the peak isn’t projected until 2010 at an 11% rate. This is the origin/catalyst of the $250 billion (net) credit default swap pain noted by PIMCO’s Bill Gross back in January of this year. So, if you want to see how banking losses get into the $1 to 2 trillion range, this is one contributing component.

Investment Strategy Implications

Last week’s so-called “Olympian rally” in equities must be taken with a huge grain of salt. As noted in several areas of this report*, the contradictory nature of the recent market rally is hardly the stuff of sustainability. Highly fragmented market action with little to no sustained and coordinated leadership provides no real investment comfort beyond riding the bear rally from its undervalued levels.

Until there is more market structure, an overall market neutral approach is advisable to take. Scalping any “lunch money” is also a good short-term course of action for a modest amount of money. Given the looming danger of a no-end-in-sight credit crisis and a 2009 that may stress test more than the banking system, the deleveraging process on multiple levels (banking, US consumer) warrants an above average level of caution.

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No End In Sight meets Mr. Alpha and Regression to the Mean

Vinny Catalano, CFA — Thu, 31 Jul 2008 11:08:00 GMT

“U.S. bank stocks may be staging another suckers' rally.” Reuters, July 31, 2008

From time immemorial the four most dangerous words in the investment language has been “This time is different”. Today, however, a new phrase seems destined to join the dreaded phrase group – “No end in sight”.

If an investor assumes that the IMF is correct, then the bank loss write-downs could reach $945 billion. If hedge fund investor extraordinaire John Paulson is correct, the number increases to $1.3 trillion. If Bridgewater Associates is correct, the number rises further to $1.6 trillion. And the top end of Nouriel Roubini’s disaster scenario range is a cool $2 trillion.

At under $500 billion in losses taken thus far, “no end in sight” is an apt phrase.

But, to quote the Joker, “Why so serious?”

Investment Strategy Implications While the relief certain investors may feel due to Merrill’s actions may be premature, investment strategy considerations drive the current portfolio decision-making process. For, if an investor has been fortunate enough to have produced alpha thus far this year – for example, portfolio and investment strategy decisions made in the Model Growth Portfolio (MGP) have yielded over 300 basis points of alpha thus far this year – then the real risk may not be the next plunge in equities (that’s coming) but the danger in not exploiting the near-term momentum game courtesy hedge fund momentum players and thereby losing valuable alpha in any short-term bear market rally.

Therefore, the appropriate current investment strategy appears to be largely a market neutral one. With an undervalued market and no sustainable and exploitable trends or themes at work, being fully invested – yet with no particular tilt from a sector perspective* – seems most appropriate. It’s only from a style and size perspective that a modest tilt toward the Smids and growth (as opposed to value) remains advisable**.

So, when Warren Buffett declares that the financial crisis due to “financial weapons of mass destruction” is “far from over”, investors should heed the warning. For those who are paid to exploit near term market moves, however, an undervalued market dominated by hedge fund momentum players is too hard to ignore and an investor stands to lose a considerable amount of hard won alpha***.

No end in sight is real. However, regression to the mean in an undervalued market may take precedence for the time being.

*The MGP is strongly underweight Energy. This will change shortly pending their 2Q08 earnings reports, the potential of negative political influences therefrom, and technical analysis considerations.

**This, however, would change should the recent weak relative performance of the Smid growth styles continue.

***If wrong, then the absolute performance will suffer, no doubt, but the alpha remains largely unchanged.

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